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OVERVIEW

One of the major strains of feminist jurisprudence has criticized
American law, and the liberal jurisprudence and political philosophy on
which it is said to be grounded, as male or masculine.' A central theme
of the critique has been that the law embodies a masculine perspective in
emphasizing autonomy and the individual over interdependency and the
community. Liberalism has been viewed as inextricably masculine in its
model of separate, atomistic, competing individuals establishing a legal
system to pursue their own interests and to protect them from others'
interference with their rights to do so.2 Hence, it is said that liberal,
1. The body of scholarship called "feminist jurisprudence" has emerged in the last decade,
although the term appears to have been coined in 1978. See Ann C. Scales, Towards a Feminist
Jurisprudence,56 IND. L.J. 375, 375 n.2 (1981). The most prominent pioneering work is that of
Catharine MacKinnon. See e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the
State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS 515 (1982) [hereinafter MacKinnon, Agenda]; Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward FeministJurisprudence,8 SIGNS
635 (1983) [hereinafter MacKinnon, Toward], reprintedin CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD
A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 3-12, 171-83 (1989). For recent attempts to divide feminist
jurisprudence into stages or phases, see Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence:Grounding the
Theories, 4 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 191 (1990); Martha Minow, Introduction:Finding Our Paradoxes, Affirming Our Beyond, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.REv. 1 (1989). Feminist jurisprudence grows
out of an extensive literature about women and the law and advocacy for women's rights.
2. "Liberalism" as it appears in feminist jurisprudence includes a wide range of historical and
contemporary political philosophy and jurisprudence from Thomas Hobbes to Robert Nozick. See,
e.g., Robin West, Jurisprudenceand Gender, 55 U. CHI. L.REV. 1 (1988). See generally ALISON M.
JAGGAR, FEMINIST POLITICS AND HUMAN NATURE (1983) (including Hobbes as a liberal). Feminists have included in "modem" or "masculine" jurisprudence not only liberal jurisprudence but
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masculine jurisprudence has exalted rights over responsibilities, separateness over connection, and the individual over the community.3
Feminist jurisprudence has sought to bring the experience and voice
of women to the jurisprudential enterprise,4 proposing an alternative
conception of the person-or, at least, of women -based on female experience of the world, feminine nature, or a "different voice."' An alternative vision often articulated is one of interdependency, connection,
responsibility, and caring. A key claim of "relational feminism" is that
persons should be viewed in the context of relationships, not as separate,
"autonomous individuals." 6 In contrast to liberal social contract theories, models emphasizing care and mothering have been proposed. Feminists have advocated reform of the legal system and a reconception of law
to recognize human interdependency and connection and to promote
responsibility. The goal is often expressed as supplementing or replacing
an "ethic of justice," based on conceptions of rights and rules, with an
"ethic of care," based on notions of responsibility and relationships.7
This Article looks at the model of "atomistic man" that is claimed
by much of feminist jurisprudence to be at the root of liberalism and the
legal system. I shall argue that the feminist critique of liberalism as
presenting an atomistic and unconnected conception of the person
attacks a caricatured picture of liberalism. By "caricature" I mean an
exaggeration that is not without some basis in fact, particularly as to
certain historical and even contemporary forms of liberalism, 8 but that is
also the Critical Legal Studies movement as well as conservative or libertarian thought. See, e.g.,
West, supra; Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 72
VA. L. REv. 543 (1986).
3. Feminist jurisprudence contains many different emphases and approaches. My focus is on
what might be called "relational feminism" or "cultural feminism." See DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 307 (1989); see also MARTHA MINOW,
MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE 219 (1990) ("the relational turn"). In text, for simplicity, I often
use "feminist" to refer specifically to the work of relational feminists. But elements of the atomism
critique appear in work by feminists who might not characterize themselves as relational feminists.
Other proponents of a feminist jurisprudence have critiqued the maleness of liberalism in different
ways and have offered different alternatives. See, eg., MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY
OF THE STATE, supra note 1 (domination thesis).
4. For statements of the purpose and subject of feminist jurisprudence, see, e.g., Christine A.
Littleton, In Search of a Feminist Jurisprudence, 10 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1987); MacKinnon
Agenda, supra note 1; MacKinnon, Toward, supra note 1.
5. The most frequently cited source of an alternative vision is CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982).
6. MINOW, supra note 3, at 194.
7. These distinct ethics derive from Carol Gilligan's work in moral psychology. See GILLIGAN, supra note 5. See infra text accompanying notes 38-115.
8.

See. e.g., ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957) (economic

theory of democracy); ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956) (interest
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not accurate as to other contemporary versions of liberalism, most prominently the work of both John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin.9 I do not
mean to suggest that the feminist critique is intended as a caricature, nor
do I intend to downplay its significance for feminist jurisprudence. I am
not suggesting a simple identity between liberal and feminist jurisprudence, nor that Rawls and Dworkin, if properly interpreted, are wholly

acceptable to feminists on their own terms. Finally, I do not intend to
ignore the claims of feminist jurisprudence to be engaged in projects that
are both radical and distinctive. Rather, I question the simple dichotomies drawn to date between rights and responsibilities, justice and care,
and male and female jurisprudence and experience, and I attempt to

point to unexplored common ground. As a feminist with respect for lib-

eralism,1" I am arguing that there is more room for dialogue between
feminists and liberals than feminists have acknowledged and that such
dialogue might be furthered by revisiting the feminist critique of liber-

alism as atomistic.
The feminist characterization of liberalism as atomistic has been due
in part to the different meanings intended by liberals and feminists in

using similar vocabulary about the person. For example, feminists often
use "autonomy" to connote atomism, conjuring up the atomistic man

who conceives himself as fundamentally unconnected with or antagonistic to others, whose identity is formed independent of attachments to
others, who is self-sufficient, and who thinks and acts only out of selfinterest. 1 At the same time, feminists sometimes use "autonomy" to
group pluralism); DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (2d ed. 1971) (interest group
pluralism); see also ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974) (libertarian theory
derived from the separateness of persons).
9. Rawls's major work is JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971), along with several
subsequent articles clarifying and revising his theory, some of which are discussed infra text accompanying notes 158-240. Dworkin's major works are RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (rev. ed. 1978); RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985); and RONALD
DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
10. By feminist, I mean the characteristic commitment to the diagnosis and eradication of the
subordination of women. See, eg., Clare Dalton, Where We Stand: Observations of the Situation of
FeministLegal Thought, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1988). This construction should not be read
to ignore that certain feminist legal theories and litigation strategies, particularly those advocating
"formal equality," that is, that laws should not embody emplicitly sex-based distinctions, even in the
case of pregnancy, have been labeled (often by their critics) as "liberal feminism." See infra note 64.
11. For a classic discussion of atomism, often cited by feminists, see Charles Taylor, Atomismn,
in POWERS, POSSESSIONS AND FREEDOM: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF C.B. MACPHERSON 39-40 (Alkis
Kontos ed., 1979). See also ZILLAH R. EISENSTEIN, THE RADICAL OF LIBERAL FEMINISM 5 (1981)
(noting need for feminist theory to make "a conscious differentiation" between "a theory individuality that recognizes the importance of the individual within the social collectivity and the ideology of
[liberal] individualism that assumes a competitive [atomistic] view of the individual").
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connote self-determination or self-government. 12 The influence of moral
development and psychological theory upon feminist jurisprudence
might explain part of the confusion of the two meanings, as well as the
tendency to reduce the second meaning into the first. While autonomy as
atomism is not a necessary component of liberalism, autonomy as selfdetermination is important in both feminism and liberalism.
The feminist argument that liberalism reflects an ethic of justice and
rights but ignores an ethic of care and responsibility that reflects
women's experience overdraws the distinction between those two ethics
and overlooks the fact that both ethics can be found in liberalism. I will
demonstrate this point with illustrations from both the work of Rawls
and that of Dworkin. I will also challenge the atomism critique by examining relational feminist claims about the poverty of liberal legalism's
analysis of two issues: the "no duty to rescue" rule in tort law and
women's reproductive freedom. In examining relational feminist alternatives based on an ethic of care, I will explore how the resources of the
liberal tradition might enrich such proposals as well as the extent to
which liberal ideas play a part in relational analysis.
I intend this Article to open the door to further discussion about
how notions of connection and interdependency can best be translated
into law, but my primary concern is the accuracy or adequacy of the
atomism critique of liberalism. Liberalism and such key concepts as
rights, autonomy, equality, fairness, and justice need not be read as atomistic and have richer potential for feminist concerns than has been appreciated. Just as feminists have passionately sought to end the
subordination of women and to attack harmful stereotyped depictions of
women, defined by men as the Other, so feminists should move beyond
stereotyped depictions of the experience or thought of a male Other. 3
As feminists attempt to reinterpret certain liberal concepts for use in
feminist jurisprudence,14 it is important to separate out critique from
caricature.
12. See Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts, and Possibilities, I
J.L. & FEMINISM 7, 7-10 (1989) (suggesting both the atomistic and self-determination meanings of autonomy and indicating that both have been critiqued by feminists).
13. Cf. Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatistand the Feminist,63 S.CAL. L. REv. 1699, 1718
(1990) (recommending a feminist "middle way" by which "neither women nor men should impoverish themselves with the conventional categories of femininity and masculinity").
14. See, eg., MINOW, supra note 3 (attempting to integrate rights-based and relational
approaches); Robin West, Foreword: Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 HARV. L. REv.43 (1990) (offering responsibility-based defense of liberal rights); Nedelsky, supra note 12, at 7 (seeking to retain
"basic value" of autonomy, while "rejecting its liberal incarnation"); see also Mari J. Matsuda,
Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a Jurisprudencefor the Last Reconstruction,
YALE
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II. THE FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF LIBERALISM AND
AN ALTERNATIVE FEMINIST VISION
A.

THE LIBERAL PARADIGM OF SEPARATION VERSUS AN
ALTERNATIVE FEMINIST PARADIGM OF CONNECTION

1. The Atomism Critique
The charge that liberalism lacks a rich conception of the person

embedded in community is not new.15 Feminists have drawn on sources
of that criticism, invoking Michael J. Sandel, Alisdair MacIntyre,

Roberto Unger, and others.

6

In particular, Sandel's influential critique

of Rawls's A Theory of Justice has played a key role in the feminist critique that liberalism views human beings as essentially separate and disembodied from their social contexts. Robin West takes as the "definitive

restatement" of the "separation thesis that underlies modem jurisprudence" Sandel's claim with respect to Rawls:
[On a deontological ethic, where the right is prior to the good, this
means that] "[w]hat separates us is in some important sense prior to
what connects us-epistemologically prior as well as morally prior.
We are distinct individuals first, and then we form relationships and
engage in co-operative17arrangements with others; hence the priority of
plurality over unity."
Feminist critics have linked the construct of the social contract,
employed in some historical and contemporary liberal theories, with a
100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1387-92 (1991) (exploring ethical basis for accent pluralism derived from liberal
values of promotion of individual personhood, the goal of human flourishing, and noninterference
with life choices, but finding that an "even stronger rationale for accent pluralism lies outside liberal
thought" in an antisubordination principle).
15. See, ag., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMrrs OF JUSTICE (1982); ALISDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (2d ed. 1984); ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE
AND POLITICS (1975); C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALiSM: HOBBES TO LOCKE (1962); Taylor, supra note 11. Liberals have frequently challenged the
accuracy of such criticisms. See, eg., Allen E. Buchanan, Assessing the Communitarian Critique of
Liberalism, 99 ETHICS 852 (1989); Amy Gutmann, CommunitarianCriticsof Liberalism, 14 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF.308 (1985); Don Herzog, As Many As Six Impossible Things Before Breakfast, 75 CAL. L.
REV. 609 (1987); Will Kymlicka, Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality, 99 ETHICS 883
(1989).
16. See, eg., MINOW, supra note 3, at 151-52 (citing Sandel); Nedelsky, supra note 12, at 7-8

(citing MacIntyre, Sandel, and Taylor); Sherry, supra note 2, at 545 (citing MacIntyre, Sandel, and
Unger); West, supra note 2, at 2 (citing Sandel and Unger).
17. West, supra note 2, at 2 (quoting SANDEL, supra note 15, at 133, but omitting the bracketed introductory clause; emphasis Sanders); see also Sherry, supra note 2, at 545 (citing same pas-

sage from Sandel).
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conception of the person as self-interested and unconnected.18 Martha

Minow suggests that social contract theories, like that of Rawls, exclude
"any who would identify themselves as members of groups first, rather
than as autonomous individuals first." 1 9 In feminist writing about "lib-

eral legalism," moreover, autonomy is bound up with separation from
other persons and connotes the presocial self criticized by Sandel. Liberalism depends, it is claimed, upon a model of the social contract that
presupposes a paradigm of "contractual relations between self-interested
or mutually disinterested individuals" and "hold[s] out an impoverished
view of human aspiration."20
Liberal man, feminists assert, is atomistic, and atomism is at the

root of our legal system. Hence, speculating as to a relational feminist
alternative, Kenneth Karst suggests that the American Constitution was

framed by men who "saw man as an 'atom of self-interest.' "21 Suzanna
Sherry says that the atomistic liberal paradigm, founded on autonomy,
rests on a "fundamentally pessimistic perception of human nature and a
sadly alienated perception of self."2 2 Drawing upon older virtue-based

political philosophies like classical republicanism, such feminists associate the historical triumph of liberalism's supposed self-interested, unconnected individualism with the decline of holistic, intersubjective
communitarianism.23
18. For a discussion of the use of the social contract made by Rawls, see infra text accompanying notes 158-71. Social contract theory is generally associated with a number of liberals, prominently John Locke. See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., 1960)
(1690). Not all liberals, though, have used the social contract construct. John Stuart Mill did not,
nor does Ronald Dworkin. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (David Spitz ed., 1975) (1859);
DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 9, at 206; infra text accompanying notes 243, 270-71. And
not all social contract theorists have been liberals. Thomas Hobbes arguably was not. See THOMAS
HOBBEs, LEVIATHAN (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1968) (1651). But see UNGER, supra note 15 (apparently treating Hobbes as the quintessential liberal); JAGGAR, supra note 2 (including Hobbes as a
liberal because of his influence on Locke). Jean-Jacques Rousseau, also a social contract theorist,
could hardly be accused of holding atomistic conceptions of the person and society. See JEANJAcQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (Roger D. Masters ed. & Judith R. Masters
trans., 1978).
19. MiNOW, supra note 3, at 151. Minow also cites Sandel in her critique of Rawls. Id. at 151
n.10.
20. Virginia Held, Mothering Versus Contract, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREsT 287, 288 (Jane
Mansbridge ed., 1990).
21. Kenneth L. Karst, Woman's Constitution, 1984 DUKE L.J. 447, 486 (quoting RICHARD
HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION AND THE MEN WHO MADE IT 3 (1948)).

22. Sherry, supra note 2, at 549.
23. See, eg., id.
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Like Rawls, Dworkin has been criticized as a proponent of an atomistic, individualistic political philosophy and jurisprudence.2 4 If Rawls

has been associated with the disembodied individual, Dworkin has been
associated with an isolating focus on rights. In particular, Dworkin's
project of "taking rights seriously" has been attacked for focusing onesidedly on individual rights and ignoring civic responsibilities.2 5 For
example, West challenges liberal legalism for its "atomistic focus on
rights," such as the right of privacy, and its "insulation" of the rightsholder from public scrutiny. 6 She claims that "[p]recisely because of its

insistence on insularity, liberal legalism demands of the citizen almost
none of the so-called 'civic virtues': mercy, compassion, public involvement, fellow-feeling, sympathy, or, simply, love"; it "demands nothing of
the citizen beyond self-regarding behavior."'27
24. See, eg., id. at 565-66 (finding unconvincing Dworkin's denial that his version of liberalism
adopts an atomistic or individualistic view of human nature and Rawls's argument that, although
individualistic, his theory is not incompatible with communitarian ideals).
25. See, eg., West, supra note 14, at 46-47, 71-72. The supposed dichotomy between rights
and responsibilities in feminist critiques of liberalism and the prominence of responsibility in relational feminism's alternative vision probably derives from Carol Gilligan's contrast between an ethic
of rights, associated with an ethic of justice, and an ethic of responsibility, associated with an ethic of
care. GILLIGAN, supra note 5. Communitarians also draw similar distinctions. See, e.g., MARY
ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DIscouRsE

76-108 (1991)

(chapter entitled "The Missing Language of Responsibility"); the new journal, THE RESPONSIVE
COMMUNITY: RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES; Gerald Marzorati (moderator), Forum: Who Owes
What to Whom? Drafting a ConstitutionalBill of Duties, HARPER'S, Feb. 1991, at 43 (claiming that
vocabulary of rights is nearly exhausted, while vocabulary of responsibilities has yet to emerge).
26. West, supra note 14, at 69, 71-72. West has elsewhere indicated that she identifies with the
liberal tradition of Dewey and Mill (and, as discussed infra text accompanying notes 383-405, she
would argue, Havel), and not that of Dworkin. See Robin West, Liberalism Rediscovered: A Pragmatic Definition of the Liberal Vision, 46 U. Prrr. L. REv. 673 (1985).
27. West, supranote 14, at 71, 75-76. West indicates that she is not claiming that a responsibility-based defense of individual freedom is superior to one based on rights. Id. at 78. It is beyond
the scope of this Article to discuss at length the rights debate involving not only feminist critiques of
rights, but also those of communitarians, the Critical Legal Studies movement, and Critical Race
Theory. Vindication of rights and the pursuit ofjustice, however subject to redefinition or reconceptualization, play a prominent role in Critical Race Theory. See, eg., Matsuda, supra note 14, at
1331-32, 1392-93; Man J. Matsuda, PragmatismModified and the False Consciousness Problem, 63
S. CAL. L. REv. 1763, 1768-71 (1990).
Among relational feminists, Minow especially has sought to interpret rights to meet the criticisms of the left and right by emphasizing the "social" component of rights that she claims has
largely been absent from liberal defenses of rights. See Martha Minow, InterpretingRights: An Essay
for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860 (1987); MINoW, supra note 3, at 267-311. For other feminist
arguments that invoking rights is useful for attaining feminist goals, see, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: PerspectivesFrom the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 589 (1986); Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critiqueof Rights Analysis, 63 TEx. L.
REV. 387 (1984). Cf Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals From Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 401 (1987) (criticizing Critical Legal Studies movement for failure to recognize the importance of rights in black experience).
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Combining the feminist critiques of Rawls and Dworkin, to put the
point dramatically, we emerge with a picture of a disembodied individual, an unencumbered self, protected legally by rights shielding him from
community scrutiny and permitting him to pursue his self-interest with

no thought of responsibility to others. Liberalism, it is claimed, thus permits atomistic man to separate from others and does not require of him,

or even encourage in him, any fellow feeling or other attitude or behavior
fostering social cohesion.
2. Atomism and Connection

Yet feminist jurisprudence brings something new to the older critiques of liberalism, since its distinctive project is to reflect the experiences
and voices of women. Its critique has derived in part from empirical
work on the way women experience the world, as well as the way the
world treats women. z In particular, the insights of moral psychology
and object relations theory play a large role in providing feminist jurisprudence with interpretive constructs.2 9 Indeed, "male jurisprudence,"

with its emphasis upon individual autonomy and rights, has been interpreted by such critiques as the institutionalization of the male infant's
psychoanalytic drama of development, whereby connection with and
dependency upon the mother are rejected, often painfully, for autonomy,

which is understood as separation and independence. 3" Ignored is
women's "unique perspective on law and jurisprudence," which arises
28. For a good list of feminist work on how women experience the world, see Sherry, supra
note 2, at 580-81. For a more recent survey, see MINOW, supranote 3, at 192-214. It is outside the
scope of this Article to discuss the rich collection of feminist legal writing critiquing how the law and
social structures treat women and how gender bias and discrimination affect women's experience of
the world. Such diagnosis has been a central component of feminist contribution to legal theory and
reform. See, eg., ZILLAH R. EISENSTEIN, THE RADICAL FUTURE OF LIBERAL FEMINISM (1981);
Mary Joe Frug, Securing Job Equalityfor Women, 59 B.U. L. REv. 55 (1979); Sylvia A. Law,
Women, Work Welfare, and the PreservationofPatriarchy,131 U. PA. L. REv. 1249 (1983); MacKinnon, Toward, supra note 1; MacKinnon, Agenda, supra note I; Schneider, supra note 27.
29. The most commonly cited works are NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF
MOTHERING (1978); DOROTHY DINNERSTEIN, THE MERMAID AND THE MINOTAUR (1976); and
GILLIGAN, supra note 5 (drawing on Chodorow's work).
30. Perhaps the most elaborate model is Sherry's contrast of the "masculine" and the "feminine" paradigms. Sherry, supra note 2. Sherry claims that "development of the nation's ideology
has paralleled the individual moral development in the male pattern" and that this focus has "distorted" our legal system. Id. at 581-84, 591. In a dramatic critique of the "patriarchal paradigm,"
Ann Scales attributes the narrow focus on autonomy, in the male point of view, to the self/other
split encountered in male development. Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence:
An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373, 1384-85 (1986). But see Frances Olsen, The Sex of Law, in THE
POLITICS OF LAW (David Kairys ed., rev. ed. 1990) (arguing against an association of gender with
law).
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out of women's very different developmental experience. In their experience, it is said, painful separation from the mother does not occur, resulting in a built-in empathy and an association of identity and connection
with others.'
Drawing upon feminist theory about women's experience, West has
contrasted the "connection thesis" that characterizes the experience of
women with the "separation thesis" that characterizes the experience of
men, which she claims underlies modem jurisprudence. West's connection thesis is grounded in what she calls "material" experiences as well as
"existential" experiences:
[P]erhaps the central insight of feminist theory of the last decade has
been that woman [sic] are "essentially connected, not essentially separate," from the rest of human life, both materially, through pregnancy,
intercourse, and breast-feeding, and existentially, through the moral
and practical life.32
West argues that, on the separation thesis, women are not legally recognized human beings:
If by "human beings" legal theorists mean women as well as men, then
the "separation thesis" is clearly false. If, alternatively, by "human
beings" they mean those for whom the separation thesis is true, then
33
women are not human beings. It's not hard to guess which is meant.

West concludes that "[t]he liberal self at best reflects male experience of
selfhood within the liberal tradition" and is "not an accurate account of
34
women's experience."
One basic message that emerges from the empirical literature about
"women's ways of knowing" is that while men conceive of themselves as
31. See, eg., Sherry, supra note 2, at 580-85 (drawing on CHODOROW, supra note 29, and
GILLIGAN, supra note 5).
32. West, supra note 2, at 3.
33. Id. But West also argues that both the "separation thesis" and the "connection thesis"
have "unofficial" messages: Men (as expressed in critical legal theory) crave connection and dread
alienation, while women (as expressed in radical feminism) fear invasion and crave individuation.
Id. at 5. West nonetheless distinguishes women's natural, effortless state of connection from men's
craving to overcome separation. Id. at 40. Cf. Martha Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women:
Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1991) (calling for a recognition of the
danger to women of "separation assault," which occurs when men attack women to block them from
leaving violent relationships).
34. Robin West, Feminism, CriticalSocial Theory and Law, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 59, 85
[hereinafter West, Feminism]. See also Robin West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A
PhenomenologicalCritiqueofFeministLegal Theory, 3 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 81, 140 (1987) [hereinafter West, Women's Hedonic Lives] (while liberal and radical legal theory assume "to be human is to
be in some sense autonomous . . . [w]omen's lives are not autonomous, they are profoundly
relational").
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fundamentally separate and value autonomy, women conceive of themselves as fundamentally connected and value relationships.3 5 Likewise,
women view problems from a relational perspective. Minow has recently
called this message the "relational turn":
[F]eminist work specifically reflects upon relationships between people
rather than treating people as autonomous, with identities existing
prior to their social relationships. Feminists criticize the assumption
of autonomous individualism behind American economic and political
theory and legal and bureaucratic practice, for this assumption rests on
a picture of public and independent man rather than private and often
dependent, or interconnected, woman.3 6
The above passage intimates the feminist focus on the invisible but
important realm of caretaking along with the socioeconomic circumstances in which it occurs. The passage also suggests that, precisely
because of such circumstances, dependency and connection are problematic for women.3 7
3.

An Alternative Feminist Vision

Feminists have brought from empirical work about women's experience not simply fuel for the critique of the prevailing order-be it labeled
patriarchy, liberalism, male jurisprudence, or the like-but also material
for the construction of an alternative vision. Perhaps the most widely
cited source of an alternative vision has been Carol Gilligan's study of
women's moral development, In a Different Voice.3 8 Indeed, it is difficult
now to think about the content of such a vision prior to her heralding of
'39
a "different voice" and an "ethic of care."
35. See, eg., MARY F. BELENKY, BLYTHE CLINCHY, NANCY R. GOLDBERGER, & JILL M.
TARULE, WOMEN'S WAYS OF KNOWING: THE DEVELOPMENT OF SELF, VOICE, AND MIND (1986).

Minow has recently summarized some of the key claims of this literature. See MINOW, supra note 3,
at 194. It lies outside the scope of this Article to explore all of them.
36. MINOW, supra note 3, at 194. For an insightful treatment of the historical dualisms of
public/private, market/family, and autonomous man/connected woman, see Frances Olsen, The
Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1497 (1983).
37. See Katharine T. Bartlett & Carol B. Stack, Joint Custody, Feminism and the Dependency
Dilemma, 2 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 9 (1986).
38. GILLIGAN, supra note 5. Gilligan and her associates have subsequently published two collections of essays further examining women's moral development: MAKING CONNECTIONS (Carol
Gilligan, Nona Lyons, & Trudy Hanmer eds., 1990); and MAPPING THE MORAL DOMAIN: NEW
IMAGES OF SELF IN RELATIONSHIP (Carol Gilligan, Janie Ward, & Jill Taylor eds., 1988) [hereinafter MAPPING THE MORAL DOMAIN].

39. In its earliest appearance, feminist jurisprudence sought to bring about the full citizenship
of women, notwithstanding motherhood. See Scales, supra note 1. In her two articles in Signs,
MacKinnon advanced a radical critique of liberalism for its subordination of women through
notions like the right of privacy. MacKinnon, Agenda, supra note 1; MacKinoon, Toward, supra
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As informed by feminist theory and, in particular, Gilligan's notion
of a different voice, the conception of the person at the heart of the feminist paradigm is derived from women's experience of themselves as fundamentally connected to others. A legal and social system informed by
the "connection thesis" and the insight that life is lived in a web of relationships would not simply protect persons from each other through
rights such as the right to be let alone but might also recognize rights to

connection and care."° Politics and law would attend to interconnection

and relationships and would foster community by inculcating civic vir-

tue.41 Society would not embody detachment, objectivity, universality,

and abstraction but instead empathy, engagement, subjectivity (or intersubjectivity), and contextuality.4 z Some relational feminists seek to sup-

plement liberalism and law with the missing values of the different voice
and the ethic of care; others claim that a relational focus requires a com-

plete transformation of our understanding of law and that a true feminist
jurisprudence cannot be realized without the eradication of patriarchy.43

West has called for "reclaiming" love as the root of morality and for
introducing it into public life.' Similarly, Gilligan has identified the
absence of a focus on love as a target of the ethic of care. 5 West has

cautioned, though, that "we have not yet even articulated-much less
put into practice-a vision of judging, representation, and adjudication

based on an ethic of care rather than detachment, or a theory of law
grounded in love rather than in egotism tempered by reason.""
note 1. Prior to the absorption of Gilligan's work, the celebration of a feminine, relational voice had
not been prominent. But see Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis:Some Reflections on Culture,
Courts, and Feminism, 7 WOMEN's RTs. L. REP. 175, 189 (1982) (discussing feminist disagreement
over strategy in Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981), between equality ideology and those disassociating "female ethic of nurturance and life-giving" from "male ethic of aggression and militarism"); RHODE, supra note 3, at 306 (arguing that "American feminists have always differed over
difference").
40. See, eg., Karst, supra note 21; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice, 1
BERKELEY WOMEN'S

L.J. 39, 60-62 (1985).

41. See, eg., Sherry, supra note 2; West, supra note 14.
42. See, eg., Scales, supra note 30; Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory, 86
COLUM. L. REv. 1118 (1986).
43. For supplementation, see, e.g., Karst, supra note 21; for transformation, see, e.g., MINOW,
supranote 3; West, supra note 2; see also Scales, supra note 30, at 1381 (rejecting "incorporationism"
and cautioning that Gilligan's work "could... become the Uncle Tom's Cabin of our century").
44. Robin West, Love, Rage and Legal Theory, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 101, 107, 109 (1989);
see also West, supra note 2, at 65. West includes love among the civic virtues not demanded by
liberal legalism. See supra text accompanying note 27.

45. Carol Gilligan, Remapping the MoralDomain, in MAPPING
note 38, at 3, 5.
46. West, supra note 44, at 109 (emphasis omitted).

THE MORAL DOMAIN,

supra
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Despite the extensive talk about care in relational feminism, few
have elaborated on what care is. 47 As Gilligan describes it, the injunction to care connotes responding to the needs of other persons with
whom one is in a web of relationships, as well as alleviating the suffering
of the world.4 8 Care seems to entail both attitude and action, that is,
49
caring about or caring for as well as giving care to or taking care of.
Feminist talk about care emphasizes psychological attitude and motivation and often neglects the physical activity of caring or the social context in which it occurs." In her explication of maternal practice,
however, Sarah Ruddick speaks of mothering as "tak[ing] upon oneself
the responsibility of child care, making its work a regular and substantial
part of one's working life."'" Similarly, Gilligan associates the origin of
the ethic of care with children's need for attachment to a caring adult in
order to survive. 2 Feminists seeking to articulate a general theory of
care suggest that "caring be viewed as a species activity that includes
everything that we do to maintain, continue, and repair our 'world' so
that we can live in it as well as possible."5 3
4. Care and Mothering
Paralleling Gilligan's contrast between an ethic of care and an ethic
ofjustice is the contrast between mothering and social contract as models
for human relationships. 4 The experience of women as mothers is often
central to relational feminist ethic of care analyses.5 5 For example, West
argues that the mother-child relationship demonstrates that, unlike men,
47. See Bernice Fisher & Joan Tronto, Toward a Feminist Theory of Caring,in CIRCLES OF
CARE 35, 36 (Emily Abel & Margaret Nelson eds., 1990) (noting the absence of a strong secular
tradition in which to conceptualize caring).
48. See GILLIGAN, supra note 5, at 19-23, 100.
49. Fisher & Tronto, supra note 47, at 40.
50. Id. at 37, 38-39.
51. SARA RUDDICK, MATERNAL THINKING 17 (1989).
52. See infra text accompanying note 87.
53. Fisher & Tronto, supra note 47, at 40 (emphasis omitted).
54. See, eg., Held, supra note 20; Judith Resnik, On the Bias" FeministReconsiderationof the
Aspirations of Our Judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1877 (1988) (summarizing several articulations of
ethic of care or mothering models); see also RUDDICK, supra note 51 (articulating an experiential
theory of "maternal practice" inseparable from Gilligan's findings).
55. See Dalton, supra note 10, at 7-8 (contrasting feminist jurisprudence based on "core idea of
'Woman' as 'Mother,' drawing usually on the theories of Chodorow, Dinnerstein, and Gilligan,"
with that based on "the core idea of 'Woman' as 'Sexual Subordinate,'" represented in work of
MacKinnon).
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women routinely and naturally respond, without any coercion, to a situation of inequality by nurturing and caring for the weaker and the dependent person. 6 She suggests that women's mothering experiences "could
ultimately form the foundation of a feminist, maternalist (and humanist)
moral theory-and therefore a legal theory," rooted in "an intersubjective sensitivity to the needs of the other."5 " Thus, West posits the mothering experience as a model for many hierarchical, unequal relationships
(for example, bureaucratic relationships or the relationships between
teachers and students) and suggests that such relationships can be ideally
characterized as "infused simply with care," not as sources of fear and
oppression.5 8 On this model, a desire for equality reflects an inappropriate distrust of the other.5 9
Arguing that a mothering model better captures the fundamental
fact of human dependency than the liberal contractarian model of

rational economic man, Virginia Held has suggested that to the extent
law cannot incorporate a mothering paradigm, it should shrink in impor-

tance as a regulatory force in our lives.'

Yet, other nonlegal theorists

about "maternal thinking" have cautioned that maternal care is not
equivalent to all forms of care.61 And in a society where caretaking
responsibilities within the home are still deeply gendered, advocacy of a
62
mothering model may conflict with goals of equality-based parenting.
56. See West, supra note 2, at 37; West, Feminism, supra note 34, at 80. Ruddick similarly
focuses on mothering as a response to a child's vulnerability and need, stating that "[plreserving the
lives of children is the central constitutive, invariant aim of maternal practice." RUDDICK, supra
note 51, at 19. "Mothering" need not be a sex-linked task. West claims that men can "mother" and
nurture life, although "most men don't." West, supra note 2, at 71. Ruddick views "mothering" as
potentially work for men as well as women and finds no reason to think one sex more capable at
"mothering" than the other. RUDDICK, supra note 51, at 41.
57. West, Feminism, supra note 34, at 80-81.
58. Id. at 81.
59. Id.; see also Nedelsky, supra note 12 (urging that we rethink bureaucratic relationships
between the individual and the state as preserving rather than threatening autonomy). But see
MINow, supra note 3, at 267-311 (defending rights in hierarchical relationships between children
and educational institutions). Exploring the link between trust and inequality in a different context-women's accounts of sexual pleasure-West suggests that the association of trust (in a situation of controlled inequality) with pleasure "should serve to remind us that to the extent that
absolute equality comes at the cost of the trust of which human beings are capable, often expressed
in the consensual abandonment of autonomy and relinquishment of control over oneself to another,
that equality will come at a high cost." West, Women's Hedonic Lives, supra note 34, at 131.
60. Held, supra note 20, at 304.
61. RUDDICK, supra note 51, at 47.
62. See Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Draftees: The Strugglefor ParentalEquality, 38
UCLA L. RaV. 1415, 1463-71 (1991) (analyzing the "volunteer father/draftee mother conceptualization" in family law and exploring a parenting model premised on equality of responsibility).
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Thus, the path for the translation of a mothering model into legal

thought and reform is not entirely clear.6"
5.

Internal Feminist Critiques

Internal feminist critiques of such an alternative feminist vision have
raised significant questions about the accuracy of the articulation of a
unified or essential "women's experience,"' the attribution of an ethic of

care to women, and their viability as bases for legal reform.6

Not sur-

prisingly, some feminists have viewed the "different voice" as the result

of women's subordination or socialization, and have argued that we cannot know women's voice and potential until subordination by and to men
ends, and it is no longer true that "to be a woman 'is not the name of a
way of being human.' "66 Others have cautioned about the "dark side of
63. Some feminists have found a parenting model as distinguished from a mothering model
instructive for ideal social relationships within and beyond the family. See, e.g., Judith Areen, A
Need for Caring,86 MICH. L. REv. 1067 (1988) (invoking a parental model in advocating the need
for caring in the context of treating persons with AIDS); Czapanskiy, supra note 62; Katharine T.
Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293 (1988) (proposing a transformation of our
legal vision of parenting to incorporate notions of responsibility, care, and other-directedness instead
of rights and selfishness). But see Janet Dolgin, Status and Contractin FeministLegal Theory of the
Family:A Reply to Bartlett, 12 WOMEN'S Ris. L. REP. 103 (1990) (suggesting that Bartlett has not
recognized the extent to which family law contains a mixture of ideals of both rights and
responsibilities).
64. A long footnote about the essentialism critique has become a standard feature in current
work in feminist jurisprudence. "Essentialism" is said to collapse all women, regardless of differ-

ences, into the construct "Woman."

See, eg., ELIZABETH SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN:
PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT (1988). In critiques of essentialism in legal
thought, West's connection thesis repeatedly has been critiqued (as has MacKinnon's subordination
thesis) for essentializing women's experience and for failing to acknowledge differences among
women, such as race, class, and sexual orientation. See, eg., Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in FeministLegal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581 (1990); Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing
the Intersection of Race and Sex A Black Feminist CritiqueofAntidiscriminationDoctrine,Feminist
Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139; Cain, supra note 1. Among relational
feminists, Minow has been prominent in calling for a rejection of essentialism and recognition of
differences. See Martha Minow, Beyond Universality, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 115. For a recent
formulation of a "symmetrist" position (also called by some "formal equality" or "sameness" feminism or "liberal feminism"), under which "the most salient differences, the differences that matter
most, are differences among women," see Wendy Williams, Notesfrom A First Generation, 1989 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 99, 105.
65. See, e.g., Joan Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797, 807 (1989) (discussing how relational feminists attempt to "reclaim the compliments of Victorian gender ideology
while rejecting its insults").
66. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281,
1299 (1991) [hereinafter MacKinnon, Reflections] (favorably quoting Richard Rorty's characterization of her central point); see also FeministDiscourse, Moral Values, and the Law-A Conversation,
34 BUFFALO L. REV. 11, 25-28 (1985) [hereinafter Conversation] (MacKinnon conversing) (arguing
that women cannot know what they could be or what their voice would be until they are free from
male subordination and get "this foot off our necks").
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difference," pointing out, for example, the cost to women of caretaking
and the oppression of the subject of care when actual women do not
embody the ideal. 7 Some feminists have questioned the promise of a
mothering model, both for its appeal to an experience that not all women

share, and for its fundamentally hierarchical nature."
Some feminists have also affirmed the importance of autonomy,
understood as self-determination, and of rights as a means to that end,
while warning of the dangers of an uncritical embrace of community.69
In particular, feminists of color have argued that rights can be a source of
self-definition and empowerment and that rights, even if conceived
merely as negative liberties necessary to combat discrimination or ensure

personhood, afford important space for personhood and protection
against abuse of governmental power.70 Some relational feminists have
argued that rights may be necessary for community, since they set proper
boundaries between the self and others-a process that is itself
relational.7 1

Similarly, some feminists have spoken of "the irreducible tension
between the individual and the collective," and of the "deeper moral tension between any individual's duties to humanity in general and his or

her duties toward those with whom he or she stands in a special relationship," not as phenomena unique to liberalism but as more basic features
of human society.7 2 And there is increasing emphasis on recognizing and
67. See RHODE, supra note 3, at 311; see also RUDDICK, supra note 51, at 17-19 (noting that
not all mothers behave responsibly (and responsively) when faced with vulnerable, dependent other).
68. See, eg., Cain, supra note 1; Fisher & Tronto, supra note 47, at 51; cf. SPELMAN, supra
note 64, at 80-113 (criticizing Chodorow for inadequate attention to race and class differences).
69. See, eg., Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. RaV. 829, 855
(1990); Finley, supra note 42, at 1177; Olsen, supra note 27, at 398-400; see also Marilyn Friedman,
Feminism andModern Friendship:Dislocating the Community, 99 ETHIcs 275, 277-78 (1989). Joan
Tronto comments that the current rights/community debate does not offer a "clear alternative to
feminists who might advocate an ethic of care" and suggests that unless feminists assume responsibility for situating an ethic of care in such debate, the end result may be that "caring can be used to
justify positions that feminists would find unacceptable." Joan Tronto, Beyond GenderDifference to
a Theory of Care, 12 SIGNs 644, 662 (1987).
70. See, eg., Dorothy Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color,
Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1419, 1468-71 (1991); Judy Scales-Trent,
Black Women andthe Constitution:Finding OurPlace, Asserting OurRights, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 9, 40-44 (1989); Williams, supra note 27, at 416, 430-31.
71. See MINOW, supra note 3, at 383; cf. Williams, supra note 27 (discussing role of rights in
allowing blacks to stand in relationship and establish separate identity).
72. Nedelsky, supra note 12, at 21; Areen, supra note 63, at 1078 n.47; see also Finley, supra
note 42, at 1177 (exploring the limits of responsibility in context of imposing employer responsibility
for accommodating parenting responsibilities).
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affirming differences and diversity in women's (and all human) experience and on a jurisprudence based on "multiple consciousness" and multiple communities. 7 Rather than regarding connection with others as
something effortlessly attained by women, either by virtue of their biological or social experience, such theorists urge that connection and community require effort and determination to expand one's own perspective by
recognizing the perspectives of others.74
These internal feminist critiques serve as important challenges to the

simple dichotomies between liberalism and feminism sketched above, as
well as to the translation from claims about women's experience to legal

theory. Despite such critiques, relational claims and insights (however
modified) continue to play a prominent role in feminist legal theory.75
For the most part, those critiques have not led to a reassessment of the
underlying atomism critique of liberalism. In order to demonstrate that
feminists attack a caricature of liberalism, and to point to common
ground, I shall now examine more fully the dichotomies drawn between
masculine and feminine, and justice and care.
B.

THE DIFFERENT VOICE AND THE ETHIC OF CARE

As stated above, Giligan's work in moral development theory has
been used to advance the feminist atomism critique of liberalism. Gilligan's conception of the different voice was initially heralded within the
73. See, eg., Martha Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REv. 10 (1987);
Maril J. Matsuda, When the FirstQuail Calls: Multiple Consciousnessas JurisprudentialMethod, 11
WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 7, 9 (1989) (explaining multiple consciousness as "a deliberate choice to see
the world from the standpoint of the oppressed" and advocating an "outsider jurisprudence" based
on experience of oppression); Harris, supra note 64, at 615-16 (calling for "multiple consciousness"
through telling stories of the silenced). It lies outside the scope of this Article to assess the ongoing
debate as to the continuing viability of positing commonality of experience of women sufficient to
ground feminist thought and practice. See, eg., Catharine MacKinnon, From Practiceto Theory, or
What Is a White Woman Anyway?, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 13, 18-22 (1991) (responding to gender
essentialism critiques and arguing that women are oppressed "as women"); MacKinnon, Reflections,
supra note 66, at 1291, 1298 (arguing that "[c]omposed of all its variations, the group women has a
collective social history of disempowerment, exploitation, and subordination extending to the present"; focusing on women of color as revealing racism in the law of sex and sexism in the law of race);
Martha L. Fineman, ChallengingLaw, EstablishingDifferences: The FutureofFeministLegal Scholarship, 42 FLA. L. Rlv. 25, 37-41 (1990) (arguing that, notwithstanding differences among themselves, women may share other characteristics giving them a basis for cooperation and that women's
experience of society is significantly different from men's); Leslie Bender, From GenderDifference to
Feminist Solidarity: Using Carol Gilligan and an Ethic of Care in Law, 15 VT. L. REV. 1 (1990)
(same).
74. See, eg., Bartlett, supra note 69, at 880-87; Harris, supra note 64, at 615.
75. See, eg., MINOW, supra note 3; Bartlett, supra note 63; Bender, supra note 73; Leslie
Bender, Feminist (Re)Torts. Thoughts on the Liability Crisis,Mass Torts, Power, andResponsibilities,
1990 DUKE L.J. 848.
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legal community as an antidote to atomism.7 6 Feminists building upon
Gilligan's work have argued that the ethic of justice reflects a conception
of the self as separate and autonomous and a conception of rights,
whereas the ethic of care reflects a conception of the self as connected
and interdependent and a conception of responsibilities.7 7
1. The Different and the Indifferent Voices
Upon first glance, the distinction between the different, feminine
voice and the dominant, masculine voice would seem to be between the
different voice and the indifferent voice.78 While the different voice
speaks in terms of connection, relationship, responsibility, and care for
others, the dominant voice speaks in terms of separation, being left alone,
noninterference with rights, and preserving one's place in the hierarchy.
The justice and care perspectives, with their norms of equality and
attachment, have different moral imperatives: not to act unfairly toward
others and not to turn away from someone in need. Gilligan argues that
"all human relationships, public and private, can be characterized both in
terms of equality and in terms of attachment, and that both inequality
'79
and detachment constitute grounds for moral concern.
The work of Gilligan and her associates is an attempt to introduce
into moral discourse a focus on the moral evil of detachment from others
and on the moral concern embodied by care and attachment to others.
The ideal of autonomy, celebrated in moral psychology as a sign of development, has come at the expense, she claims, of rendering "the reality of
love evanescent." 80 Female resistance to detachment, she argues, is not a
sign of failure of development or individuation, but an embodiment of
76. See, ag., Conversation,supra note 66, at 36 (Spiegelman introducing Gilligan); Karst, supra
note 21, at 480-95. See also Joan Williams, supra note 65, at 812-13 (arguing that "relational feminism [as represented by Gilligan's "different voice"] is better understood as a critique of possessive
individualism than as a description of what men and women are actually like").
77. I focus primarily on Gilligan's work and that of her associates because relational feminists
have most frequently used it. However, feminists have also drawn upon Nel Noddings's "ethic of
caring" associated with the "feminine voice." See NEL NODDINGS, CARING (1984).
78. I use the terms "feminine" and "masculine" advisedly. Gilligan has stated that the different voice "is characterized not by gender but theme" and that, while "[i]ts association with women is
an empirical observation," she makes no claim about the origin of the difference. GILLIGAN, supra
note 5, at 2. Yet Gilligan and her associates trace the different voice primarily through the experiences of women and in subsequent work have sought to contribute, through "women's thinking,"
what would otherwise be missed by leaving out girls and women from psychological research. See
Carol Gilligan, Preface, in MAPPING THE MORAL DOMAIN, supra note 38, at i, v.
79. Carol Gilligan, Moral Orientationand Moral Development, in WOMEN AND MORAL THEORY 19, 20 (Eva Kittay & Diane Meyers eds., 1987).
80. Gilligan, supra note 45, at 5.

1190

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:1171

the moral perspective of care and connection."1 As her work suggests,
listening to that perspective challenges the traditional opposition between
dependency and autonomy (or independence) by showing that, for her
female subjects, dependency is often instead opposed to isolation.82
Negative valuation of autonomy is crucial in assessing feminist critiques of liberalism. Indeed, feminist legal applications of Gilligan's work
have suggested that female ambivalence about autonomy reflects societal
reservations about the concept, reservations that have to do with the
responsibility of choice and a possible loss of relationship accompanying
achievement.8 3 Feminist critics have associated autonomy with indifference, isolation, separation, and lack of connection. Gilligan reports that
her subjects are "caught colloquially by the difference between being
'centered in oneself' and being 'self-centered': Autonomy as self-government shifts from acting consistently with one's beliefs to 'not attending or
responding to others.' "84
The feminist association of liberalism with isolation or atomism has
been due in part to the different meanings of autonomy intended by liberals and feminists. The prominence of moral development and psychological theory in feminist jurisprudence might explain part of the confusion
of the meanings of autonomy. The mixture of those distinct but overlapping meanings has obscured the extent to which feminists and liberals
share kindred concerns. Autonomy need not be atomistic, 85 and in the
theories of Rawls and Dworkin autonomy as self-government coexists
with and includes many forms of connection among citizens.
At the same time, keeping the meanings distinct also helps to illuminate some of the differences that go beyond vocabulary. As discussed
below, some feminist critiques of liberal "rights talk" and embrace of
responsibility prove to be more a matter of emphasis and redefinition
than a complete repudiation of rights and autonomy. Such feminists
emphasize public justification of rights in terms of the responsibilities
they entail and the community values they serve. But responsibility, it
turns out, resembles autonomy in the sense of freedom to make choices
about one's life. A genuine point of debate, however, is the feminist critique of rights as atomistic on the ground that rights insulate the right
81. Id. at 13.
82. Id. at 14-15; see also Gilligan, supra note 79, at 31-32.
83. See Karst, supra note 21, at 475-80.
84. Carol Gilligan, Adolescent Development Reconsidered, in MAPPING THE MORAL DOMAIN,
supra note 38, at vii, xxiv-xxvi.
85. See Thomas E. Hill, Jr., The Importance ofAutonomy, in WOMEN AND MORAL THEORY,
supra note 79, at 129, 133-35.

1992]

"ATOMISTIC MAN" REVISITED

holder from scrutiny, while liberals would argue that that very insulation
is fundamental to protecting self-determination.
2. Reciprocity Versus Response
The association of the ethic of justice with atomism or indifference
fails to appreciate that both the ethic of justice and the ethic of care
embody concern for other people. The two views of this concern,
though, are distinguished by both the form of that concern for others and
by their conceptions of the self. This more subtle distinction generally
has not been appreciated by advocates of the ethic of care. That may be
explained in part by the corrective nature of Gilligan's efforts and the
understandable focus on the perspective that has been missing. Focusing
on this distinction helps to identify more precisely the claimed difference
between the voices and to assess whether in fact liberalism lacks or cannot embrace the ethic of care.
In Mapping the Moral Domain, as well as in Making Connections,
Gilligan and her associates explore more fully what it means to speak of
the ethic of justice and the ethic of care. 6 As Gilligan previously has
explained, both ethics arise out of an experience in the human life cycle.
No human infant survives without the love and nurture of an adult,
hence the value of attachment and the moral evil of detachment. The
ethic of care reflects that experience.8 7 At the same time, the human
infant experiences the inequality of the parent-child relationship, which
is a potential source of oppression. The ethic of justice arises from that
experience.8 8 The link of inequality with the potential for oppression and
thus the need for an ethic of justice has often seemed absent in feminists'
embrace of mothering as a model.8 9 However, this distinction between
86. See

MAPPING THE MORAL DOMAIN,

supra note 38;

MAKING CONNECTIONS,

supra note

38.
87. Gilligan, supra note 45, at 4-5; see also Conversation, supra note 66, at 47-48 (Gilligan
conversing). For the meaning of "attachment" as used in attachment theory, see Judith P. Salzman,
Save the World, Save Myself, in MAKING CONNECTIONS, supra note 38, at 110, 142-43.
Noddings attributes ethical life to an idealized self-concept rooted in the memory of being cared
for and seeks to build an ethic of caring based on such memory. She claims that certain findings,
attitudes, and memories about care are universal. NODDINGS, supra note 77, at 28. She also states,
however, that an ethic built on caring is "characteristically and essentially feminine" because it
arises "out of women's experience, just as the traditional logical approach to ethical problems arises
more obviously out of masculine experience." Id. at 8. Noddings says, nonetheless, that either sex
can share both approaches. Id.
88. See Gilligan, supra note 45, at 4-5; Conversation, supra note 66, at 47-48 (Gilligan
conversing).
89. But see infra text accompanying notes 107-12 (discussing Gilligan's recognition of the
potential for women's oppression from connection).
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justice and care seems blurred with respect to oppression, since Gilligan
links care with nonviolence, or a desire that no one be hurt."
The justice perspective, according to which the "separate/objective

self" is autonomous, is claimed to view relationships in terms of "reciprocity," described as "a concern for others, considering them as one
would like to be considered, with objectivity and in fairness." 9 In
essence, one utilizing a justice perspective applies the Golden Rule. 92
Yet in so doing, Gilligan claims, one is self-referential despite one's
attempt to think about the perspective of the other.93 Moreover, Gilligan
contends that "reciprocity," as found in the work of Rawls (in the device

of the original position) and that of moral development theorist Laurence
Kohlberg, "does not require one to encounter the other to feel any connection with her or him in taking the other's perspective." 94
In contrast, the care perspective is said to involve a conception of
self as "connected" and "interdependent in relation to others," and to
view relationships as "response to others in their terms," described as "a
concern for the good of others or for the alleviation of their burdens,
hurt, or suffering (physical or psychological)." 9 5 In contrast to the

Golden Rule, a concept of Biblical "knowing" is invoked to signify the
type of knowledge of the other when relationships are experienced as

response. 96 The care perspective is said to avoid the problem of selfreference and equation of the self and the other by instead engaging the
90. GILLIGAN,supra note 5, at 174.
91. Nona P. Lyons, Two Perspectives: On Self Relationships, and Morality, in MAPPING THE
MORAL DOMAIN, supra note 38, at 21, 33. Similarly, Noddings describes the reciprocity found in
"contract" theories such as that of Rawls as a promise to behave as the other does. She uses "reciprocity" instead to describe an ethic of caring, redefining it as the response or acknowledgement that
the person who is cared for must contribute to the relationship in order to make the other's conduct
caring. NODDINGS, supra note 77, at 4.
92. See, eg., Lyons, supra note 91, at 29.
93. Gilligan, supra note 45, at 6; see MINOW, supra note 3, at 262-63 (critiquing the Golden
Rule approach). The essentialism critique attacks this self-referential error in feminist theory. See
supra note 64.
94. Carol Gilligan & Grant Wiggins, The Origins ofMorality in Early ChildhoodRelationships,
in MAPPING THE MORAL DOMAIN, supranote 38, at 112, 125; see also Seyla Benhabib, The Generalized and the Concrete Other, in FEMINISM AS CRITIQUE 77, 88-91 (Seyla Benhabib & Drucilla L.
Cornell eds., 1987) (critiquing moral reciprocity as found in Kohlberg's use of Rawls's original
position).
95. Lyons, supra note 91, at 33.
96. See Gilligan & Wiggins, supra note 94, at 125. Of course, Biblical "knowing" often means
carnal knowledge.
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self with the other in a process that "implies the possibility of learning
from others in ways that transform the self."9 7
Gilligan claims that the two perspectives of justice and care show
two different conceptions of responsibility, with different implications for
autonomy. From a justice perspective, responsibility means "making a
commitment and sticking to it," as in abiding by a contract.98 From a
care perspective, responsibility does not mean "taking charge of yourself
by separating yourself" from others, but rather "taking charge of yourself by looking at others around you,.., seeing what you need, seeing
what they need, and... taking the initiative to respond." 99 Responsibility becomes response and care," and autonomy becomes self-directed
response to the needs of self and others.
One striking feature of the justice/care dichotomy is the characterization of response as responding to the needs of the other. While there is
a rich description of interdependency and knowing others, there is a
seeming absence of focus on response as engagement with the other in a
way that does not focus specifically on the needs of the other. At the
same time, the ethic of justice is presented as impoverished. There is no
conception of active, other-directed notions of justice, such as "doing justice," social justice, and the like. Equality, juxtaposed with attachment,
is viewed as a formal, distancing, contractual relationship rather than as
one of mutuality, and interdependency is focused on alleviating suffering.
It is doubtful that either the model of reciprocity or the model of
response captures the full range of human relationships."10 What is missing is a range of mutually enriching engagement with the other, either as
citizens, as co-workers in pursuit of common goals, or in friendship and
love.102 The dichotomy between the justice and care perspectives and the
range of possible models for human relationships should be kept in mind
97. Gilligan, supra note 45, at 6. Noddings speaks of an "engrossment" of the one caring in
the one cared for whereby the one caring recognizes the one cared for's perspective as a possibility
for oneself. To complete the act of caring, the one cared for must have a response that Noddings
calls reciprocity, an acknowledgment of the caring. NODDINGS, supra note 77, at 30-35. Gilligan
does not focus on any requisite state in the care recipient.
98. Gilligan, supra note 45, at 7.
99. Id.; see also Conversation, supra note 66, at 44 (Gilligan conversing).
100. See Karst, supra note 21, at 506.
101. But the seeds of such a richer model may be seen in the association, by some of Gilligan's
subjects, of connection and dependency with friendship and its pleasures. See, eg., Carol Gilligan,
Preface, in MAKING CONNECTIONS, supra note 38, at 6, 19-20.
102. But see Karst, supranote 21, at 506 (suggesting how the notion of a "different voice" could
transform the concept of citizenship in constitutional law through enriching concepts of respect,
participation, and responsibility).
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when assessing the presence or absence of the two perspectives in
liberalism.
3.

Moral Maturity and Gender

Gilligan's work indicates that most women and men use both the
justice and care perspectives in their moral reasoning. 03 Indeed, Gilligan suggests that the absence of either of the two perspectives may be a

liability and that persons should learn to view moral problems from both
perspectives."
Still, Gilligan reports that a predominant focus on care
is found almost exclusively in women (while men "overwhelmingly" tend
to focus on justice) 0° and that women come closer than men to articulating a coherent view of a care perspective as a "principled" approach to

morality rather than simply as a "personal aspect" of morality that is at
0 6
work in their most intimate relationships. 1

Gilligan speaks of moral maturity as an integration of rights and
responsibilities in which both equality and attachment find their proper
place. 107 In this process, the concepts themselves are transformed.'

Men move from an emphasis upon equality, rights, and noninterference
to a recognition of difference and of the importance of attachment and
care. Perhaps precisely because of their greater tendency to focus on care
103. See Carol Gilligan & Jane Attanucci, Two Moral Orientations,in MAPPING THE MORAL
DOMAIN, supra note 38, at 73, 82; Conversation, supra note 66, at 47-48 (Gilligan conversing).
104. Gilligan & Attanucci, supra note 103; see also Gilligan, supra note 84, at xix-xx.
105. See Conversation, supra note 66, at 48-49 (Gilligan conversing); Gilligan & Attanucci,
supra note 103, at 80-83. However, race seems to be a powerful determinant that may contradict
this gender association. Compare Gilligan & Attanucci, supra note 103, at 80-83 (arguing that
minority students (women and men) are more likely than white students to apply a "Justice Focus"
to moral dilemmas) and Conversation, supra note 66, at 76-77 (Gilligan conversing) (noting that
black female medical students showed strong justice focus atypical of other women in study) with
Tronto, supra note 69, at 650-52 (arguing that circumstantial evidence strongly suggests that moral
views of minority groups would be more likely characterized by ethic of care than ethic of justice);
see also supra note 27.
106. Gilligan & Wiggins, supra note 94, at 129, 131-37. Gilligan challenges Kohlberg's interpretation of her work as identifying "a domain of special relationships of obligation" associated with
one's "personal life," in which a care and responsibility orientation may be identified. See Lawrence
Kohlberg, Charles Levine & Alexandra Hewer, Synopses and Detailed Replies to Critics, in
LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, II ESSAYS ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL
DEVELOPMENT 340 (1984). Instead of focusing on women's supposed tendency to "confus[e] morality with care or interpersonal relationships," Gilligan claims inquiry should focus on the absence
from men's decision making of consideration of "a dimension which has to do with issues of care,
responsibility and interdependence." Conversation, supra note 66, at 48-49 (Gilligan conversing).
For a critique of Kohlberg, see Benhabib, supra note 94.
107. GILLIGAN, supra note 5, at 100; Conversation, supra note 66, at 58-62 (Gilligan
conversing).
108. Conversation, supra note 66, at 58-62 (Gilligan conversing).
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for others, women must learn to focus on themselves in order to attain

personal integrity. Gilligan teaches that women must learn to include
themselves in the circle of care, or to bring justice, equality, and rights to
bear on a care perspective.'0 9 This important conclusion has often
seemed absent from relational feminists' use of Gilligan's work.
As Gilligan explains, women's moral maturity requires rejecting the
equation of feminine goodness with self-sacrifice, an equation society has
encouraged, if not expected."
While a focus on connection allows
women to recognize relationships and responsibilities, women's very

interdependency, which has included their subordination, allows them to
see the potential not only for care but also for oppression."' As we also

see in some feminist legal critiques, interdependency and connection have
both positive and negative valences, connoting a recognition of not only
fundamental human interdependency but also the subordination and

socioeconomic dependency of particular women through particular intimate relationships.1 12
Thus, Gilligan and her associates have used many dichotomies to
express the care and justice perspectives, while at the same time arguing

that moral maturity consists in seeing beyond dichotomies such as self/
other, inclusion/exclusion, and separation/connection. They have
recently suggested that the musical metaphor of a fugue of many voices
109. See GILLIGAN, supra note 5, at 128-74, especially 149 & 166.
110. Id. at 74-75; see also Gilligan, supra note 84, at xxx-xxxi (noting that women's inclusion of
themselves among persons for whom they consider it moral to care is "genuinely problematic not
only for women but also for society in general").
111. GILLIGAN, supra note 5, at 168. Carol Gilligan has interpreted public disbelief of Professor Anita Hill's allegations of sexual harassment by then-Chairman Clarence Thomas, on the ground
that she continued in her employment with him and moved with him to another job, as manifesting a
failure to understand Professor Hill's view of her world as one of relationship and connections. See
Rosemary Bray, Taking Sides Against Ourselves, N.Y. TiMEs, Nov. 17, 1991, (Magazine), at 56.
Gilligan is quoted as observing:
Her basic assumption was that you live in connection with others, in relationship with
others. Now, her experience was one of violation; it was offensive to her. But she was
making the attempt to work it through in the relationship; trying to resolve conflict without breaking connection.
Id. at 95; see also Mahoney, supra note 33, at 49-53 (describing some women's experiences of love
and intimacy as well as violence in relationships where battering occurs).
112. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37. West also acknowledges that the very connecting experiences that she identifies may also be sources of oppression. See West, supra note 2, at 2836, 55-56; see also West, Women's Hedonic Lives, supra note 34, at 93-94, 131-32 (hypothesizing that
women define themselves as "giving selves" in response to their fear of "the acquisitive and potentially violent nature of male sexuality" and attempting to distinguish between responses motivated
by fear and by trust). Although not a relational feminist, MacKinnon powerfully explores the negative valence of connection. See, eg., MAcKiNNON, supra note 1.
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may show the way out of "the deadlocked paradox of self and relationship" still prominent in psychological theory: "that one can only experience self in the context of relationships with others and that one can only
experience relationship if one differentiates other from self.""' 3 In the
"counterpoint of justice and care voices," different voices may be discerned, and each may be enriched by adding themes of the other."I4 Yet
the counterpoint of justice and care itself may unwittingly reinforce the
pitting of atomistic self-sufficiency, independence, and a right to be let
alone against relationship, responsiveness, and connection.115
C.

CRITIQUE OF THE DIFFERENT VOICE AND THE ETHic OF CARE

Certain basic issues surrounding the ethic of care and responsibility
should be addressed in evaluating its use as a basis for legal reform." 6
Gilligan stresses the need, as a matter of human development of both
sexes, for "an integration of rights and responsibilities," but she has not
yet articulated just what that would mean for public life. I 7
First, there is the fundamental question whether the ethic of care
should be associated with gender. Gilligan and her associates have
linked the ethic of care and responsibility with women, and some relational feminists have "celebrat[ed]" that link as "a long overdue recognition of women's special knowledges and experiences-women's
expertise-that can help us restructure our laws."" I While Gilligan and
her associates have found that both women and men tend to utilize the
concepts of justice and care in resolving moral dilemmas, they claim that,
without studying women's moral reasoning, a "care focus" would be all
but lost." 9 The "difference" of the different voice itself, however, has
been questioned on empirical and methodological grounds in a number
113. Carol Gilligan & Annie Rogers, Epilogue:Soundings into Development, in MAKING CONsupra note 38, at 314, 320, 328.
114. Id. at 320-22.
115. See, eg., id. at 315-18, 320-25 (associating girls' statements regarding self-sufficiency, independence, and a right to be let alone with the justice voice; responsiveness, relationship, and connection with care).
116. In this section, I am indebted to the insightful analysis set forth in Joan Tronto's examination of the adequacy of the ethic of care as a moral theory. See Tronto, supra note 69. See generally
CIRCLES OF CARE, supra note 47 (a collection of essays attempting to provide a theoretical overview
of writings on care and to focus on how specific social and historical settings shape both the nature of
care giving and its rewards). Leslie Bender has recently proposed a "gender-based ethic of care"
rooted in Gilligan's work as a "gender difference theory," and has addressed some of the issues
considered here. See Bender, supra note 73, at 3, 47.
117. GILLIGAN, supra note 5, at 100.
118. Bender, supra note 73, at 41; see supra note 77 and accompanying text.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 105-06.
NECTIONS,

1992]

"A TOMISTIC MAN" REVISITED

1197

of challenges to Gilligan's work. 120 Furthermore, such work has questioned whether women are more altruistic and empathic than men and
has suggested that gender does not affect the likelihood of a person helping a stranger.1 2 ' In addition, a critique akin to gender essentialism has
been leveled at Gilligan for taking inadequate account of the impact of
122
race, class, and cultural context upon the construction of gender.
Second, before embracing the ethic of care as a basis for feminist
legal reform, we should inquire whether its possible origins in female subordination render it suspect. An original impetus for feminist jurisprudence was the desire to end the subordination of women and to attain for
women treatment as equal and full citizens. 21 Since some feminists
began to speak about the different voice, others have warned that the care
and responsibility values articulated by that voice are a result of women's
subordination and are the adaptive values of the victim. 124 These and
other critics (recently joined by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor) have
warned that embracing values of the ethic of care could lead to a revival
of the "cult of true womanhood" and unwittingly serve as justification

for limiting women's social roles. 125 Indeed, some critics have suggested
120. For a useful introduction to this debate, see On In a Different Voice: An Interdisciplinary
Forum, 11 SIGNs 304 (1986) [hereinafter Forum]. Subsequent to the publication of Gilligan's work,
based on Lawrence Walker's extensive review of the literature indicating no significant difference
between the moral reasoning of women and men, Kohlberg found no significant gender differences.
See Tronto, supra note 69, at 647 n.12. Glligan replies by conceding that there are "no sex differences on the Kohlberg scale" (while at the same time challenging Walker's findings), but insisting
that that conclusion "completely miss[es] [her] point," which is not whether "educated women are
capable of high levels of justice reasoning," but how they "would spontaneously choose to frame
moral problems." Forum, supra, at 328 (reply by Gilligan).
121. Forum,supra note 120, at 313-14. This work has significance for a duty to aid premised on
an ethic of care. See infra text accompanying notes 336-72.
122. Id. at 321-24 (critique by Stack that Gilligan "derives a female model of moral development from the moral reasoning of primarily white, middle-class women in the United States"); see
also supra note 105 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 39.
124. See supra text accompanying note 66. In her most recent and perhaps most dramatic statement on the subject of the different voice, MacKinnon observes:
[Women trying to resist male domination] live every day with fear, boredom, humiliation, deprivation, desperation, and dependency with no one to depend upon. Whatever
sameness they share with men is not working very well, nor are there differences the precious kind. Their screams of pain and terror are not generally valorized as a "different
voice." Their difference lies in being on the bottom.
MacKinnon, Reflections, supra note 66, at 1293-94; cf FRIEDRICK NiETZScHE, ON THE GENEALo(GY OF MORALS (Walter Kaufmann trans., 1968) (1887) (interpreting Christianity as a "slave
morality").
125. See Williams, supra note 65 (analyzing use of Gilligan's work, and that of other relational
feminists, to support gender stereotypes in Title VII litigation). On October 29, 1991, the author
attended the annual James Madison Lecture at New York University School of Law, delivered by
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor. As reported in the press, Justice O'Connor expressed deep concern
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that Gilligan's work itself "hints at another possible explanation of the
origins of caring" in women's "subordinate or tentative social posi-

tion." 12 6 In response, defenders of the ethic of care have argued that care
values nonetheless are important and should be promoted and
nurtured. 127
But can such values be separated from their historical origin and
social context? As noted above, Gilligan herself argues that women
should overcome the equation of caring with self-sacrifice and should
move to a stage where they consider not only the needs of others but also
their own needs.12 Ruddick cautions that chronic self-denial is the characteristic temptation of mothers and calls for self-preservation on the
part of mothers.1 29 Feminists, who have encouraged a rethinking of the
appropriate social roles of women, should be careful about advocating an
ethic that may have the unintended effect of creating or perpetuating

socially oppressive expectations of both women and men and that may
validate the already unequal and deeply gendered division of labor for
caretaking. 3 0 Some feminist critiques of the connection thesis suggest

that a theory of care and community not rooted in subordination or
socialization may be derived from women's experience, outside the heter-

osexual construct, of women living with and loving other women. 13 1 In
that feminist jurisprudence, in speaking of gender difference, celebrated the stereotypical traits that
were attributed to women in a long series of judicial opinions justifying restricting women's access to
the professional and public sphere. See Nat Hentoff, Justice O'Connor and the Myth of the "True
Woman, " WASH. PosT, Nov. 23, 1991, at A27. Unfortunately, Justice O'Connor did not acknowledge the diversity of perspectives within feminist jurisprudence.
126. Tronto, supra note 69, at 648-49.
127. See eg., Bender, supra note 73, at 41; Conversation, supranote 66, at 57 (Menkel-Meadow
conversing); Karst, supra note 21, at 484 n.140.
128. See eg., Naomi Cahn,Defining FeministLitigation, 14 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 3 (1991)
(arguing that feminist litigation can draw on insights of an ethic of care, but must recognize the
dangers of an ethic that glorifies women's powerlessness and must transcend the limits of the ethic).
129. RUDDICK, supra note 51, at 122.
130. See, e.g., Czapanskiy, supra note 62; ef Williams,supra note 64, at 107 & n.21 (distinguishing "enacting Amy" (Gilligan's female exemplar of the "different voice") through legislating sex
categories from the "enormously fruitful and ultimately transformative" use of Gilligan's ethic of
care to critique and evaluate legal constructs). Cautioning against "enshrining activities that are
entwined with women's subordinate status," some feminists argue that, given current class, race, and
gender divisions in society, "in practice, caregiving often cannot be disentangled from personal service" and that "most careglvers are members of subordinate groups, who provide care from compulsion and obligation as well as warmth and concern." Emily Abel & Margaret Nelson, Circles of
Care: An Introductory Essay, in CIRCLES OF CARE, supra note 47, at 6-7.
131. See Cain, supra note 1, at 202, 212-13; Leigh M. Leonard, A Missing Voice in Feminist
Legal Theory: The HeterosexualPresumption, 12 WOMEN'S RTs.L. REP. 39, 45, 47-49 (1990).
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addition, there may be resources within the Western philosophical tradition providing a less gender-based model for a general theory of care.13 2
Third, even if the ethic of care did not arise from the social subordination of women, is it an appropriate model for legal reform? Is an ethic
derived in large part from women's experience in maternity or intimate
relationships translatable as a general guide for private and public duties
of care and responsibility to other persons? Although Gilligan argues
that a care focus can be a principled approach to morality, not confined
merely to a "domain of special relationships," other proponents of an
ethic of care stress the intensity of personal relationship necessary for
genuine caring and suggest that care quickly turns into abstract problem
solving if the requisite attitudes are missing.' 3 3 Further, recent feminist
empirical work on care argues that care giving is "not an appropriate
model for all social relationships," since it "fosters exclusivity and privatism rather than a sense of collective responsibility." 13' 4 Indeed, advocates
of introducing an ethic of care into public life have acknowledged inevitable difficulties in transplanting to society at large an ethic that was
identified in moral decision making involving small, associative
groups.135 It would appear that whether care entails attitude or activity
or both, something may be lost in attempts to translate it into general
standards.
Those advocating an ethic of care must confront the question of how
to spin the "web of relationships [broadly] enough so that some are not
beyond its reach." 136 A central theme of feminist jurisprudence has been
to advocate legal reform that includes the traditionally excluded and
allows into the dialogue those voices previously silent or silenced. 1 37 As
132. Joan Tronto and Annette Baier suggest that the philosophy of David Hume may offer such
a grounding. See Tronto, supra note 69, at 658-59; Annette C. Baler, Hume, the Women's Moral
Theorist?, in WOMEN AND MORAL THEORY, supra note 79, at 37. But Leslie Bender has rejected a
"humanist" (rather than a gender-based) "reconstruction of legal and ethical discourse based on an
ethic of care," urging that women "must be an integral part of this reconstruction, because
[women's] knowledges and perceptions, which [they] developed as gendered women, are critical to
this transformative project." Bender, supra note 73, at 40, 45.
133. See NODDINGS, supra note 77, at 25.
134. See Emily K. Abel & Margaret K. Nelson, Circles of Care An IntroductoryEssay, in CIRCLES OF CARE, supra note 47, at 4, 7.
135. See Karst, supra note 21, at 490-91; Areen, supra note 63, at 1078; cf Tronto, supra note
69, at 659-61 (suggesting that in order to expand the theory of care into the larger community,
people must be able to care for those outside of their own family, and for those with cultural
differences).
136. Tronto, supra note 69, at 661.
137. See, eg., Bartlett, supra note 69, at 855; Matsuda, supra note 73, at 9-10.
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Joan Tronto suggests, "whatever the weaknesses of Kantian universalism, its premise of the equal moral worth and dignity of all humans is
attractive because it avoids [the] problem" of leaving some people out.138
It may be that an ethic of care could be an appropriate standard in certain legal relationships but that it must be supplemented by an ethic of
justice when it is necessary to set a standard for widespread application. 139 As discussed below, in addressing the no duty to rescue rule,
liberal arguments for a duty of beneficence or a duty of mutual aid,
imposed independent of any relationship other than common humanity,
may capture some of the aims of the ethic of care while avoiding the
problem of exclusion. 4
Fourth, as noted above, many theorists have questioned whether the
ethic of care can be an appropriate source of legal reform without a fundamental transformation of law and the legal system. Some, fearing cooptation, reject any possibility of incorporating the different voice into
existing law by supplementing the ethic of justice so long as patriarchy
holds sway. These theorists argue for a complete transformation of the
law and of society based on a feminist vision of human possibility and
community. 141
Fifth, the contextuality and indeterminacy of care may make it
incompatible with legal standards as presently understood. Minow has
recently argued that a relational approach and an imperative to care cannot yield norms, principles, or tell us what do to, nor indeed should we
expect them to.142 On this view, our conception of law itself and our way
of conceiving legal problems should be transformed to be more contextual and particular. 14 3 Indeed, in one of the most elaborate studies of
care, Nel Noddings asserts as a definitional matter that a person who acts
138.

Tronto, supra note 69, at 661. Feminist work in philosophy and moral psychology has

contributed to a growing interest in issues of impartiality, including reconciling impartiality with
close personal relationships. See Lawrence C. Becker, Impartiality and Ethical Theory, 101 ETHICS
698, 700 (1991) (introducing Symposium On Impartiality and Ethical Theory, 101 ETHICS 698
(1991)).
139. Tronto notes that Hume viewed justice as a necessary supplement to the natural passion of
benevolence. Tronto, supra note 69, at 659 n.54.
140. See infra text accompanying notes 333-72.
141. See supra text accompanying note 43.
142. MINOW, supra note 3, at 222. Both Minow and Gilligan, discussing Susan Glaspell, A Jury
of Her Peers, EVERY WEEK, Mar. 5, 1917, reprintedin THE BEST SHORT STORIES OF 1917, at 256
(Edward O'Brien ed., 1918), suggest that from a care perspective, detachment itself can be seen as a
crime, leading to such legally recognized crimes as murder. MINOW, supra note 3, at 221-22; Gilligan, supra note 79, at 30.
143. MINOW, supra note 3, at 211-24.
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routinely according to some fixed rule is not engaged in care and that the
test of care is whether a person is not acting in a rule-bound fashion." 4
Sixth, advocates of legal reform based on an ethic of care and
responsibility should consider the impact of using the coercive power of
the law to implement an ethic of care on the moral quality of caring
attitudes and activity. How significant are the attitudinal aspects of
care? 4 ' The legal system generally concerns itself with objective conduct rather than subjective attitudes. Coercion of caring activity where a
caring attitude is absent might satisfy a legalistic duty of care but such
"caring" might lack moral worth."4 In short, there is a fundamental
question whether such an ethic (or duty) is an appropriate subject for
legal coercion, as opposed to personal and communal aspiration.
Seventh, we should consider whether an ethic of care would result in
a maternalism that is no better than the paternalism that feminists as
well as liberals reject. 4 Such a result would have obvious costs for the
recipients of care. Some feminist proponents of legal reform based on an
ethic of care that is informed by a mothering model argue that such an
approach would avoid the problems of paternalism by increased responsiveness to the needs of the particular other and a commitment to fostering autonomy. 4 Yet as Minow has suggested, concerns similar to
feminists' relational insights have animated many social reforms that
ultimately proved injurious to their intended targets.149 Minow attributes these failures to the paradigm of autonomous individualism at work
144. NODDINGS, supra note 77, at 13, 24.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 47-53. Noddings argues that caring requires a genuine
engrossment in the other and the other's perspective and a corresponding response of acknowledgement by the person cared for. Id. at 7-21. While advocating personal care giving by tort defendants
to tort victims, Bender raises the question of "whether care by someone legally forced to provide it
would be worse than no care at all." Bender, supra note 75, at 906 n.171.
146. See, eg., Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 637
(1980) (suggesting that it is meaningless to talk about morality in the absence of any choices that
allow a care giver to experience responsibility or autonomy). But see RUDDICK, supranote 51, at 6570 (indicating that while mothers reported feelings of ambivalence about and even hate for their
infants, they nonetheless behaved in caring ways).
147. Without endorsing the views expressed therein, I note that a central message in two current
best-selling books about men and masculinity is that men are voicing their pain about not having had
enough interactions with their fathers ("not enough father" and, implicitly, "too much mother").
See ROBERT BLY, IRON JOHN: A BOOK ABOUT MEN (1990), and SAM KEEN, FIRE IN THE BELLY
(1990). Increasingly, the authors observe, men are being reared primarily by their mothers; yet Bly,
in particular, argues that it is only adult men who can help boys become men. See BLY, supra, at 1427.
148. See, eg., Areen, supra note 63, at 1075; see also Finley, supranote 42, at 1178-79 (responsibility perspective).
149. MINOW, supra note 3, at 227-66.
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in society as a whole."' ° But the literature about mothering and caring
acknowledges that mothers and care givers are not immune from the
danger of projecting one's own perspective onto the other when assessing
the other's needs and interests and that, in fact, caring sometimes
involves using one's own judgment about the other's needs, even when
doing so conflicts with the other's perspective.1 5 1 Concerned with the
hierarchy of "the maternal image of caring," some feminists suggest that
sisterhood or friendship may offer models for caring that avoid such
1 52

inequality.

Eighth, legal models that celebrate responsibility and care deriving
from women's mothering experience may invite state censure or control
of actual women who fail to live up to or whose experience is not
reflected in such idealized standards. 53 Such models, if they are to be
used, need to recognize the real constraints on women's lives due to poverty, lack of health care, abusive relationships, and the like that contribute to some mothers' feelings of powerlessness to meet some middle-class
ideal of care. These models should seek to further a governmental commitment to family supports and women's equality, and to acknowledge
150. Id. at 257-66.
151. See, e.g., RUDDICK, supra note 51, at 69-70; NODDINGS, supra note 77.
152. See Fisher & Tronto, supra note 47, at 51, 52-56 (sisterhood); Areen, supranote 63, at 1078
(friendship).
153. See infra note 458 (discussing the debate over state regulation of women's conduct during
pregnancy). As a number of feminists of color have persuasively argued, Black women were traditionally excluded from Victorian ideals of "true womanhood" and have experienced a long history of
devaluation of Black motherhood. See, eg., Roberts, supra note 70, at 1436-44, 1472. This devalua.
tion is amply demonstrated by Louisiana gubernatorial candidate David Duke's vilification of
women with children receiving public assistance as "welfare mothers" who deliberately have more
children in order to collect more government benefits (calculated by his critics to be $11 per week).
See, eg., Robert Sutro, Duke Campaigns on DistortedFacts Despite Rebuttals and Clarifications,
N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 12, 1991, at AI8; Anna Quindlen, (Same Old) New Duke N. Y Times, Nov. 13,
1991, at A25, Charles Madigan, New Look Old Message, CI. TRIB., Nov. 17, 1991, at I. More
generally, the rhetoric of personal responsibility appears in discussion of a number of states' proposed welfare reforms that encourage single mothers to marry (referred to as "bridefare"), to restrict
or reduce government benefits of women who have additional children, or who fail to finish high
school, and the like. See, eg., Ronald Brownstein, Tough Love Comes to Politics, L.A. TIMEs, Nov.
19, 1991, at Al; Rogers Worthington, States Yank Welcome Mat on Welfare, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 11,
1992, at 1; Edsall, Clinton Rises on Party'sShifting Alliances, WAsH. PoST, Jan 19, 1992, at A14; see
also Martha Fineman, Images ofMothers in Poverty Discourses, 1991 DUKE L.J. 274 (addressing the
characterization, in poverty discourses, of single motherhood as pathological and as the cause of
crime and poverty); Janet Dolgin, The Law's Response to ParentalAlcohol and "Crack" Abuse, 56
BROOKLYN L. REV. 1213, 1235-54 (1991) (detailing symbolic (and pretextual) role of parental alcohol or drug abuse in neglect determinations when the real basis of courts' decisions is parental poverty or inability (or unwillingness) to follow middle-class patterns of life).
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5 4 Nor, regrettably, are
different understandings of care and mothering.'
15 5
mothers immune from child abuse.

Finally, Gilligan and her associates' call to moral maturity,
expressed as the integration of rights and responsibilities, or as the recognition of both justice and care approaches to moral dilemmas, raises the
question of whether either ethic, in isolation, is an appropriate basis for a
legal standard. Gilligan suggests that including both perspectives transforms the "moral discourse" itself. 56 The possibility of transcending the
justice/care dichotomy itself may be seen in feminists' invocation of justice as a component of care, together with "the voice of care and responsibility" as "an integral part of justice and being human."1'57 We need to
examine further what such integration and transformation might mean
for law and politics.
III. THE FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF LIBERALISM AS
ATOMISTIC ATTACKS A CARICATURED PICTURE
OF LIBERALISM
I shall now show that the feminist critique of liberalism as atomistic
attacks a caricatured picture of liberalism. I shall do so by drawing on
illustrations from the work of Rawls and Dworkin, two leading liberals
who have been subjects of that critique. I shall argue that liberalism as
expressed by Rawls and Dworkin is not atomistic and does not conceive
of human beings as fundamentally separate, prior to human connection,
and forming their identities independent of society. Rather, such forms
of liberalism recognize a wide range of human connection and interdependency as underlying and playing a part in political philosophy and
154. See infra text accompanying notes 406-19 (discussing the use of empirical claims about the
circumstances of women's lives in certain feminist arguments about the incidence of unwanted pregnancy and the use of these empirical claims as the basis for imposing collective responsibility for

solutions).
155. Hence, Ruddick distinguishes maternal practice from simply being a mother. See RUDDICK, supranote 51 (discussed supra note 56). West, in contrast, talks about what most women do,
naturally. See West, supranote 2 (discussed supra note 56 and accompanying text). In a number of
instances of child abuse, the mother herself is described as caught in desperate circumstances,
scarcely more than a child herself. See, eg., Priscilla Painton, Miracle in Brooklyn, TIME, Apr. 8,
1991, at 31 (describing the story of a twelve-year old girl who abandoned her baby (who was later
rescued from a trash compactor) as a "parable that points up all the tragedies that can befall a little
girl living on American's fraying urban front").

156.

Conversation, supra note 66, at 45 (Gilligan conversing).

157. Bender, supra note 73, at 43 (arguing that the ethic of care is an integral part of justice);
Fisher & Tronto, supra note 47, at 54 (arguing that the notion of justice is part of the ideal of care
underlying sisterhood).
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law. Furthermore, I shall show that both the care and justice perspectives, and their norms of response and reciprocity, are combined in liberalism to a greater extent than feminists have acknowledged.
A.

RAwLs's POLITICAL THEORY Is NOT ATOMISTIC NOR IS THE
ETHic OF CARE MISSING FROM IT

1. Justice as Fairnessas a Social Contract Theory
Rawls uses a form of social contract, the notion of the original position, to decide which principles of justice would be most appropriate for
a society conceived as "a fair system of cooperation between free and
equal persons."15' 8 Through his version of the social contract, Rawls
"seeks to deepen and to justify Rousseau's idea that liberty is acting in
accordance with a law that we give to ourselves."'15 9 The use of the original position thus aims to secure liberty, here meaning autonomy as selfdetermination. Rawls posits two features of the original position to eliminate distortions due to inequality of bargaining power: a veil of ignorance as to one's place in society, and a requirement of mutual
disinterest. o
Rawls's use of the notion of the original position, more than any
other aspect of his theory, has given rise to the criticism that his theory
embodies an atomistic view of the person that is contrary to the reality of
human connection. By examining several elements of Rawls's theory of
justice as fairness, I will show that it is not atomistic nor is connection
wholly missing from it. I will suggest that it is a richer theory than a
simple dichotomy between justice and care allows.
2.

Conception of the Person

A frequent feminist criticism is that Rawls's notion of the original
position evinces a disembodied, abstract, and atomistic conception of the
person. 6 Much of the feminist literature appears to regard as definitive
158. John Rawls, Justice asFairnes:Politicalnot Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB. Avr. 223, 231
(1985).
159. RAwLS, supra note 9, at 201. Again, Rousseau, also a social contract theorist, could
hardly be accused of holding atomistic conceptions of the person and society. See ROUSSEAU, supra
note 18.
160. RAWLS, supra note 9, at 136-48.
161. See, &g., Mai J. Matsuda, LiberalJurisprudenceandAbstracted Visions ofHuman Nature:
A Feminist Critique of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 16 N. MEX. L. REV. 613 (1986).
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Sandel's critique of Rawls's theory as presupposing a conception of the
person as a disembodied individual prior to attachments.162
Rawls has addressed Sandel's and similar criticisms and has clarified
that the original position is only a device of representation and that its
inhabitants are not to be confused with actual persons.1 63 He points out
that mistaking the original position for a conception of the person leads
to the erroneous view-propounded by Sandel-that the original position presupposes a metaphysical conception that "the essential nature of
persons is independent of and prior to their contingent attributes, including their final ends and attachments, and indeed, their character as a
whole.,,164
Rawls has countered Sandel's criticism by explaining that justice as
fairness is "political, and not metaphysical."' 16 5 Rawls describes his liberal political conception of justice as fairness as deriving from the "fundamental intuitive idea" of society "as a fair system of cooperation
between free and equal persons."166 He proposes that political liberalism
rests upon shared public values that specify the fundamental terms of
political and social cooperation. He further claims that a political conception of justice as fairness can be supported, as a shared basis of justification of political decisions in a constitutional democracy, by an
overlapping consensus among various comprehensive moral ideals as to
167
such values.
Rawls also acknowledges that citizens could not, in all likelihood,
stand apart from their attachments and their views of the good, which
are so integral to their identity.168 However, to the extent that Rawls's
theory contemplates that citizens are capable of revising and assessing
162. See, eg., MiNow, supra note 3, at 151 n.10; West, supranote 2, at 2. Even some feminists
who are wary of Sandel's communitarianism accept his critique of liberalism. See, e.g., Friedman,
supra note 69, at 277-78.
163. Rawls, supra note 158, at 234-39.
164. Id. at 238.
165. Id. at 224. The continuing influence of Sandel in feminist critiques of Rawls, notwithstanding Rawls's subsequent elaboration of his theory, is puzzling. Richard Arneson has recently
observed that "the critical absorption of Rawls's thought into current discussion on the theory of
justice has lagged behind his outpouring of work since the early 1970s." Richard J. Arneson, Introduction, in Symposium on Rawlsian Theory of Justice: Recent Developments, 99 ETHics 695, 695

(1989).
166. Rawls, supra note 158, at 231.
167. E.g., John Rawls, The Domain of the Politicaland Overlapping Consensus, 64 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 233 (1989).
168. Rawls, supra note 158, at 241. But cf. MINOW, supra note 3, at 151 ("Social contract
theories ...exclude ...any who would identify themselves as members of groups first, rather than
as autonomous individuals first.").
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their conceptions of the good, such capacity provides a vantage point for
women from which to assess whether certain kinds of connection,
at the
69
familial or community level, are desirable and not oppressive.1
Moreover, Rawls's conception of the person is not one of self-interested atomism. Rawls posits two moral powers of the person: the capacity for a sense of justice and the capacity for a conception of the good. 170
His account of a person's capacity for a conception of the good shows
recognition of connection with and care for others:
The capacity for a conception of the good is the capacity to form, to
revise, and rationally to pursue a conception of one's rational advantage, or good. In the case of social cooperation, this good must not be
understood narrowly but rather as a conception of what is valuable in
human life. Thus, a conception of the good normally consists of a
more or less determinate scheme of final ends, that is, ends we want to
realize for their own sake, as well as of attachments to other persons
and loyalties to various groups and associations. These attachments
and loyalties give rise to affections and devotions, and therefore the
flourishing of the persons and associations who are the objects of these
sentiments is also part of our conception of the good. Moreover, we
must also include in such a conception a view of our relation to the
world-religious, philosophical, or moral-by reference to which the
7
value and significance of our ends and attachments are understood.1 1
Although I argue below that Rawls's conception of justice itself contains
elements of what Gilligan calls the ethic of care, Rawls's account of the
second moral power should be read in light of Gilligan's call for a focus
on attachment as an important, hitherto unacknowledged (or at least
under-acknowledged) dimension of morality.
3. Empathy, Care, and Perspective Taking
Some feminists claim that behind the veil of ignorance is simply
Rawls himself. There is no recognition" of the differences among people
and of the wide range of human behavior and human possibility.' 72 In
terms of the ethic of justice, it is said that the person in the original
169. In criticizing communitarianism as well as relational feminism, feminists have spoken of a
need to assess such connections. See RHODE, supra note 3, at 311; Friedman, supra note 69, at 277.
170. RAWLS, supra note 9, at 505; Rawls, supra note 158, at 233. Sandel acknowledges that
Rawls's notion of a conception of the good "speaks to that which connects us." SANDEL, supra note

15, at 133.
171. Rawls, supra note 158, at 233-34.
172. See, ag., Matsuda, supra note 161, at 617.
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position is self-referential and in perspective taking assumes that all per17 3
sons are like that very self.
To the contrary, in a sympathetic feminist critique of Rawls, Susan
Moller Okin interprets the original position not as requiring one to
"think from the position of nobody," but instead to attempt to "think
from the position of everybody, in the sense of each in turn."'174 Through
doing so, one becomes aware of others' differences. Furthermore, Okin
argues that "Rawls is far from being a moral rationalist and that feelings
such as empathy and benevolence are at the very foundation of his principles of justice."' 175 She contends that persons could not go through the
exercise of the original position unless they were motivated by care,
empathy, and concern for others. To be so situated, in turn, requires that
human beings must be nurtured and socialized in an environment that
best develops these capacities; the fundamental experience of care is crucial for the achievement and maintenance of justice. 176 Thus, Okin challenges the distinctibn between the ethic of justice and the ethic of care
and suggests that the latter is necessarily present in the persons Rawls
imagines as engaging in the exercise of the original position. She suggests
that Rawls's reliance upon Kant and his emphasis upon reason and evi1 77
dent mistrust of feeling have obscured these aspects of his theory.
In any event, Rawls distinguishes between the mutual disinterest
and the veil of ignorance imagined of parties in the original position, on
the one hand, and persons' recognition of each other as particular others
and their need for each other in society, on the other. He claims that
parties in the original position would acknowledge the natural duty of
mutual respect, which is shown "in our willingness to see the situation of
173. See MINOW, supranote 3, at 154; Benhabib, supra note 94, at 89; supratext accompanying
notes 91-94.
174. S.M. Okin,Reason andFeeling in Thinking aboutJustice, 99 ETHICS 229, 244 (1989) [hereinafter Okin,Reason]; see also S.M. OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 101 (1989) [hereinafter OKIN, JUSTICE].

175. Okn,Reason, supra note 174, at 238.
176. Id. at 248-49; OKiN, JUSTICE, supra note 174, at 97-101; see also Owen Flanagan &
Kathryn Jackson, Justice, Care, and Gender The Kohlberg-GilliganDebate Revisited, 97 ETHICS
622, 630, 634 (1987) (arguing both that fairness presupposes a foundation of caring and trust and

that justice is necessary for care).
177. Okn,Reason, supra note 174, at 230. Okin argues that Rawls's theory is better interpreted
as requiring equal concern (which includes empathy) rather than mutual disinterest. Id. at 238, 248.

It is true that Rawls has argued that the assumption of mutual disinterest and the veil of ignorance
take the place of benevolence and that he does not assume those in the original position to be motivated by benevolence or an interest in one another's interests. RAWLS, supra note 9, at 148. In so
doing, Rawls would seem to reject a reliance upon fellow feeling or benevolence as a realistic basis
for a theory of justice. Okin challenges that rejection.
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others from their point of view, from the perspective of their conception
of their good."' 17 He presupposes dialogue, not abstract speculation
about the other, claimed by Gilligan to be the mode of reciprocity: "[T]o
respect another as a moral person is to try to understand his aims and

interests from his standpoint" and, if one's actions materially affect
another, "to present him with considerations that enable him to accept
1 79
the constraints on his conduct," if necessary.

Thus, the notion of perspective taking through actual engagement
with the other is present in Rawls's political theory.' Rawls and other
liberals, like some feminists, conceive such perspective taking as a component of deliberative politics and recognize that one's own perspective is
partial and can be widened through exchange with others.',' Liberal
exploration of dialogic models of politics, particularly the notion of civic
republicanism, has in fact drawn upon both Rawls's work and feminist

work (and, in particular, Okin's interpretation of Rawls's work), speaking of a "political empathy" necessary for such dialogue. 1 82 That the

notion of justice as fairness entails citizens listening to and seeking to
understand each other suggests, in the terms of Gilligan and her associ-

ates, a convergence of such dichotomies as justice/care, rules/relationships, and public/private.' 83
Rawls's elaboration of the duty of mutual respect suggests a notion
of societal care and sensitivity. Rawls movingly speaks of how members
178. RAwLS, supra note 9, at 337. The duty is "to show a person the respect which is due to
him as a moral being ...with a sense of justice and a conception of the good." Id. For a feminist
argument in support of anti-pornography laws deriving from Rawls's duty of mutual respect or
equal respect, see Christina Spaulding, Anti-Pornography Laws as a Claim for Equal Respect, 4
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 128 (1989).
179. RAWLS, supra note 9, at 338.
180. See also Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, Moral Conflict and PoliticalConsensus, 101
ETHics 64, 76 (1991) (arguing that mutual respect requires "a favorable attitude toward, and constructive interaction with, the persons with whom one disagrees").
181. See, eg., RAwts, supra note 9, at 358; Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J.
1493, 1526-28 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1554
(1988); Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 180, at 77-78. For feminists' conceptions, see supra text
accompanying notes 73-74.
182. See generally Symposium: The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988) (discussing the revival of civic republicanism in constitutional theory) especially Sunstein, supra note
181, at 1554-55 (attempting to synthesize liberalism and civic republicanism). An important issue in
the elaboration of such models is whether they require restrictions on speech or conduct that silences
the speech or impairs the participation of women and others traditionally excluded from the cormmunity (e.g., pornography and "hate" speech). See, eg., Spaulding, supra note 178, at 161-65.
183. See Elizabeth Bernstein & Carol Gilligan, Unfairnessand Not Listening, in MAKING CONNECTIONS, supra note 38, at 147 (reporting on adolescent girls' association of listening with fairness
as a surprising convergence of seemingly distinct concepts).
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of society depend upon each other and are damaged by indifference to
one another:
Also respect is shown in a willingness to do small favors and courtesies, not because they are of any material value, but because they are
an appropriate expression of our awareness of another person's feelings
and aspirations. Now the reason why this duty would be acknowledged is that although the parties in the original position take no interest in each other's interests, they know that in society they need to be
assured by the esteem of their associates. Their self-respect and their
confidence in the value of their own system of ends cannot withstand
the indifference much less the contempt of others. Everyone benefits
then from living in a society where the duty of mutual respect is
honored. The cost to self-interest is minor
in comparison with the sup1 84
worth.
own
one's
of
sense
the
for
port
Just as Gilligan speaks of the moral evil of detachment, Rawls
speaks of the undermining impact of indifference. Thus, Rawls's theory
envisions not a disembodied individual, but a society where recognition
of interdependency leads to mutual respect-and where mutual respect
entails not the right to be let alone but an almost tender-hearted solicitude for one another. In addition, society's members depend on each
other's reassurance and respect for their sense of self-worth and confidence in their world view, and thus hardly possess atomistic selfsufficiency.185

4. Social Cooperationand Social Union
The feminist atomism critique of Rawls's theory seems especially
puzzling in view of Rawls's repeated description of his conception of
society as "a fair system of cooperation between free and equal persons"
and of a person as "a fully cooperating member of a society over a complete life." 18 6 Rawls has stated that his conception of the person is of a
moral person, a citizen "who can take part in, or who can play a role in,
social life, and hence exercise its various rights and duties."'8 7 He does
not conceive such moral persons engaged in social cooperation to be
merely atoms instrumentally pursuing their self-interests. Rather, Rawls
184. RAwLs, supra note 9, at 338.
185. Charles Taylor contrasts atomism with the recognition that self-understanding is created
and sustained by the common recognition that persons receive in the life of society. Taylor, supra
note 11, at 41-43.
186. Rawls, supra note 158, at 231, 233. But see Spaulding, supra note 178, at 157-60 (invoking
Sandel's critique of Rawls to distinguish citizenship from membership).
187. Rawls, supra note 158, at 233.
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provides an account of the "cooperative virtues" through which the principles of justice "are embodied in human character and regulate political
and social life."' 8
Perhaps the clearest evidence that Rawls's conceptions of the person
and of society are not atomistic is his account of a well-ordered society as
"a social union of social unions."' 8 9 Rawls squarely addresses the question of whether a social contract theory is "a satisfactory framework for
understanding the values of community and for choosing among social
arrangements to realize them."' 19 0 He rejects the idea that such a theory
necessarily entails an ideal of "private society," in which social arrangements are merely instrumental to the pursuit of self-interest and have no
value in themselves, "the activity of engaging in them not being counted
as a good but if anything as a burden," and in which "each person
assesses social arrangements solely as a means to his private ainis."''l
Instead, Rawls advances a conception of social union, a type of
mutual cooperation necessary for self-completion, as rooted in the
"social nature of mankind."' 9 2 Urging that this social nature not be
understood in a trivial fashion, such as reducing it to viewing relations
with others instrumentally, Rawls argues that "it is through social union
founded upon the needs and potentialities of its members that each person can participate in the total sum of the realized natural assets of the
others."19' 3 As he conceives social union, human beings flourish by
enjoying each others' talents, "excellences," and contributions; no one
person can do everything that she or he might do, nor, all the more, can
she or he do everything that another person can do.194
188. Id. at 247. Rawls elsewhere elaborates a "reasonable moral psychology" by which citizens
are not only normal and fully cooperating members of society, but "they want to be, and to be

recognized as, such members." Rawls characterizes this moral psychology as a philosophical, not
psychological, account drawn from the political conception of justice as fairness. JOHN RAWLS,
POLITICAL CONSTRUCTIVISM Lecture II: 7-8 (presented December 5, 1991 at New York University
School of Law's Colloquium in Law, Philosophy, and Political Theory).
189. RAWLS, supra note 9, at 527.
190. Id. at 520.
191. Id. at 521 (rejecting Hegel's critique of liberalism as a notion of an atomistic, instrumental
"private society" or "civil society").
192. Id. at 522.
193. Id. at 523.
194. Id. In her critique of Rawls, Matsuda misses precisely this component of social union. See
Matsuda, supra note 161, at 627-28 (suggesting as a feminist counterassumption that "[t]he desire for
power and achievement may be a product of never learning to rejoice at the excellence of others," and

that, in contrast to Rawls's emphasis on achievement, "feminist thought... considers the possibility
that... enjoying the talents and differences of others also feel[s] good") (emphasis added).
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Rawls suggests that social union is indispensable to self-realization:
"[P]ersons need one another since it is only in active cooperation with
others that one's powers reach fruition. Only in a social union is the
individual complete." 19' 5 Indeed, Rawls describes social union in language of connection and of expanded self-definition, stating that only
through such union do we "cease to be mere fragments" or "but parts of
'
what we might be."196
Thus, he articulates a notion of social union and
interdependency that is at odds with the separation thesis attributed to
him (and to liberalism generally) by West.197
Admittedly, Rawls's focus on a person's pleasure and self-completion in the realization of the talents of others may seem individualistic,
yet it is not atomistic; such pleasure has, in fact, been identified as a
desirable feminist goal.19 Further, Rawls also recognizes human interdependency at a more explicitly relational level.19 9 His notion of social
union as a sense of connection with other persons in a community-even
stretching across many generations 2 -echoes the experience of interconnectedness described by Gilligan in her subjects who speak about the
web of connection, and it challenges the contrast between such a web and
the ladder, an image associated with the ethic of justice. 0 1
Finally, relating the principles of justice to human sociability, Rawls
describes a well-ordered society as "a social union of social unions."2 "2
Not atomistic, Rawls's citizens have a shared final end, to establish and3
' 20
maintain just institutions, which are "prized as good in themselves.
195. RAWLS, supra note 9, at 525 n.4.
196. Id. at 529. Even Sandel acknowledges "intersubjective-sounding passages" in Rawls's
description of social union, although he concludes that the necessary strong, constitutive sense of
community that he argues Rawls's theory requires "cannot be accounted for by a conception that is
individualistic even in Rawls's special sense of the term." SANDEL, supra note 15, at 151, 152.
197. See supra text accompanying note 17.
198. See Matsuda, supra note 161, at 627-28.
199. Rawls mentions sexual affinity as "the most obvious example of the need of individuals
both human and animal for each other." RAwLs, supra note 9, at 525.
200. Id. at 523-25.
201. See, e.g., GILLIGAN, supra note 5, at 160 (One women states: "By yourself there is little
sense to things. It is like the sound of one hand clapping"; other people are "part" of a "giant
collection of people that you are connected to.").
202. RAWLS, supra note 9, at 527.
203. Id.
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Admittedly, Rawls rejects the notion of political society as a "community" that has common ends deriving from a shared comprehensive con-

ception of the good. 2°4 Thus, feminist critics have correctly stated that
05
Rawls's liberalism has no shared telos. 2
However, rejection of a shared telos does not necessarily entail a
conception of an atomistic, unconnected society (as feminist critics of
communitarianism have also recognized).20 6 First, Rawls acknowledges

that, on a liberal view, citizens do have a "common aim" of "high priority," "the aim of political justice."2 "7 Second, while Rawls rejects "community" as the proper characterization of political society, his view of
justice as fairness "assumes, as other liberal political views do also, that

the values of community are not only essential but realizable" through
various associations both within political society and beyond its bounda-

ries. 20 8 The social cooperation and social union that Rawls envisions are

thus not credibly interpreted as motivated by narrowly conceived personal advantage or atomistic self-interest. 2°
5. Autonomy and Toleration
Feminist critics have stated that autonomy is at the heart of the
liberal paradigm.2 10 Rawls contends that his political conception of justice as fairness does realize the "full value of autonomy," as specified by a

political conception ofjustice,211 but he maintains that it does not entail a
comprehensive moral ideal of autonomy.21 2 As Rawls puts it, justice as
fairness is a political conception, not a comprehensive moral ideal.213 He

204. John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 10 &
n.17 (1987); see infra text accompanying notes 210-19 (discussing comprehensive moral ideals and
Rawis's recognition of irreducible pluralism as a fact of modern Western constitutional
democracies).
205. See, eg., Sherry, supra note 2, at 548-49. But see infra text accompanying notes 253-69
(discussing Dworkin's presentation of liberalism).
206. See eg., Friedman, supra note 69.
207. Rawls, supra note 204, at 10 n.17.
208. Id.; see also Kymicka, supra note 15, at 904 (stating that because liberals recognize "that
people naturally form and join social relations," state coercion is unnecessary to provide "communal
context"). For a compelling argument as to the value of voluntary associations, independent of the
state, in fostering self-definition and expression, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism,
97 YALE L.J. 1713 (1988).
209. Contra Matsuda, supra note 161.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 19-27.
211. John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. PHIL. 515, 528 (1980).
212. By "comprehensive moral ideals," Rawls refers to the religious, philosophical, and moral
doctrines held by persons as to the meaning, value and purpose of human life, that is, their conception of the good. See, eg., Rawls, supra note 158, at 245-47.
213. Id.
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cautions that "[t]he conception of the citizen as a free and equal person is
not a moral ideal to govern all of life, but is rather an ideal belonging to a
conception of political justice." He argues that persons can accept this
conception of the citizen "without being committed in other parts of
their life to comprehensive moral ideals often associated with liberalism,
for example, the ideals of autonomy and individuality." Indeed, Rawls
states that "[a]s comprehensive moral ideals, autonomy and individuality
[as found in Kant and J. S. Mill] are unsuited for a political conception of
justice." "So understood," Rawls concludes, "liberalism becomes but
'2 14
another sectarian doctrine.
The distinction between liberalism's conception of autonomy or
individuality as an element of a political conception of justice, on the one
hand, and a comprehensive moral ideal, on the other, has not been
acknowledged in feminist criticism of Rawls. More generally, Rawls's
distinction underscores that his conception of justice is part of apolitical
philosophy, not a personal morality. Once this is understood, it can be
seen that those who invoke Gilligan and those who defend Rawls are
talking past one another. Whereas liberals such as Rawls and Dworkin
are talking about persons' rights against the government and what the
government may or may not coerce persons to do, the subjects of Gilligan's studies are typically talking about what they as individuals ought to
do when confronting personal moral problems. 15
In justifying the coercive use of political power, Rawls contends that
different comprehensive moral ideals, which could include the liberalism
of Kant and Mill, form the basis of an overlapping political consensus
concerning a conception of justice (which constrains the government's
pursuit of a conception of the good) as distinguished from a conception
of the good. He argues that in view of the fact of irreducible pluralism in
people's comprehensive moral views since the Reformation, a unified
conception of the good cannot serve as a shared basis for political justification except through oppressive use of state power.2" 6 Rawls calls for
214. Id. at 246.
215. Of course, a key feminist tenet is that "the personal is the political." The distinction made
in the text does not necessarily contradict that tenet. The point rather is that Gilligan's subjects
typically are wrestling with how they resolve or might resolve personal moral problems that may
raise issues that are ultimately addressed politically (e.g., abortion). See infra text accompanying
notes 373-429.
216. See, e.g., Rawls, supranote 158, at 225, 249; Rawls, supra note 204, at 4. Therefore, Rawls
affirms the traditional deontological liberal positing of the right as prior to the good. See, e.g.,
RAwLs, supra note 9, at 30; Rawls, supra note 158, at 250. As seen above, what West calls the
"separation thesis" rests on Sandel's interpretation of that priority. See supra text accompanying

note 17.
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the application of the principle of toleration to philosophy itself.2 17

Given the feminist recognition of difference and diversity as key facts of
human experience and the dangers of forced community and of state

coercion,2 18 Rawls's caution and call for toleration may be attractive.219
6.

The Difference Principleand Fraternity

A fusion of the ethic of justice and the ethic of care can be seen in
Rawls's account of the difference principle-the second principle of justice-as an interpretation of the principle of fraternity. 220 Rawls's
account suggests that the difference principle, with its focus on benefiting
the least advantaged members of society, might be conceived as respond-

ing to the needs of others and as expressing a notion of social interdependency and connection, a point that
acknowledge, at least partially.22 1

some relational

feminists

Rawls acknowledges that "[i]n comparison with liberty and equality"-which he associates with the first principle of justice-"the idea of

fraternity has had a lesser place in democratic theory.

'222

He suggests

that this may be because fraternity is conceived "less specifically [as] a

political concept, not in itself defining any of the democratic rights but
conveying instead certain attitudes of mind and forms of conduct without which we would lose sight of the values expressed by these rights.
217.

'223

See, eg., Rawls, supranote 158, at 223; Rawls, supra note 204, at 13. See also DAVID A.J.
Rawlsian interpretation of
the Constitution rooted in toleration).
218. See supra text accompanying notes 69-74.
219. For example, Mad Matsuda has recently called for "accent tolerance," premised on an
antisubordination rationale. See Matsuda, supra note 14, at 1387-92. Matsuda argues that a more
powerful argument against accent discrimination than immutability of accent is "a notion of radical
pluralism" which includes self-determination. It is a curious irony, in the continuing efforts of critical jurisprudence to reinterpret or to reclaim from liberalism such concepts as toleration, that Matsuda cites, as sources on the centrality of toleration and the sanctity of the individual in liberal
thought, not Rawls or Dworkin, but feminist theorists Robin West and Margaret Jane Radin. Id. at
1388-89 & nn.209 & 214.
220. The difference principle is: "Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions:
[F]irst, they must be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of
opportunity; and second, they must be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of
society." The formulation is that given in Rawls, supra note 158, at 227. Okin argues that the
difference principle can be used as a tool for feminist criticism if one takes seriously that in the
original position those formulating the principles of justice do not know their sex. OKIN, JUsTICE,
supra note 174, at 105.
221. See, eg., MINoW, supra note 3, at 153-54.
222. RAWLS, supra note 9, at 105. The first principle of justice is: "Each person has an equal
right to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with
a similar scheme for all." The formulation is that given in Rawls, supra note 158, at 227.
223. Id.
RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION (1986) (advancing a
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Acknowledging that fraternity contains such a notion, as well as "a sense
of civic friendship and social solidarity," Rawls claims that the difference
principle corresponds to a "natural meaning of fraternity":
namely, to the idea of not wanting to have greater advantages unless
this is to the benefit of others who are less well off. The family, in its
ideal conception and often in practice, is one place where the principle
of maximizing the sum of advantages is rejected.
Members of a family commonly do not wish to gain unless they
can do so in ways that further the interests of the rest. Now wanting to
act on the difference principle has precisely this consequence. Those
better circumstanced are willing to have their greater advantages only
under a scheme in which this works out for the benefit of the less
224
fortunate.
Rawls speaks of the difference principle and fraternity in terms that
call into question a simple distinction between the ethic of care and the
ethic of justice or between response and reciprocity.22 He states that the
difference principle "expresses a conception of reciprocity," understood
as a "principle of mutual benefit."22' 6 As he explains "reciprocity," it

connotes a conception of the self and society as connected rather than
separated. Thus, the difference principle "represents, in effect, an agree-

ment to regard the distribution of natural talents as a common asset and
27
'2
to share in the benefits of this distribution whatever it turns out to be."
Such an agreement "to share one another's fate 228 is not the narrow
contract associated with the ethic of justice. In fact, Minow characterizes the difference principle and its notion of sharing talents as an
"important challenge to the usual forms of autonomous individualism in
229
liberal political theory.,

224. Id. In view of some feminist calls for the need for love in public life or of a mother-child
model for society at large, it is interesting that Rawls attributes the relative neglect of fraternity to its
association with ties of feeling and sentiment "which it is unrealistic to expect between members of
the wider society." Id. at 106. Yet he uses the family as an example of how the difference principle

embodies fraternity.
225. While the difference principle concerns itself with the well-being of the least advantaged, in
operation it does not require actual knowledge of the needs of the particular other. Although
Rawls's invocation of the family as an example might suggest a more particular application, akin to
the mode of response, the difference principle operates at the level of social policy and the basic
structure of society. See id. at 100-02.
226. Id. at 102.
227. Id. at 101.
228. Id. at 102.
229. MINOW, supra note 3, at 154. Minow nonetheless argues that the "difference principle
preserves too much of the concept of the abstract individual ... to respond fully to issues of difference." Id. A commitment to economic redistribution and egalitarianism in the name of social justice, even if it does not always rise to the level of the difference principle, is characteristic of many
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Duty of Mutual Aid

Of particular interest in demonstrating the presence of "care" concerns in Rawls's work is his notion of the natural duty of mutual aid:
"the duty of help[ing] another when he is in need or jeopardy, provided
that one can do so without excessive risk or loss to oneself."23 0 As we
have seen with the duty of mutual respect, Rawls contends that the natural duties would be adopted by persons in the original position.23 1
Rawls considers two different justifications for the duty of mutual
aid. The first, suggested by Kant, is "that situations may arise in which
we will need the help of others, and not to acknowledge this principle is
to deprive ourselves of their assistance. ' 23 2 But Rawls contends that
"this is not the only argument for the duty of mutual aid, or even the
most important one. ' 233 Instead, he argues:
A sufficient ground for adopting this duty is its pervasive effect on the
quality of everyday life. The public knowledge that we are living in a
society in which we can depend upon others to come to our assistance
in difficult circumstances is itself of great value.... The primary value
of the principle is not measured by the help we actually receive but
rather by the sense of confidence and trust in other men's good intentions and the knowledge that they are there if we need them... . Once
we try to picture the life of a society in which no one had the slightest
desire to act on [this] dut[y], we see that it would express an indifference if not disdain for human beings that would make a sense of our
own worth impossible....

[W]e should note the great importance of

publicity effects.234
contemporary liberal theories. See, eg., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL
STATE (1980); Ronald Dworkin, Foundationsof Liberal Equality, in XI THE TANNER LECTURES
ON HUMAN VALUES 1 (Grethe B. Peterson ed., 1990).
230. RAwLS, supra note 9, at 114. Natural duties are duties that "hold between persons irrespective of their institutional relationships; they obtain between all as equal moral persons." Id. at
115. Other natural duties similarly showing care concerns include "the duty not to harm or injure
another" and "the duty not to inflict unnecessary suffering." Id. at 114. Unlike the duty of mutual
aid, these two duties are stated in the negative. The care perspective shares a desire that no one
should be hurt and has as its imperative to recognize and alleviate the suffering of the world. See
supra text accompanying notes 48 & 78.
231. Id. at 116. For a discussion of the duty of mutual respect, see supra text accompanying
notes 178-85.
232. Id. at 338.

233. Id. at 339.
234. Id. Rawls similarly focuses on the negative impact of indifference upon human beings'
sense of self-worth in his justification of the natural duty of mutual respect. Id. at 338. See supra
text accompanying notes 184-85. For a feminist model of caring based in part on "sisterhood-as.
equality," which "includes a notion ofjustice in that anyone may need care at any time," see Fisher
& Tronto, supra note 47, at 54.
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Rawls's justification pictures society not as atomistic or self-interested
but as interdependent and connected.
Below, I explore how a Rawlsian duty of mutual aid and a feminist
proposal based on an ethic of care compare as bases for imposing a duty
2 35
to aid in tort law.
8.

Justice, Care, and Gender

I have argued that the feminist critique of Rawls's liberal political
theory as atomistic stems from a caricatured picture of liberalism and
that Rawls's work recognizes human connection and indeed reflects
many of the care virtues championed by relational feminists. I have
attempted to demonstrate that Rawls's theory of justice as fairness is
richer than a simple distinction between justice and care suggests. I am
not suggesting that Rawls's theory offers a perspective on relationships
and care identical to that espoused by such feminists or that his emphasis
on individuals does not conflict with a relational emphasis.2 3 6 However,
feminists could more valuably critique Rawls's work with respect to
whether his theory would adequately secure justice for women and
whether the realm of nurture and care remains too invisible.2 37

Okin addresses such issues in her sympathetic feminist critique of
Rawls's theory.238 Although she rejects the simple distinction between
the ethic of justice and the ethic of care, her project, in effect, seeks to
bring justice to bear on a primary realm of care-the family-and to
make more explicit the role of caring and feeling in deriving the principles of justice to govern the political realm. She criticizes Rawls's
235. See infra text accompanying notes 294-372.
236. For example, Okin suggests that a more explicit consideration of "the standpoint of women
in gendered society" might lead to a greater focus in conceptions of the good on relationships and
traditionally more female contributions to human life. OKIN, JUSTICE, supra note 174, at 107-08.
But see S.M. Okin, Thinking like a Woman, in THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL DIFFRENCE 145, 145 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 1990) (cautioning about the stereotype of women as unfit for
citizenship because of excessive attachment within a small relational circle).
237. For example, Rawls posits the Aristotelian principle as a "deep psychological fact":
"[O]ther things equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of their realized capacities (their innate or
trained abilities), and this enjoyment increases the more the capacity is realized, or the greater its
complexity." RAWLS, supra note 9, at 426. It is a fair question whether such a principle captures
many of the routinized, daily tasks involved in care giving and nurturing. Yet, Rawls prefaces his
discussion with the statement that "the general facts of social interdependency must be reckoned
with." Id. at 424. For a feminist critique of the devaluation of dailiness and housekeeping, see
Judith Resnik, Housekeeping: The Nature andAllocation of Work in FederalTrial Courts, 24 GA. L.
REv.909 (1990).
238. See OKIN, JUSTICE, supra note 174; Okin, Reason, supra note 174.
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assumption that families are just and claims that his theory gives inadequate attention to the issue of justice in the gender system, embodied in
large part in the family, which, Rawls claims, is one of the fundamental
structures of society through which a sense of justice (and care) is inculcated. 3 9 Yet Okin argues that the feminist potential of Rawls's theory is
considerable. In particular, she points out that it can be drawn upon as a
source of feminist criticism and as a tool for change both domestically
and internationally if we assume that in the original position persons do
not know their sex and if the family and the gender system are subject to

scrutiny. 24
B.

DWORKIN'S VISION OF LIBERALISM IS NOT ATOMISTIC NOR
DOES IT LACK A VIEW OF HUMAN CONNECTION

1. Dworkin'sDistinctiveness From Rawls
If feminist critiques of liberalism have linked Rawls with the disembodied individual, they have associated Dworkin with an isolating focus
on rights.2 4 1 And some feminists have tended to treat Rawls and Dworkin as virtually identical.2 42 Yet Dworkin stands in interesting contrast
to Rawls, for he voices criticisms of some versions of liberalism that are
similar to those raised by some feminists. Dworkin does not rest his
defense of liberalism on a social contract model,24 3 nor does he embrace
the priority of the right over the good. 2" He challenges the separation of
OKIN, JUSTICE, supra note 174, at 97-101.
240. Id. at 101-09. Okin focuses in particular upon the gendered division of labor in society at
present and how the difference principle could affect such division. Martha Fineman applauds
Okin's critique yet criticizes her focus on a rather limited definition of the family as a monogamous,
heterosexual couple and their children. Martha Fineman, Book Review, 101 ETHICS 647 (1991)
(reviewing OuIN, JUSTICE). Recently, Okin has argued that Rawls's device of the original position,
with its veil of ignorance, can provide a powerful Archimedean point across cultures in critiquing
practices perpetuating women's subordination. See S.M. Okin, Gender Inequality and Cultural Differences (unpublished manuscript, delivered Oct. 24, 1991 at New York University School of Law's
Colloquium in Law, Philosophy, and Political Theory).
241. See, eg., West, supranote 14, at 52, 71 n.140. Feminist critiques of Dworkin have focused
primarily on TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 9, his first book, and his essay, Liberalism,
reprintedin DWORKIN, A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 9, at 181. With the exception of his
essays on abortion, see infra note 281, his more recent work, including his article on community,
Liberal Community, 77 CAL. L. REv. 479 (1989), and his elaboration of the philosophical foundations of liberalism, supra note 229, has received little or no critical attention from feminists. But see
Drucilla L. Cornell, Institutionalizationof Meaning, Recollective Imagination and the Potentialfor
TransformativeLegal Interpretation, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1135 (1988) (critiquing LAW'S EMPIRE,
supra note 9).
242. See, e.g., Sherry, supra note 2; Held, supra note 20.
243. See DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 9, at 192-93, 206; Dworkin, supra note 229, at
22-26.
244. Dworkin, supra note 229, at 3-6.

239.
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ethics and politics or, as he distinguishes them, the personal and the
political.24
I will demonstrate that Dworkin's vision of the person and of society, particularly in his most recent work, is far from atomistic, but recognizes both connection and responsibility and contains elements of both
the ethic of justice and the ethic of care. In fact, those two ethics blend
together in Dworkin's conception of liberalism in ways that challenge the
demarcation of them as distinct.
2. Equal Concern and Respect
Dworkin's vision of the way in which government must treat persons embraces both justice and care perspectives. As he explains the constitutive principle of liberalism, equal concern and respect:
[G]overnment must treat those whom it governs with concern, that is,
as human beings who are capable of suffering and frustration, and with
respect, that is, as human beings who are capable of forming and acting
on intelligent conceptions of how their lives should be lived. 246
This principle embodies not only respect, understood essentially as
autonomy or the capacity for self-determination, but also concern, which
stems from a notion of vulnerability and need.24 7
Dworkin illustrates the meaning of equal concern and respect by
showing that it entails a right to treatment as an equal as distinguished
from a right to equal treatment: "If I have two children, and one is dying
from a disease that is making the other uncomfortable, I do not show
equal concern if I flip a coin to decide which should have the remaining
dose of a drug."2 4 8 Clearly, equal concern is not myopic with regard to
differences among people and their needs.2 49
245. Id. at 6, 13.
246. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 9, at 272 (emphases added).

247. In this regard, Dworkin parallels Bentham in focusing on the human capacity to suffer,
although he combines this emphasis with a Kantian notion of respect based on capacity for choice.
See H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM 98 (1982) (For Bentham, "Et]he question is not can they
reason? nor can they talk? but can they suffer?") (quoting JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1970)).
248. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 9, at 227.
249. See GILLIGAN, supra note 5,at 166 (suggesting that morally mature view of equality moves
in direction of equity). Although I am not here addressing the adequacy of Dworkin's conception of
equality with regard to the equal treatment/special treatment debate among feminist legal theorists,
Herma Hill Kay suggests that Dworkin's distinction between the right to equal treatment and the
right to be treated as an equal is "helpful." See Herma Hill Kay, Models ofEquality, 1985 U. ILL. L.
REV. 39, 87.
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Thus, Dworkin's conception of equality combines notions of both
reciprocity and response. According to Dworkin, the principle of equal
concern and respect
requires that officials and those who control them treat citizens with
the same concern and respect as they show themselves ....Those in
power are meant to treat others as they treat themselves, not in the
sense of supplying for them only the same goods and opportunities

they take themselves, so that a masochistic tyrant could justly torture
everyone along with himself, but in the more fundamental sense of
attempting, so far as it is possible, to see the situation of each person

defined through the ambitions and values of that person, just as he
must see his own situation defined through his own ambitions and values in order to have that grasp of himself as an entity that is necessary
to self-consciousness and therefore to self-identity.2 50
Clearly, one does not merely substitute oneself for the other but engages
in perspective taking that attempts to see the other in the other's own
terms. Both Rawls, through the duty of mutual respect, and Dworkin,
through a notion of equal concern and respect, espouse a perspective taking (claimed by feminists to be missing from the ethic of justice) that is
similar to that associated with the ethic of care.2 5 ' Thus, equal respect is
not, as Gilligan suggests, primarily about "balancing the claims of other
and self," but involves "an understanding" of the other and "recognition
of differences" in the other that may give rise to compassion and care.2 52
3.

The Challenge Model of Ethics

In his Tanner Lectures on liberal equality, Dworldn articulates a
defense of liberal political theory derived from a conception of liberal
ethics described as a "challenge model of ethics."2'53 He notes that liberalism, as traditionally defended, runs contrary to individual experience
by apparently asking people to be detached and impartial in the political
sphere, when they are, in fact, attached, passionate, and committed in
their personal lives.254 In contrast to this discontinuity, Dworkin posits a
continuity between what he calls the personal, including the realm of
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 9, at 356-57.
251. See supra text accompanying notes 178-85. Both Rawls and Dworkin acknowledge Bernard Williams's account of such perspective taking as a component of equality. See Bernard Williams, The Idea of Equality, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, AND SOciETY (Peter Laslett & W.G.
Runciman eds., 1962) (cited in RAWLS, supra note 9, at 337 n.3, and in DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY, supra note 9, at 357 n.1).
252. GILLIGAN, supra note 5, at 164-65 (contrasting an ethic of rights and an ethic of
responsibility).
253. Dworkin, supra note 229, at 16-22.
254. Id. at 12-16.
250.
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ethics, and the political. Furthermore, Dworkin rejects the priority of
the right over the good, 25 5 a key tenet of some forms of liberalism which,
as we have seen, has been a central target of the atomism charge.2 56 In
to his earlier claim that the essence of liberalism is "neutralcontrast
ity,"'2 7 Dworkin argues that the "heart or essence" of liberalism is its
insistence that "liberty, equality, and community are not three distinct
and often conflicting political virtues... but complementary aspects of a
any
single political vision, so that we cannot secure or even understand
25 8
one of these three political ideals independently of the others.
Although a superficial reaction to the name "challenge model of ethics" and to Dworkin's description of it might lead feminists to assume
that there is nothing about it compatible with feminist ideals, a careful
examination suggests the presence of elements of both of the conceptions
of morality mapped by Gilligan. The central motif of the challenge
model of ethics is that of a life lived skillfully: It holds that "a good life
has the inherent value of a skillful performance" and that "events and
achievements.., can have ethical value even when they have no impact
beyond the life in which they occur., 25 9 Dworkin contrasts this model
with the impact model, in which the value of a life is measured by its
objective impact on the world, such that a great humanitarian or successful artist might be said to have lived well." 6 The challenge model does
not mean to suggest that only a life of great adventure or full of internal
challenge is successful, but that "life itself is to be seen as a challenge. "261
,Dworkin's challenge model is rooted in a notion of autonomy in that
one may be viewed as giving oneself "an important self-assignment. 2 62
Dworkin states that the notion of a skillfully lived life includes "impact"255. Id. On the centrality of that tenet, see, for example, John Rawls, The PriorityofRight and
Ideas of the Good, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 251, 251-53 (1988); Rawls, supra note 158, at 250.
256. See supratext accompanying notes 17-20; see also Sherry, supranote 2, at 568-69 (discussing Dworkin on neutrality).
257. See Dworkin, Liberalism, reprintedin DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supranote 9,
at 181, 191-92.
258. Dworkin, supra note 229, at 7. Dworkin had previously abandoned his claim about neutrality in Ronald Dworkin, Why Liberals Should Care about Equality, reprinted in DWORKIN, A
MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 9, at 205, 205-06.
259. Dworkin, supra note 229, at 57.
260. Id. at 55-57. Dworkin argues that an impact model would exclude much of what we consider valuable in and important to a good life because of such focus on objective impact. Interestingly, for purposes of this Article, he offers as an example parents' desire to be close with their
children, commenting that parents may hope, but cannot be certain, that their children's lives will be
better as a consequence, but such closeness nonetheless is important to the parents' lives. Id. at 5657. Dworkin does not there address the impact of physical care taking and nurturing upon children.
261. Id. at 62.
262. Id.*at 58.
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type intuitions and ambitions, including responding to the suffering of
others: "[T]he idea that living skillfully means . . . recognizing and

responding to human misery [is] not only [a] possible interpretationnl of
the challenge model but, for many people, [a] compelling interpretationol
'
of it."263
Compare Gilligan's report that the "moral imperative that

emerges repeatedly in interviews with women is an injunction to care, a
responsibility to discern and alleviate the 'real and recognizable trouble'

of this world." 2 Thus, in Dworkin's model of challenge, a life lived
well may include not only self-realization through artistic and other individual accomplishments but also helping others. Clearly, his challenge
model is not atomistic but embraces a notion of connection through

many forms of relationships and associations, including political community, as well as through responding to the needs of others. In the terms
of Gilligan's twin voices, the challenge model of ethics represents moral
maturity, as it allows for recognition of the needs of the self as well as
those of others.265

The challenge model of ethics calls for toleration in political life.
Liberal equality is committed to toleration of different views of what

makes life go well because it recognizes, under the challenge model, that
"someone's life cannot be improved against his steady conviction that it
has not been."'2 66 Thus, while liberal equality is neutral or tolerant as to
what Dworkin calls first-person ethics, it is not neutral or tolerant about
third-person ethics, or coercive paternalism.26 7 Further, the law, which
Dworkin categorizes as a resource, would be unequal for those persons
forbidden to lead "the lives they think best for them only because others
'
disagree."268
Thus, while ethical liberals may seek to persuade each

other of the best way to live and to argue for their own conception of the
good, they must not, even if they are in the majority, use the coercive
263. Id. at 119.
264. GILLIGAN, supra note 5, at 100; see also Okm, supra note 236, at 158 (treating this sentiment as a universal principle). Compare also Dworkin's notion of an important self-assignment with
Gilligan's definition of responsibility (from the care perspective) as "taking charge of oneself" by
assessing needs and responding to them, see supra text accompanying notes 99-100.
265. Furthermore, a key theme of such a life is responding appropriately to one's culture and
circumstances. See, eg., Dworkin, supra note 229, at 63, 68-71, 98. Dworkin's emphasis on context
and particular situation, and on the role of each in shaping one's views and choices as to the best life
to lead, is also interesting in view of the feminist embrace of contextuality and particularity and
critique of liberalism's supposed universality. See MINOW, supra note 3, at 194. Dworkin associates
the challenge model with Aristotelian ethics, see Dworkin, supra note 229, at 118, an association also
of interest in light of some feminists' invocation of an Aristotelian focus on virtue. See, e.g., Sherry,
supra note 2, at 547 n.14.
266. Dworkin, supra note 229, at 116.
267. Id. at 117.
268. Id. at 115.

1992]

"A TOMISTIC MAN" REVISITED

1223

power of the state to "forbid anyone to lead the life he wants, or punish
him for doing so, just on the ground that they think his ethical convictions are wrong. ''1 69 Hence, on Dworkin's conception of equality, not
unlike Rawls's conception of justice, liberalism secures the conditions in
which people can live out their conceptions of the good.
4. Fraternity/Sororityand Community
Although feminists sometimes criticize Dworkin as espousing a contractarian theory,2 7 ° he has expressly disavowed such a theory. In Law's
Empire, Dworkin instead advances a notion of community or fraternity/
sorority as the best basis for political legitimacy:
The best defense of political legitimacy-the right of a political community to treat its members as having obligations in virtue of collective
community decisions-is to be found not in the hard terrain of contracts or duties of justice or obligations of fair play that might hold
among strangers, where philosophers have hoped to find it, but in the
more fertile ground of fraternity, community, and their attendant obligations. Political association, like family and friendship and other
forms of association more local and intimate, is in itself pregnant of
obligation.27
Thus, contrary to relational feminist claims that liberal legalism
focuses one-sidedly on rights and knows nothing of civic responsibilities,2 72 Dworkin proposes that political community be viewed as a community of principle with attendant obligations, or responsibilities, of
269. Id. at 115. Of course, such toleration does not extend to ethical ideals challenging liberal
equality's foundational principles of justice, ideals that are for that reason disapproved. Thus, ethical toleration is not compromised "when a racist is thwarted who claims that his life's mission is to
promote white superiority." Id. at 117. Many feminists would argue that production and consumption of pornography should be similarly disapproved. Although Dworkin has endorsed certain
restrictions upon pornography, he has not endorsed feminist arguments against pornography rooted
in arguments based on harm to women. See Ronald Dworkin, Do We Have a Right to Pornography?,
reprintedin DWORKIN, A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 9, at 335, 353-59 (agreeing with conclusions of the Williams Report on revising British obscenity law but defending a right to private
consumption of pornography derived from a right to moral independence; feminist arguments not
discussed or at issue); Ronald Dworkin, Liberty andPornography,N.Y. REv. BooKS, Aug. 15, 1991,
at 12, 14 (discussing litigation arising out of the Indianapolis antipornography ordinance drafted by
MacKinnon and other feminists and finding causal arguments about the role of pornography in
defining and silencing women "strikingly implausible" in view of likely greater impact and arguable
harm to women of "subtle and ubiquitous" images pervading popular culture.")
270. See, eg., Held, supra note 20, at 288.
271. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 9, at 206. Dworkin calls the word "fraternity"
"unfortunate because it is etymologically masculine" and indicates that he means "sorority" as well,
or the idea common to both terms. Id. at 437 n.13.
272. See, e.g., West, supra note 14, at 71-72.
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membership. While Dworkin's discussion of the family as an example of
a just community is problematic from a feminist perspective-as will be
discussed below 2 7 3 -his drawing upon family, fraternity, and community
in deriving notions of the obligations, or responsibilities, of association is
particularly significant in view of feminist emphasis upon responsibility
and proposals of parental or mother-child models for societal and legal
relationships.
Dworkin, however, distinguishes fraternity or sorority among citizens from feelings like love:
It bears repeating that nothing in this argument suggests that the citizens of a nation state, or even a smaller political community, either do
or should feel for one another any emotion that can usefully be called
love. Some theories of ideal community hold out that possibility:
[T]hey yearn for each citizen to embrace all others in emotions as
profound, and with an equivalent merger of personality, as those of
lovers or the most intimate friends or the members of an intensely
devoted family. Of course we could not interpret the politics of any
political community as expressing that level of mutual concern, nor is
this ideal attractive.
For, Dworkin cautions:
The general surrender of personality and autonomy it contemplates
would leave people too little room for leading their own lives rather
than being led along them; it would destroy the very emotions it celebrates. Our lives are rich because they are complex in the layers and
character of the communities we inhabit. If we felt nothing more for
lovers or friends or colleagues than the most intense concern we could
possibly feel for all fellow
citizens, this would mean the extinction not
2 74
the universality of love.
Dworkin's argument appears to reject anything like West's invocation of
2 75
the need for love in public life.
Other feminists echo Dworkin's delineation of different spheres of
community and different levels of feeling appropriate to each. 276 Similarly, his concern about the need for some room in which to experience
one's autonomy and lead one's own life is echoed by feminist cautioning
about the need for some zone of noninterference and the danger of forced
community.2 77 At the same time, his fear of the surrender of autonomy
273.

See infra text accompanying notes 279-83.

274.

DWORKMN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 9, at 215.

275. See West, supra note 44.
276. See supra text accompanying note 72.
277. See supra text accompanying notes 69-71.
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and merger of personality could easily, though not persuasively, be interpreted by relational feminists applying object relations theory as manifesting the classic dilemma of the infant male who must separate from
278
the mother.
5. Sexual Equality and the Family
Certain of Dworkin's examples of just and unjust communities fail
to address adequately the sexual equality of women and women's autonomy within the family.2 79 For example, in exploring what role justice
will play in interpreting one's associative obligations, Dworkin posits a
culture that accepts equality of the sexes but "in good faith thinks that
equality of concern requires paternalistic protection for women in all
aspects of family life," including parental control of a daughter's marriage. He suggests that the daughter experiences a genuine conflict about
her responsibilities, and that if she marries against her father's choice,
she "owes him at least an accounting, and perhaps an apology, and
should in other ways strive to continue her standing as a member of the
' 280
community she otherwise has a duty to honor.
But a culture that interprets equality of the sexes to permit a paternalism within the family that affects "all aspects of family life" can
hardly be consistent with a satisfactory vision of sexual equality, or of
equal concern and respect.2 8 ' Such paternalism, although the "only"
unjust feature, is no small matter. As Drucilla Cornell has stated, the
inequality imagined in Dworkin's paternal refusal of a daughter's right to
marry is "exactly what makes the achievement of justice within the family necessary if so-called intimacy is not to be turned into a bad excuse
for masculine power. ' 282 Thus, while Dworkin's model of associative
obligation for a political community puts explicit focus on responsibility,
and is certainly not atomistic, his discussion of family obligation illustrates the potential for oppression as well as care in women's experience
of connection (as Gilligan and West have recognized) and confirms the
278. See supra text accompanying notes 29-31.
279. To explain the circumstances in which a true community exists such that its members have
obligations or responsibilities to it, Dworkin articulates a model of a community of principle or
integrity. See DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 9, at 214. However, Dworkin notes that even
such genuine communities with integrity may be unjust and takes up the issue of whether a member
has obligations to such a community nonetheless. Id. at 202-05.
280. Id. at 205.
281. This example is especially jarring, considering Dworkin's sensitivity elsewhere to issues of
women's autonomy. See, ag., Ronald Dworkin, The GreatAbortion Case, N.Y. REv. BooKs, June
29, 1989, at 49; Ronald Dworkin, The Future ofAbortion, N.Y. REv. BooKs, Sept. 28, 1989, at 47.
282. Cornell, supra note 241, at 1174-75.
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need to bring justice to bear on28the
family in a meaningful way (as Okin's
3
critique of Rawls points out).
6.

Liberal Community and Integration

Finally, in Liberal Community, Dworkin further develops the
notion of political community and its attendant responsibilities by articulating a conception of integration through which the individual identifies
with the collective life of the political community. 2 4 Dworkin's conception of integration calls into question West's recent claim that liberal
legalism "demands nothing of the citizen beyond self-regarding behavior. ' 28 5 Dworkin puts forward a form of civic republicanism that he
finds consonant with liberalism. His model of integration reveals a
model of self and community that is not atomistic. The model contains
an expanded notion of self-definition for purposes of the collective life of
a political community, understood as its formal political acts.2 86
But, Dworkin argues, limiting collective life to formal political acts
'287
does not mean that integration "adds nothing to political morality.
Dworkin contrasts the "integrated liberal's" attitude toward politics with
the nonintegrated, "paragon of liberalism" supposed by its critics (as dis288
tinguished from the "selfish individual of invisible-hand fantasies").
While such a paragon is "moved by a sense of justice" to work for what
justice demands, "[h]e will not count his own life as any less successful"
if, despite his best efforts, injustice persists (unless he is its victim). 28 9 In
contrast:
The integrated liberal will not separate his private and public lives in
that way. He will count his own life as diminished-a less good life
283. See supra text accompanying notes 109-12 & 236-240. Dworkin's hypothetical replicates
the association of the father with authority, the traditional division of labor within the family.
Absent in his discussion of associative obligation is whether either parent takes responsibility for
care. See RUDDICK, supra note 51, at 42 ('The point about-or against-Fathers is that their
authority is not earned by care and indeed undermines the maternal authority that is so earned.").
284. Dworkin, supra note 241, at 499.
285. West, supra note 14, at 75-76.
286. See Dworkin, supra note 241, at 499-502. Dworkin confines the scope of the collective life
of a political community to its formal political life, for example, legislation, adjudication, enforcement and other executive functions of government. Id. at 500. Attacking the communitarian argument made by Justice White in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), Dworkin argues for liberal
tolerance of homosexuality and rejects the notion of a "collective sex life" such that a community
may use the law to support its vision of ethical decency. Dworkin, supra note 241, at 479. See infra
text accompanying notes 398-429 (discussing protection of rights notwithstanding community
disapproval).
287. Dworkin, supra note 241, at 501.
288. Id.
289.

Id.
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than he might have had-if he lives in an unjust community, no matter
how hard he has tried to make it just. That fusion of political morality
and critical self-interest seems to me to be the true nerve of civic republicanism, the important way in which individual citizens should merge
their interests and personality into political community. It states a dis2 90
tinctly liberal ideal, one that flourishes only within a liberal society.
Thus, "integration" goes further than "fraternity" or "sorority."
Although Dworkin distinguishes fraternity from a merger of personality,
akin to that among lovers or friends or family, integration welcomes a
form of citizens' merger of personalities and interests into political community. Citizens so connected share one another's political fate and a
29 1
commitment to make society just.
Indeed, precisely such a sense of connection can threaten one's personal attachments and life projects where such pervasive injustice exists
that one's acceptance of responsibility to repair the political community
results in a denial of those personal projects and attachments. 9 2 Hence,
Dworkin concludes that, because a just community is a prerequisite for a
life respecting both the "particular responsibilities" of our personal lives
and our political responsibilities, a political community has an "ethical
primacy" over our individual lives.29 3
7.

Rights and Responsibilities

I have used illustrations from Dworkin's presentation of liberalism
to challenge the relational feminist critique of liberalism as atomistic and
to challenge the distinctions drawn between justice and care, equality and
attachment, reciprocity and response, and rights and responsibilities.
Autonomy, far from licensing citizens' atomistic, self-regarding behavior
under the guise of rights and neutrality, is resonant with ethical responsibility, and community membership gives rise to associative obligations
and responsibilities. Of course, Dworkin's view of a citizen's integration
with and obligations to the political community might not satisfy the
strongest desires for connection. And, in order for such a vision of integration or fraternity/sorority to be attractive to feminists, the political
290. Id.
291. Id.; cf.RAwLs, supra note 9, at 102 (describing citizens who agree to share one another's
fate, discussed supra text accompanying notes 220-29).
292. Dworkin, supra note 241, at 504. Compare Gilligan's claim that women need to reject
equation of feminine goodness with self-sacrifice, discussed supra text accompanying notes 109-12.
Here, however, it is a concern with "justice," not "care," that threatens one's own self-development
and attachments.
293. Id. See also Dworkin, supra note 229, at 88 (explaining ethical priority in light of the
challenge model).
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community must truly conceive justice and equality to include justice
and sexual equality for women. Finally, "taking rights seriously" is not
the only component of Dworkin's vision of liberalism. As I will suggest
below, however, rights and the "insulation" that they afford are important for all persons, and rights should not and need not be rejected in the
embrace of responsibility.
IV. KINDRED CONCERNS OF FEMINISM AND
LIBERALISM: PROPOSALS FOR A DUTY TO AID
I now shall examine further the feminist atomism critique of liberalism by considering proposals for the translation of relational feminist
ideals into law. I shall focus on feminist analyses of two legal issues, the
no duty to rescue rule in tort law and women's reproductive freedom. In
each instance, themes of responsibility and relationships are said to stand
in opposition to rights and autonomy. Critical of liberalism's supposed
"atomistic" approach in both areas, feminist analysis proposes a relational approach, telling us that we should view the stranger in peril and
the woman making the abortion decision as connected to others. Yet,
application of an ethic of care analysis takes different directions in the
tort and the abortion contexts, with different implications for our understanding of responsibility and autonomy. I will explore whether a feminist ethic of care analysis arguing for a duty to aid in tort can be
reconciled with an ethic of care analysis justifying abortion.
In examining the tort and reproductive freedom issues, I will argue
that liberal treatment of such issues shows kindred concerns with relational feminism but offers better protection to self-determination,
whether understood as autonomy (as liberals have termed it) or as
responsibility (as relational feminists have termed it). Ironically, the
emphasis by some relational feminists upon connection, combined with a
devaluation of autonomy, poses a special threat to women in the area
from which the ethic of care and the connection thesis in large part
derive-women's potential to be mothers.

A.

BENDER'S FEMINIST PROPOSAL: FROM THE "BAD MAN" TO THE
"GOOD NEIGHBOR"

Leslie Bender asserts: "Tort law needs to be more of a system of
response and caring than it is now. Its focus should be on interdependence and collective responsibility rather than on individuality, and on
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safety and help for the injured rather than on 'reasonableness' and economic efficiency." 294 She urges that we reject Justice Holmes's advice to
set the legal standard "at the minimum" and "write laws for the 'bad
man.' "295 Instead, she contends that "[tihe law can be a positive force in
encouraging and improving our social relations, rather than reinforcing
our divisions, disparities of power, and isolation. 2 96 Bender proposes to
reform the tort law standard of care, which she associates with the masculine voice, to reflect the ethic of care associated with Gilligan's conception of a different, feminine voice.29 7 I have chosen this example both for

its specificity and because of the potential application of its aspirational
principles to other areas of law.2 98
With respect to tort law generally, Bender proposes to "convert the
present standard of 'care of a reasonable person under the same or similar circumstances' to a standard of 'conscious care and concern of a
294. Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primeron Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDuc. 3, 4
(1988) [hereinafter Bender, Primer]. Bender presents her article as a "primer" on "a few of the
major components of feminist theory." Id. at 3. Her critique of liberal theory is similar to that
discussed above. She has subsequently explored other ways in which feminist insights could transform tort law. See Leslie Bender, Changing the Values in Tort Law, 25 TULSA L.J. 759 (1990);
Bender, supra note 75.
295. Bender, Primer,supra note 294, at 31 (quoting O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10
HARV. L. REv. 457 (1897)).
296. Id. Other feminist legal theorists have also expressed an aspirational view of the role of law
and social institutions. See, eg., Matsuda, supra note 161, at 628; Ruth Colker, Feminism, Theology,
and Abortion. Toward Love, Compassion, and Wisdom, 77 CAL. L. REv. 1011 (1989).
297. Bender, Primer,supra note 294, at 3, 28-32. Bender contrasts existing tort law with that of
a feminine voice:
Tort law should begin with a premise of responsibility rather than rights, of interconnectedness rather than separation, and a priority of safety rather than profit or efficiency.
The masculine voice of rights, autonomy, and abstraction has led to a standard that protects efficiency and profit; the feminine voice can design a tort system that encourages
behavior that is caring about others' safety and responsive to others' needs or hurts, and
that attends to human contexts and consequences.
Id. at 31-32. Recently, Bender has called for a "paradigm shift," driven by the "feminist voice of
responsibility," from the existing "rights-based focus" to a "focus on both care and rights/justice."
Bender, supranote 75, at 905, 907. In Bender, Primer,supranote 294, Bender appears to be offering
a view of responsibility not fully captured by either the "individualist" or "communalist" models
described by J.M. Balkin. See J.M. Balkin, The Rhetoric of Responsibility, 76 VA. L. REv. 197, 20608 (1990) (differentiating positions based on whether they deemphasize or emphasize persons'
responsibility for the effect of their behavior on others through manipulation of time frames and
notions of causation).
298. Bender has made a valuable contribution by addressing a specific area of law so that we can
examine what the ethic of care might mean in law. Admittedly, she presents her proposal in a brief
"primer" and does not discuss all of the issues raised by her proposal that I explore. Others working
with the rights/responsibilities dichotomy have also focused on the no duty to rescue rule. See, eg.,
GLENDON, supra note 25, at 76-108 (chapter entitled "The Missing Language of Responsibility,"
linking "the (missing) duty to rescue" with "the (missing) duties of government," as exemplified in
the language of DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989)).
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responsible neighbor or social acquaintance for another under the same
or similar circumstances.' "299 She recognizes that "we all care differently for family and friends than we do for strangers, ' ' 300 and thus proposes that "[tihe closer or more intimate the relationship, the greater our
duty of care to that person. ' 30 1 Yet she also seeks to ensure that the
stranger is protected: "The law should not permit us casually to cast
aside another's safety, health, or interests because we do not personally
know the random person who might be injured. ' 3 2 Bender's responsible
neighbor achieves concern about the stranger by imagining the stranger
whom we "affect by our 'carelessness'" as interconnected to "other peo'30 3
ple. . .- family, friends, colleagues, neighbors, communities.
In particular, Bender proposes reform of a tort doctrine she and her
students have found particularly "reprehensible," the no duty to rescue
rule.3 4 Under that rule, "[e]xcept when the person endangered and the
potential rescuer are linked in a special relationship, there is no such
duty. ' 30 5 Bender recounts how her students overcome their initial intuitive reaction that the "no duty" rule is wrong once "they take a distanced, objective posture informed by liberalism's concerns for autonomy
and liberty. ' 30 6 Such a move includes application of a "vision of human
nature as atomistic, self-interested, and as free from constraint as
possible.

' 30 7

Bender attacks the traditional no duty rule with a "new legal perspective informed by a feminist ethic based upon notions of caring,
responsibility, interconnectedness, and cooperation. ' 30 8 Acknowledging
that the traditional rule is "slowly changing," Bender asserts that "a feminist perspective that gives priority to interconnectedness, relationships,
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

Bender, Primer,supra note 294, at 31.
Id. at 32.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. The particular case found especially reprehensible is Yania v. Bigan, 155 A.2d 343 (Pa.

1959), in which Bigan invites Yania, a business competitor, onto his property, "inveigles" him to
jump into a deep trench, and then merely looks on as Yania drowns.
305. Ernest J. Weinrib, The Casefor a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247, 247 (1980); see also
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEnTON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 56, at 375-77 (5th ed.

1984); see infra note 325 (discussing types of special relationships that have been recognized).
306. Bender, Primer,supra note 294, at 33.
307. Id. Glendon similarly focuses on the experiences of first year law students in courses on
torts and criminal law. GLENDON, supra note 25, at 80-81, 85-86. Glendon faults the courts that
have decided such no duty to rescue cases for using language that is particularly shocking and for

failing to acknowledge that the law is only one of many coexisting systems of social norms and that it
does not exhaust our moral duties and traditions of mutual aid. Id. at 79-89.
308. Bender, Primer,supra note 294, at 34.
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caring, and concrete factual realities can provide a coherent framework
for change. ' '3c 9 As Bender casts the problem, focusing on autonomy
obscures the fact that a human being is in peril:
If we put abstract reasoning and autonomy aside momentarily, we can
see what else matters. In defining duty, what matters is that someone,
a human being, a part of us, is drowning and will die without some
affirmative action. That seems more urgent, more imperative, more
important than any possible infringement of individual autonomy by
the imposition of an affirmative duty. If we think about the stranger as
a human being for a moment, we may realize that much more is
involved than balancing one person's interest in having his life saved
and another's interest in not having affirmative duties imposed upon
him in the absence of a special relationship, although even then the
balance seems to me to weigh
in favor of imposing a duty or standard
310
of care that requires action.
Thus, Bender rejects a simple balancing of the autonomy of the
potential rescuer against the life of a person in peril, arguing that the
urgency of the latter's need should outweigh any "infringement of [the
former's] individual autonomy by the imposition of an affirmative
duty. ' 311 Moreover, instead of balancing the interests of those two persons in isolation, Bender expands the problem to include the value of the
person in peril, and the harm caused by his or her loss, to all other persons interconnected with and dependent upon him or her:
The drowning stranger is not the only person affected by the lack of
care... . He no doubt has people who care about him-parents,
spouse, children, friends, colleagues; groups he participates in-religious, social, athietic, artistic, political, educational, work-related; he
may even have people who depend upon him for emotional or financial
support. He is interconnected with others. If the stranger drowns,
309. Id. at 36 n.125. Bender cites case law recognizing exceptions to the traditional rule due to
the existence of special relationships, the Vermont criminal statute imposing a duty to aid in cases of
medical emergency (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (1973)), and some Good Samaritan statutes that
immunize alders from liability in order to encourage rescue. Bender, Primer,supra note 294, at 36
n.126. For discussion of the Vermont statute, see Mark A. Franklin, Vermont Requires Rescue: A
Comment, 25 STAN. L. Rv.51 (1972).
A duty to rescue has been imposed through legislation in many European countries. See THE
GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW (James M. Ratcliffe ed., 1966); Saul Levmore, Waitingfor Rescue: An Essay on the Evaluation and Incentive Structureof the Law of Affirmative Obligation,72 VA.
L. REV. 879 (1986).
310. Bender, Primer, supra note 294, at 34-35 (emphases added).

311. Id.
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many will be harmed. It is not an isolated event with one person's
3 12
interests balanced against another's.
On Bender's account of the care perspective (consistent with Gilligan's),

we overcome depersonalization and establish connection through seeing
the person in peril as "someone's" family member or friend. 13
Based on the above analysis, Bender proposes imposing a "duty of

acting responsibly with the same self-conscious care for the safety of
others that we would give our neighbors or people we know.

' 3 14

That

duty would be generated in part from "a legal recognition of our interconnectedness... and a strong legal value placed on care and concern
for others rather than on economic efficiency or individual liberty."
Bender indicates that the duty would be "shaped by the particular context," but she does not indicate whether it would exist regardless of the
degree of burden or risk placed on the person potentially rendering
aid.3 15
B.

THE TRADITIONAL RATIONALE FOR THE DOCTRINE AND ITS
EROSION THROUGH RECOGNITION OF SPECIAL
RELATIONSHIPS

In evaluating Bender's proposal, and comparing it with liberal

approaches, I shall begin with a brief discussion of the traditional rationale for the no duty to rescue doctrine in tort law. Proposals for reform of

the doctrine, and its erosion through recognition of special relationships
giving rise to a duty to rescue, illustrate the extent to which concerns

about care and connection not explicitly identified as feminist are already
or could be present in law.3 16
312. Id. Similar to Rawls's notion of the harmful "publicity effects" of living in a society where
the duty of mutual aid is not recognized, see supra text accompanying note 234, Bender also recognizes the repercussions of a person's not aiding the stranger in peril on "those who are negatively
affected by the knowledge that it is lawful in our society to do nothing, when one could easily help,
while another is drowning." Bender, Primer,supra note 294, at 35 n.122.
313. See Gilligan, supra note 79, at 32.
314. Bender, Primer,supra note 294, at 35.
315. Id. at 36. Bender notes that if "your own abilities or limitations make you incapable of
providing it, a duty to aid arising from care and concern for another's safety may require you to call
for help expeditiously." Id. Still, it is not clear if she means to include limitations due to physical
danger to oneself or personal responsibilities to others, or merely lack of certain rescue skills.
316. Bender's analysis gives scant attention to the traditional judicial distaste for the doctrine,
even when upholding it, and the numerous proposals by legal and moral philosophers for the recognition of a duty to rescue. Bender cites a number of such articles, merely indicating that "[t]here are
dozens of law review articles dedicated to analyzing the 'no duty' problem." Id. at 33 n. 116.
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Like Bender, many legal commentators have attributed the traditional legal rule to "the highly individualistic philosophy of the older
common law"3'17 and to the "inarticulate assumption[ ]" that "a rugged,
independent individual needs no help from others, save such as they may
be disposed to render him out of kindness, or such as he can induce them
to render by the ordinary process of bargaining, without having the government step in to make them help.1 318 It has also been thought that it is
a greater interference with one's liberty to require one to act than to
refrain from acting: Individuals should not be forced by law to serve or
help one another.3 19
Nonetheless, the traditional legal rule has been widely viewed as
being out of harmony with "the moral obligation of common humanity
to go to the aid of another human being who is in danger ' 3 20 or with the
"universal moral judgment of our society. 3 21 Thus, legal commentators
have characterized decisions applying the rule as "shocking in the
extreme," "unappetizing," "revolting to any moral sense," and the
like.32 2 This disharmony has been accepted on the basis of a distinction
between what the law requires and what morality implores.3 23 Bender
appears to reject any such distinction but nowhere addresses the role that
it has played in the debate over the rule.
Even courts upholding the traditional legal rule have recognized the
moral duty to give aid and have often labeled the conduct of the defendant morally reprehensible, although not legally culpable.32 4 And courts
have significantly eroded the doctrine, primarily through recognizing a
series of exceptions where a special relationship is found between the person in peril and the potential rescuer justifying the imposition of a duty
317. KEETON ET AL., supra note 305, § 56, at 373; see also 3 FowLER V. HARPER, FLEMING
JAMES, JR. & OSCAR S. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 18.6, at 719 (2d ed. 1986) (attributing the rule
to "an attitude of rugged, perhaps heartless, individualism").
318. Robert L. Hale, P=raFacie Tort. Combination, and Non-Feasance,46 COLUM. L. REv.
196, 214 (1946).
319. See, e.g., id.; KEETON ET AL., supra note 305, § 56, at 373; HARPER, JAMES & GRAY,
supra note 317, § 18.6, at 725. Compare the conscription theme in the discussions of prohibiting
abortion, infra text accompanying notes 441-42.
320. KEnTON ET AL., supra note 305, § 56, at 375.
321. HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supranote 317, at 725. But see Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of
Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 189-204 (1973).
322. KEETON ET AL., supra note 305, § 56, at 375-76 & n.22.
323. See Weinrib, supra note 305, at 264-68.
324. See, eg., Union Pacific Ry. v. Cappier, 72 P. 281 (Kan. 1903); Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 44
A. 809 (N.H. 1898); see also Weinrib, supra note 305, at 258-60 & n.48 (noting judges' "moral
revulsion" at defendants' inaction); Epstein, supra note 321, at 193-94 (discussing "judicial distaste
for the doctrine").
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to aid. 3 2 5 To date, some of these special relationships have involved persons engaged in or connected with an enterprise with the promise of economic or other benefit.326 More interesting for purposes of Bender's
proposal are special relationships found simply because of an associative
tie between the persons, for example, social companions and invitors.32 7
Commentators have predicted that special relationships triggering a duty
will similarly be recognized in the cases of parent and child, husband and
wife, nurse and patient, and the like.328
How far can the "special relationship" approach be extended? Is
common humanity or membership in society itself a sufficient basis for
recognition of a relationship creating a legal duty to rescue when one
knows another is in peril? While noting that the "process of extension
has been slow, and marked with extreme caution," Prosser and Keeton
find "reason to think that it may continue until it approaches a general
holding that the mere knowledge of serious peril, threatening death or
great bodily harm to another, which an identified defendant might avoid
with little inconvenience, creates a sufficient relation to impose a duty of
329
action.

Other commentators have suggested that "[t]he time has long
seemed ripe for a pioneering court to take the further step urged by Ames
some decades ago. "331 That step would be to impose a limited duty of
rescue when a reasonable person would have realized the plaintiff's grave
danger, and lack of danger to himself or herself, and where reasonably
effective means of rescue were easily accessible as the potential rescuer
knew or should have known.33 1 These commentators argue that, even
granting that the continuing presence of "significantly individualistic"
values in society requires giving weight to objections to legally enforced
325. Special relationships have been found by some courts to exist in the following instances:
shipmaster-crew, proprietor-business visitor, carrier-passenger, educator-pupil, employer-employee,
jailor-prisoner, hospital-patient-in-need, invitor-invitee. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 305, § 56,
at 376-77.
326. HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 317, § 18.6, at 720.
327. Id. at 723; see also Farwell v. Keaton, 240 N.W.2d 217 (Mich. 1976) (holding that drinking
companion had duty to obtain medical aid for friend who was beaten up).
328. HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 317, § 18.6, at 723; see also KEETON ET AL., supra
note 305, § 56, at 377.
329. KEETON ET AL., supra note 305, § 56, at 377; see Tarasoffv. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551
P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) (invoking societal "interdependence" in finding duty of psychiatrist to warn
strangers who are the potential targets of violent intent confided by client).
330. See HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 317, § 18.6, at 724.
331. Id. at 719 n.10 & 724. However, legal commentators have long raised certain practical
objections to a duty to rescue, such as indeterminacy problems in identifying who the potential
rescuer is. See infra note 372 and text accompanying notes 349-51.
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unselfishness or altruism, such values would be properly safeguarded
both by the limitations on the proposed duty and
by its coincidence with
332
"the universal moral judgment of our society.,
C.

LIBERAL PROPOSALS: DuTY OF MUTUAL AID OR
DUTY OF BENEFICENCE

Most commentators have not viewed the imposition of a legal duty
to rescue as barred by concerns of individual autonomy and liberty.33 3
Their view of the individual has not been atomistic; nor have they
regarded the imposition of such a duty as a violation of autonomy.
Instead, they have urged that the failure to recognize a legal duty echoing commonly held moral notions has been an aberration that should be
corrected.
Liberals have argued, for example, that the common humanity of all
persons and their vulnerability to life-threatening situations is a basis for
a duty of mutual aid or a duty of beneficence. Although it lies beyond
334
the scope and purposes of this Article to discuss each such proposal, I
would like to examine the duty proposed by Ernest Weinrib and one that
can be derived from Rawls's work as illustrative.3 35
Rawls's justification of a natural duty of mutual aid rests upon the
value of living in a society where trust and confidence obtain because of
persons' assurance that they can depend upon others to come to their aid
when they need assistance. This account seems consonant with Bender's
plea that the drowning stranger be viewed as a human being "interconnected with others. ' 336 Yet Bender arrives at her analysis through the
step of transforming the stranger into a potential neighbor by imagining
332. Id. at 725. Compare the rejection of a "woman's exception" to individualism in the context of Good Samaritanism and abortion, discussed infra text accompanying notes 436-49.
333. In the past century, Richard Epstein stands virtually alone in attempting to justify the no
duty to rescue rule. See Weinrib, supra note 305, at 259 (discussing Epstein, supra note 321).
Bender addresses Epstein's defense. Bender, Primer,supra note 294, at 35-36 n.125.
Epstein defends the rule on libertarian grounds, criticizing imposition of a duty to rescue primarily because it would undermine the tort concept of causation and erode the boundaries of individual liberty. In view of Bender's critique of tort law as lacking an adequate conception of
responsibility, see id., it is striking that Epstein rejects imposing a legal duty to rescue on the ground
that it would violate a notion of moral responsibility. Epstein, supra note 321, at 189-204. For a
critique, see Richard A. Posner, Epstein's Tort Theory: A Critique, 8 J. LEGAL STuD. 457 (1979).
334. See Weinrib, supra note 305 (addressing two centuries of such thought).
335. See id. Rawls does not address whether the duty of mutual aid should be legally enforced,
but he does indicate that people in the original position would likely adopt it as a natural duty. See
RAwLS, supranote 9, at 115-16. One could use a Rawlsian framework in arguing for the imposition
of a legal duty.
336. Bender, Primer,supra note 294, at 35.
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her or his connections to other human beings. As indicated above, the
natural duty articulated by Rawls derives from one's common humanity
with other human beings and does not depend on actual (or imagined)
337
intimate or associative relationships.
In fact, Bender likewise may ultimately ground the duty to aid on
recognition of common humanity, since she suggests that the focus on
individual autonomy has prevented us from seeing that "a human being,
a part of us," is at risk. 338 Rawls, while valuing individual autonomy,
recognizes the importance of persons' attachment to others and concern
for their flourishing. Consistent with his view of society as a fair scheme
of cooperation, Rawls notes the role that the duty of mutual aid plays in
people's trust of others and in communicating that society is not "indifferent" to human life-just as Bender counts as a harm of the no duty to
rescue rule the detrimental effect on others caused by the "knowledge
that it is lawful in our society to do nothing. ' 33 9 Given that both Rawls
and Bender envision a nonatomistic society, is Bender's proposed step
from stranger to neighbor necessary or preferable?
Weinrib argues for a judicial creation of a "duty of easy rescue,"
that is, "a duty that would arise whenever one person is caught in a
dangerous situation that another can alleviate at no significant cost to
himself," premised on certain notions of benevolence implicit in the law
of contract. 340 He contends that, while a market society generally relies
upon contract to regulate human interaction where tort and criminal law
do not otherwise apply, there are certain situations, where people are in
positions of need, helplessness, and dependency, in which the law does
not view them as market actors possessing equal bargaining position.3 4
Instead, the law has imposed tort liability upon others and has tolerated
"the deprivation of liberty involved in coercing them to act" with benevolence that is not exacted from market actors.34 2 In the context of a
person in an emergency situation in need of rescue, Weinrib argues that a
market analysis is similarly inappropriate and also that an administrative
337. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
338. See Bender, supra note 294, at 34.
339. See supra text accompanying notes 234-312.
340. Weinrib, supra note 305, at 250.
341. Id. at 272. Weinrib uses family members and police officers as examples of the law's
refusal to treat persons in those roles as "market agents" and its consequent tolerance for the deprivation of liberty involved in coercing them to act. It is assumed that natural affection will suffi-

ciently motivate family members to assist each other. Only when "natural affection is clearly
inadequate" does the law consider regulating family relations. Id. at 271.
342. Id.
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solution is insufficient to ensure that the person will receive the needed
benefit.34 3
Weinrib suggests that a legal duty of easy rescue can be justified
philosophically by recourse to either of the two dominant traditions of
moral philosophy, the utilitarian or the Kantian. 34 Weinrib finds the
latter tradition a preferable philosophical basis because a utilitarian pleasure-pain calculus does not adequately recognize the unique nature of the
harm at issue in a rescue situation-deprivation of life itself or suffering
of physical injury. In his resistance to a balancing approach because of
the significance of what is at stake for the person in danger, Weinrib
resembles Bender.

34 5

From the Kantian deontological tradition, Weinrib derives a notion
of personhood that recognizes the importance of physical integrity as a
precondition to life and the carrying out of one's life projects.

346

He

argues that the moral point of view leads the individual to "concede to
others the right to physical integrity that he implicitly and inevitably
claims for himself. ' 34 7 The general duty of beneficence derives from this

right and encompasses the duty to preserve the physical security of
another.348 Weinrib arguably preserves autonomy by imagining that

each individual would voluntarily recognize the legitimacy of another's
right to physical integrity.
Weinrib recognizes the traditional objections to enforcement of a
legal duty of beneficence because of its general and indeterminate
343. Id. at 272-73. Weinrib draws analogies to the necessity doctrine and to case law in which
courts have held unenforceable onerous contracts extracted by rescuers.
344. Id. at 279-80. With respect to the utilitarian tradition, Bentham recognized the appropriateness of a legal duty to rescue. In modem American legal history, Ames proposed a utilitarian
defense of such a legal duty. Although Kant recognized a moral duty, he did not view it as an
appropriate subject for legal obligation. Id. at 265-67, 279-92.
345. Id. at 286-87; cf Bender, Primer,supra note 294, at 34. However, whereas Bender speaks
of connections, Weinrib focuses on the preconditions of life itself.
346. Weinrib, supra note 305, at 287-89.
347. Id. at 288.
348. Id. Such a general duty would apply to other types of human needs related to life and
health. However, Weinrib recognizes the appropriate role of social institutions in meeting many of
those needs (i.e., where an institutional arrangement is adequate) in lieu of requiring individuals to
meet them in particular contexts. While not adopting the position that the Due Process Clauses of
the Constitution impose affirmative obligations upon the federal and state governments, Glendon
criticizes the Supreme Court's opinion in DeShaney for failing to acknowledge the existence of a
welfare state and seeming to endorse an image of government "that the United States decisively
repudiated in the 1930s." GLENDON, supranote 25, at 94-95. Glendon argues that the Court failed
as a public educator by characterizing constitutional law in a manner that appeared "to put such
statutory welfare commitments in tension with our basic constitutional values." Id. at 97.
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nature.349 He argues that the duty may be sufficiently narrowed in a
principled manner to permit judicial enforcement by focusing on the
emergency nature of the physical endangerment of a particular person, a
situation of imminent peril that is "not general or routine throughout the
society" and that "cannot await assistance from the appropriate social
institutions."3 5 In such particular situations, Weinrib argues, when a
rescuer can alleviate the emergency with "no inconvenience to himself"-that is, "without a significant disruption of his own projects"the rescuer's liberty is not abridged, and the general duty becomes spe31
cific enough to permit judicial enforcement. 1
D.

CRITIQUE OF BENDER'S PROPOSAL

The above liberal arguments for a duty to rescue, which stem from a
duty of mutual aid and a duty of beneficence, derive from notions of
personhood and what we owe each other by virtue of our common
humanity. Like many feminists, Bender criticizes prevailing legal doctrine and theory because it applies universal standards and, as a result,
fails to approach issues contextually and by reference to relationships
and factual particulars.3 52
Unlike those liberal proposals, Bender premises her feminist proposal on a model of a caring neighbor or social acquaintance. She argues
that one has a duty, regardless of the actual relationship, based on the
self-conscious care for the safety of others that responsible (and responsive) persons would give their neighbors or social acquaintances. For
Bender, one is moved to aid a stranger by the recognition that the
stranger is connected to others in familial, friendship, and other relationships. For liberal reformers advocating a less explicitly relational rationale, one is moved to aid a stranger by the recognition that life and health
are constitutive for each person and are a precondition of one's ability to
live and to realize one's life projects and that each person would wish to
live in a society in which she or he could depend on others to come to her
or his aid when doing so would not put the others at significant risk. 35 3 I
349.
350.
351.
persons

Weinrib, supra note 305, at 290.
Id. at 292.
Id. Compare the evolution of a legislatively imposed general duty of hospitals to treat
presenting themselves for emergency care, discussed in GEORGE J. ANNAS, SYLVIA A.
LAW, RAND E. ROSENBLATT & KENNETH R. WING, AMERICAN HEALTH LAW 43-106 (1990).
352. Bender, Primer, supra note 294, at 11, 28; see also MINOW, supra note 3, at 194 (criticizing
the autonomous, individualistic assumption of prevailing legal doctrine because it rests on an image
of "independent man" rather than "interconnected woman").
353. See supra text accompanying notes 333-51.

1992]

"A TOMISTIC MAN" REVISITED

1239

shall argue that models deriving a legal duty to rescue from a notion of
what is owed to all human beings, as human beings or citizens, are a
better basis for recognition of such a duty than is a model of what is
owed to neighbors or social acquaintances.
First, Bender's model does not set any clear limits on the duty to
rescue. In contrast, Weinrib, by recognizing a reciprocal notion of the
personhood of each person and the importance of life and health to each
person's pursuit of her or his life projects, derives a duty of easy rescue
that does not devalue the rescuer's own life and interests or require the
rescuer to put either at significant risk. Similarly, Rawls's argument for a
duty of mutual aid is premised on equal respect of all persons and is
limited by the requirement that such aid can be rendered "without exces354
sive risk or loss to oneself.,
Bender focuses only on the situation of the person in need of rescue,
ignoring the situation of the potential rescuer. To work within the terms
of Bender's model, the potential rescuer also (presumably) stands in a
web of interconnected relationships with and has responsibilities to
others. Risk or loss to oneself will likely also affect that web. Indeed,
when the responsibility analysis is broadened to include the responsibilities and relationships of the potential rescuer, it might actually militate
against rescue. 355 Assessing one's responsibilities to and relationships
with others would not necessarily enter the picture in the case of "easy"
rescue, since the assumption is that there is little or no cost to the potential rescuer. Yet such considerations may well enter the picture as soon
as any significant burden upon or danger to such a person arises. Indeed,
any attempt at rescue that would place the potential rescuer in physical
danger might be considered irresponsible, in view of the costs of relationships and responsibilities connecting such a person with others.35 6 Introducing a parallel notion of the web of connection in which the potential
rescuer stands may inevitably lead to the imposition only of a legal duty
of "easy" rescue or no risk rescue, lest the relationships and responsibilities of persons in peril be favored over those of potential rescuers.
Second, Bender's analysis undervalues individual autonomy in the
sense of self-determination. As we have seen, individual liberty and
autonomy, the values generally assumed to be protected by not imposing
354. RAwLs, supra note 9, at 114.
355. See supra note 315 and accompanying text.
356. For example, after a plane crashed into a bridge in Washington, D.C. in 1981, a man who
rescued victims was praised by some as a hero, yet was publicly criticized by others for being a hero
when he had a family at home to look out for.
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a legal duty to rescue, do not weigh heavily in Bender's analysis when
considered against the value of another's life. Such assessment echoes
the feminist atomism critique's negative valuation of autonomy because
it emphasizes separation over connection.3 s7 Yet, many feminist theorists, including relational feminists, have stressed the importance for
women of autonomy in the sense of self-determination. 358 For example,
an early and continuing theme of feminist jurisprudence has been the
inability of women to experience autonomy because of their subordination to men.35 9
Gilligan warns against equating an ethic of care with female selfsacrifice, urging instead that the final stage of moral development is recognizing the need for personal integrity through focusing on the self as
well as on others, what she calls bringing justice to the care perspective,
or the integration of rights and responsibilities. 3 ° It is neither desirable
nor necessary to embrace a standard that devalues autonomy, since an
ethic of care that regards the self as a proper subject of care can and
should take into account harm and risk to oneself in assessing one's duty
to aid another. Indeed, recognizing this inclusion of self and other,
Judith Areen (citing Weinrib) has suggested that, "[firom the care perspective, one should be a good samaritan to a stranger in need if no other
assistance is available and if the care provided will not be an undue
burden.

, 361

Third, Bender's reliance on a neighbor model is flawed because one
cannot, however regrettably, assume a certain level of care among neighbors. 36 2 Bender's own reference to the horror of the inaction of neighbors who heard Kitty Genovese's cries illustrates the difficulty of a
357. See supra text accompanying notes 28-37 and 79-85.
358. See supra text accompanying notes 69-70.
359. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
360. See supra text accompanying notes 107-12. Bender argues that "[tlort law should begin
with a premise of responsibility rather than rights." Bender, Primer,supra note 294, at 31 (quoted
and discussed supra at note 297).
361. Areen, supra note 63, at 1075-76.
362. See, eg., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 408-09 (1990)
(expressing doubt as to the viability of Bender's "caring neighbor" proposal); Elizabeth Kolbert,
Region Around New York Sees Ties to City Faltering,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1991, at Al, A48 (When a
sampling of adults from New York City and the surrounding region were asked "how much confidence do you have... [t]hat your neighbors would help you in an emergency," thirty-two percent of
city residents reported "a lot of confidence," forty percent "some confidence," and twenty-three
percent "no confidence"; in contrast, sixty percent of regional residents reported "a lot of confidence," twenty-nine percent reported "some confidence," and seven percent reported "no confidence"). The old adage is that "good fences make good neighbors."
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neighbor model amidst urban anonymity.36 3 Furthermore, Bender's proposed legal standard would vary not only from person to person, but
from neighborhood to neighborhood and from community to community. There would be obvious difficulties in articulating or applying the
appropriate standard and, indeed, some relational feminists challenge the
possibility of deriving any rules or standards about caring.36
Fourth, Bender does not need to resort to the neighbor standard
when she could instead derive a duty from what persons have in common
merely as members of the human community. She herself seems to
waver on the need for a relational standard. In the context of duty to
aid, Bender faults the failure to recognize that the stranger in peril is "a
human being, a part of us."' 365 In essence, her standard requires one to
have impersonal regard for the other regardless of whether one has an
associative relationship with the other. Such a duty could also be viewed
as flowing from the obligations of equal citizenship.3 66 While Bender's
method and terminology differ from those of Weinrib and Rawls, the
impetus behind her proposal seems similar: to recognize an obligation to
protect a human being from impairment of life and health that would
threaten the very continuation of that person's life, relationships, and life
projects.
It may be that both the common humanity approach and the neighbor approach capture the moral nerve of the Good Samaritan doctrine.
It was, after all, after Jesus was asked "and who is my neighbor?" that he
told the parable of the Samaritan, a foreigner, aiding the man who had
been left on the road "half dead" by robbers.36 7 The parable addressed
the meaning of the commandment "you shall love your neighbor as yourself" with a tale of compassionate conduct by a stranger and with a
directive to the inquirer to "go and do likewise. '36 8 The point of the
parable seems to be compassionate conduct, regardless of social relationship; the one who "had compassion" for the one in need "proved" to be a
363. Bender, Primer, supra note 294, at 36 n.126.
364. See supra text accompanying notes 142-44. But see POSNER, supra note 362, at 409 (arguing that the effect of Bender's proposal would be to move from negligence to the more "masculine"
regime of strict liability, which is "more rulelike, less standardlike, less contextualist, less sensitive to
the particulars of the individual accident"). Such tort law concepts as the reasonable person reflect
community standards. See Fleming James, Jr., The Qualities of the Reasonable Man in Negligence
Cases, 16 Mo. L. REv. 1 (1951).
365. Bender, Primer,supra note 294, at 34; see supra text accompanying note 310.
366. Exploring how the ethic of care could transform constitutional law, Karst suggests
expanding the notion of responsibility found in equal citizenship to include "not just the duty to
avoid breaking the rules; it would mean care." Karst, supra note 21, at 506.
367. Luke 10:25-37 (Revised Standard Version).
368. Id. at 10:27, 10:37.
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"neighbor."3'69 Likewise, Gilligan speaks of the role of "co-feeling" and

compassion in rendering the stranger less strange and in being able to
respond to the stranger.3 70

If connection connotes only our immediate web of relationships,
then viewing the stranger as a neighbor to others, whom we should treat

as we would treat our neighbors, might be a necessary step in order to
attempt to expand the circle of care. 37 1 But if an ethic of care can recognize a web of connection based on our common humanity, then it shares
with liberalism the notion of duties arising out of personlood. Such
duties could, and perhaps should, provide a basis for a legal duty to aid
372
when there is no significant risk or burden to oneself.

V. THE ETHIC OF CARE AND WOMEN'S REPRODUCTIVE
FREEDOM: RESPONSIBILITIES VERSUS RIGHTS
A.

ABORTION AND THE ETHIC OF CARE AND RESPONSIBILITY

As discussed above, relational feminists have invoked women's
experience of mothering as a basis for an ethic of care and as an alterna-

tive to contract as a model for many human relationships.373 Abortion
may be the most difficult test case for the translation of the relational

approach and the ethic of care into substantive law. Ironically, recognizing a duty to aid that is derived from a feminist ethic of care and respon-

sibility might threaten women's reproductive freedom. A range of legal
commentators, including feminists, have criticized the Supreme Court's
grounding of the right to abortion on a right to privacy instead of a right
to equality.374 Yet relational feminist criticism differs in emphasis by
369. Id. at 10:33, 10:36, 10:37.
370. Gilligan & Wiggins, supra note 94, at 137.
371. See, eg., Gilligan, supra note 79, at 32.
372. Weinrib persuasively counters many of the traditional indeterminacy arguments against
imposing such a contextual duty. See Weinrib, supra note 305, at 291-92. Of course, recognition of
a legal duty to rescue in a situation of peril does not exhaust the full scope of the duty of mutual aid
or the duty of beneficence. I am not proposing that such duties, to their full extent, be legally
coerced. As we have seen above, Weinrib suggests that, in fact, the duty of beneficence is discharged
in society to some extent through many legislative and administrative institutions. Id. at 290.92.
The duty to rescue devolves upon individuals precisely when the imminence of the peril "cannot
await assistance from the appropriate social institutioni]." Id. at 292.
373. See supra text accompanying notes 54-63.
374. For an often-cited explication of the sex equality argument for abortion rights, see Sylvia
A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955 (1984); LAURENCE H. TRBE,
AMERICAN CONsTrUTIONAL LAW § 15-10, at 1353 n.109 (2d ed. 1988) (citing Law); see also Catharine A. MacKinnon, Privacyv. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade, reprintedin CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 93 (1987); for a fuller exposition, see MacKinnon, Reflections,
supra note 66, at 1298-1323. Law and MacKinnon argue powerfully as to the limitations of privacy
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faulting privacy analysis for its atomism. 375 Thus, some feminists have
accused feminist organizations making autonomy arguments in abortion
litigation of making "atomistic privacy argument[s] '37 1 that reinforce the
association of abortion with irresponsibility. 377 Ruth Colker has recently
suggested that a feminist argument in support of abortion "should be
pro-woman, viewing women as interconnected members of society, rather
3' 78
than pro-choice, viewing each woman as an atomized individual.
And West has called for "public-regarding" arguments explaining the
responsibilities that the right to abortion entails.3 79
analysis and how a failure to ground abortion in women's equality perpetuates women's powerlessness (for example, in the abortion funding cases). My purpose here is not to defend the right to
privacy (as against equality) as the best justification of abortion but to argue that relational feminist
critiques of liberal privacy jurisprudence are not dispositive and that responsibility-based alternatives
pose a number of problems. Elsewhere, I have argued that privacy should continue to play an
important role in arguments defending reproductive freedom and challenged the assumption that
reliance upon a right of privacy necessarily leads to the restriction of public funding, facilities, and
the like. See Linda C. McClain, The Poverty of Privacy?, 2 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. (forthcoming
1992) (forthcoming publication of manuscript delivered at Feminism and Legal Theory Conference's
Workshop on Reproductive Issues in a Post-Roe World, Nov. 15-16, 1991, Columbia University, on
file with the Southern California Law Review); see also Roberts, supra note 70, at 1478-80 (arguing
for a view of privacy imposing affirmative obligations upon government).
375. Cf. MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW (1987). Glendon contrasts American abortion law with European abortion law: "Our law stresses autonomy,
separation and isolation in the war of all against all, in contrast to" sex equality, social solidarity,
and life. Id. at 58. Yet she also suggests that Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), is not accurately or
adequately described as a "masculine" decision so much as an American one:
The voice that we hear in the Supreme Court's abortion narrative-presenting us with the
image of the pregnant woman as autonomous, separate and distinct from the father of the
unborn child (and from her parents if she is a minor), and insulated from the larger society
which is not permitted even to try to dissuade her or ask her to wait to get counseling,
information, or assistance-is more distinctly American than it is masculine in its lonely
individualism and libertarianism.
Id. at 52. Glendon's analysis of Roe overlooks the Supreme Court's "webbed" description of the
impact of an unwanted pregnancy upon a woman's relationships. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
376. Ruth Colker, FeministLitigation:An Oxymoron?-A Study of the Briefs Filed in William
L. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 137, 174 (1990). Colker has
since indicated she does not oppose making a privacy argument in the alternative, because "certain
aspects of the abortion decision are compatible with a privacy perspective," so long as such an
argument is accompanied by an equal protection argument. See Ruth Colker, An Equal Protection
Analysis of United StatesReproductive Health Policy: Gender, Race, Age, and Class, 1991 DUKE L.J.
324, 324-25 n.1.
377. West, supra note 14, at 82.
378. Colker, supra note 376, at 167. Although I include Colker in this analysis of relational
feminism and reproductive freedom, she does not derive her critique of privacy and autonomy from
Gilligan's work but rather draws her notions of separation and connection from theology and suggests that theological insights may help feminism become more aspirational. See Colker, supra note
296.
379. West, supra note 14, at 84; see infra text accompanying notes 383-91.
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Advocates of an ethic of care and responsibility have argued that it
is inaccurate to view the pregnant woman-fetus relationship as that of
adversaries with competing rights. Gilligan reports that the women in
her study of the abortion decision saw a "justice" or "rights" approach
"as a distortion and a deformation of the situation" because it left out
issues of connection and attachment.3 8 0 She finds that women instead
"asked, in effect, whether it is responsible or irresponsible, moral or
immoral, to sustain and deepen an attachment under circumstances in
which [they] cannot be, for whatever reason, responsible, and in which
[they] cannot exercise care."3 ' Thus, a woman's decision to have an
abortion is an exercise of an ethic of care and responsibility.
In the work of feminists using an ethic of care and responsibility
model for the abortion decision, responsibility appears to be synonymous
with autonomy, understood as self-determination and the freedom to
make a difficult decision about the course of one's life.3 82 Thus, such a
model would not necessarily prohibit abortion if abortion were conceived
as an exercise of responsibility or care (as Gilligan's framework suggests).
Nonetheless, the point of view from which responsibility is assessed and
its content are crucial, lest a devaluation of autonomy lead to problematic social presumptions about responsible and irresponsible exercise of
choice that would endanger women's reproductive freedom.
B. WEST'S NOTION OF ABORTION AS A FACET OF "REPRODUCTIVE
RESPONSIBILITY": FROM "TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY" TO
"TAKING RESPONSIBILITIES SERIOUSLY"

1. Responsibility Versus Rights
In Foreword: Taking Freedom Seriously, West casts abortion as a
facet of "reproductive responsibility" and claims that a responsibilitybased argument for reproductive freedom would more accurately reflect
380. Conversation, supra note 66, at 39 (Gilligan conversing).
381. Id. at 38; see also GILLIGAN, supra note 5, at 64-105. Gilligan's subjects employed this
conceptual framework in balancing their responsibilities to themselves, to others, and to the potential child. Often, the abortion decision hinged on a woman's determination that she could not fulfill
her responsibilities to the potential child or that such responsibilities would conflict with the
woman's other obligations or life plans.
382. See West, supra note 14; Note, Rethinking (M)otherhood:Feminist Theory andState Regulation of Pregnancy, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1325, 1340 (1990). The association of responsibility with
taking control of one's life in the sense of being responsible for one's choices occurs repeatedly in
Gilligan's subjects' descriptions of their decision-making processes. See GILLIGAN, supra note 5, at
64-105, especially 77, 97.
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the experience of women than does a rights-based model.3" 3 Noting the
Supreme Court's decreasing willingness to protect individual rights,
West's proposed shift in justification is strategic as well as experiential.
Drawing on the political philosophy of Havel, West claims that rights
should be supported by "public-regarding arguments" based on the
responsibilities they entail. In contrast, she claims, liberal legalism, as
"powerfully" defended and justified by Dworkin, has insulated the right
holder from public scrutiny as to the morality of the right holder's
actions.38 4
Under a rights approach, West argues, insulating the abortion decision has a cost: "[I]t obfuscates the moral quality of most abortion decisions. ' 385 She claims:
The overriding "insulating" logic of rights, generally embraced by the
pro-choice movement, that rights insulate conduct and the actor from
scrutiny so that they can better protect the "worst of us" as well as the
"worst in us"-may reinforce the damaging misperception that the
demand for
abortion reflects the irresponsible worst of us and worst
386
within US.
In contrast, under a responsibility analysis, support for reproductive freedom would rest on the "demonstrated capacity of pregnant women to
decide whether to carry a fetus to term or to abort responsibly"; it is
precisely the "moral quality of the underlying decision that liberal legal' 387
ism insulates from scrutiny.
Under West's proposed alternative to traditional atomistic privacy
talk, women need the freedom to make reproductive decisions, "not
merely to vindicate a right to be left alone, but often to strengthen ties to
others" and "to plan responsibly," for example, "to have a family for
which they can provide, to pursue professional or work commitments
made to the outside world, or to continue supporting their families or
383. West, supra note 14, at 84. West states that such an argument "would justify rather than
supplant the rights-based claim of Roe." Id.
384. Id. at 52, 71. West contends that the liberalism of Dewey, Mill, and (she would argue)

Havel, defends individual liberties and freedoms based on their importance to human flourishing,
while the liberal legalism exemplified by Dworkin does so on anti-paternalist grounds without regard
to the moral quality of the conduct. See West, supra note 26.
385. West, supra note 14, at 81.
386. Id. at 82.
387. Id. at 82-83.
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communities." 3 ' For these reasons, among others, West views the decision to abort as not "made in an egoistic privacy vacuum. ' 38 9 She claims
that "[w]hatever the reason, the decision to abort is almost invariably
made within a web of interlocking, competing and often irreconcilable
responsibilities and commitments. ' 39 0 She distinguishes abortion from
murder, not on the "nominal and question-begging difference between a
'fetus' and a 'baby,' but rather in the moral quality of the underlying
decision":
Unlike the homicidal decision to take another's life, the decision to
abort is more often than not a morally responsible decision. The abortion decision typically rests not on a desire to destroy fetal life but on a
responsible and moral desire to ensure that a new life will be borne
only if it will be nurtured and loved.39 1
2.

Responsibility as Autonomy

West's formulation of a responsibility-based analysis of abortion is
troubling and raises a number of questions.39 2 First, West offers an
388. Id. at 84-85. A perhaps surprising convergence of relational feminism and radical feminism in talk about mothering and responsibility may be seen in West's and MacKinnon's use of
empirical claims about why women choose abortion. See McClain, supra note 374. MacKinnon
describes the abortion decision in terms of women's "desperate act of love for their unborn children"
and as "one of absolute realism and deep responsibility of a mother." MacKinnon, Reflections,
supra note 66, at 1318. More than West, MacKinnon emphasizes that many women become pregnant through what can scarcely be called voluntary, consensual sex and that many women become
pregnant while in abusive, battering relationships. Id.
389. West, supra note 14, at 85.
390. Id.; cf. GILLIGAN, supra note 5, at 64-105 (morality of the web). Compare Glendon's
analysis of the American approach that isolates the pregnant woman in her decision making from
the father-to-be, her parents, and society as a whole. Critical of Roe, Glendon suggests:
[Miost Americans, if the polls are accurate, do not desire the extreme and isolating version

of individual liberty the Supreme Court endorsed in 1973, at the instance of small elites.
Although they want abortion, they do not wish for themselves, or want to confer upon
others, a fundamental right to dispose of developing life.
GLENDON, supra note 375, at 62.
391. West, supra note 14, at 83 (emphases added). For example, in support, West cites Gilligan's assertion that women contemplate abortion as posing its moral issues in terms of responsibility,
not rights. Id. (citing GILLIGAN, supra note 5, at 64-105). But a number of the twenty-nine women
who formed the basis of Gilligan's study reported that they viewed abortion as murder, yet nonetheless felt compelled to have an abortion because of their circumstances. See, eg., GILLIGAN, supra
note 5, at 85-86, 125. For an interpretation of the phenomenon of women viewing abortion in general as morally wrong, or even murder, while justifying it in their particular cases, see ROSALIND
POLLACK PETCHESKY, AIORbON AND WOMEN'S CHOICE 368-87 (rev. ed. 1990).

392. West has been accused of engaging in biological essentialism about gender, see supra note
64 and accompanying text, and her account of the abortion decision appears to express moral essentialism about gender. Surprisingly, in view of her previous invocation of the physical experience of
pregnancy in support of the connection thesis, see West, supra note 2, at 2-3, precisely what is absent
from her description of the "typical" abortion decision is a focus on the material, physical aspects of
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impoverished conception of privacy, one that is devoid of any elements of

responsibility or relationship. She champions the political thought of
Havel for focusing on authenticity and moral responsibility, but those

themes also resonate in liberal defenses of privacy and autonomy. Second, for the same reason, West's characterization of pro-choice arguments invoking such concepts as autonomy and privacy is unfair and

ignores the twin focus on rights and responsibility, while seeking to
insure that decision-making independence resides with the pregnant
woman. Third, West's own alternative, of focusing society on the moral
quality of the woman's abortion decision and societal responsibility for
that decision, threatens to undermine women's reproductive freedom.
In West's analysis of reproductive freedom, the concept of responsibility appears to mean autonomy in the sense of self-determination and
moral independence. Thus, West states that "support for expanded
reproductive freedom should rest on the claim that only by accepting

that responsibility to make those judgments do women manifest their
freedom to pursue their authentically chosen and desired life goals." 39' 3
That notion has been central in liberal discussions about protection of
abortion rights. Although privacy may well be a misnomer for the right
that is the ground for the legal protection of abortion, 9 4 "privacy" none-

theless has connoted not isolation of the right holder for the sake of isolation, but the critical importance of a space for decision making and the
an unwanted pregnancy and their psychological concomitants. Yet she has acknowledged that
women's experience teaches that that very connection can seem a fundamental and threatening invasion of the woman's self. Id. at 29-32 (citing to women's experiences reported in the National Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL) Amicus Brief in Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986)).
It is questionable whether West's idealized formulation---"a responsible and moral desire to
ensure that a new life will be borne only if it will be nurtured and loved," West, supra note 14, at
83--can capture some women's experiences of invasion, threat, and loss of control over their lives in
the face of unwanted pregnancies and their association of abortion with self-protection or selfdefense. For example, in the NARAL amicus brief in Thornburgh, one woman wrote: "You cannot
possibly know what it is like to be the helpless pawn of nature." Id. at 31. Willis also echoes the
invasion theme: "[However gratifying pregnancy may be to a woman who desires it, for the unwilling it is literally an invasion-the closest analogy is the difference between love-making and rape....
[A]bortion is by normal standards an act of self-defense." Ellen Willis, Abortion: Is a Woman a
Person?, in POWERS OF DEsIRE: THE PoLrrcs OF SEXUALrrY 471, 473 (Ann Snitow, Christine
Stansell & Sharon Thompson eds., 1983).
393. West, supra note 14, at 83. Interpreting Havel, West offers as a "tentative definitional
claim" of a "responsibility-centered" liberalism: "a society in which individuals are and feel responsible for the moral consequences of their actions and the truth of their stated beliefs." Id. at 66.
394. TRIBE, supra note 374, § 15-10, at 1352. As to the proper locus of decision making, Tribe
suggests that identifying the right at stake in Roe as a right of privacy was "something of a
misnomer':
[W]hat is truly implicated in the decision whether to abort or to give birth is not privacy,
but autonomy. And the issue of individual autonomy--of control over one's body and
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constitutive nature of such decision making.3 95 In turn, such decision
making is crucial to the development and expression of personhood,
including the freedom to exercise moral responsibility. In her condemnation of liberal legalism's insulation of the right holder, West does not
seem to appreciate the fact that liberals have justified legal protection of
the abortion decision in terms of an allocation of decision making power
and responsibility to the woman.39 6 Nor does West acknowledge that
liberal legalism has recognized that the pregnant woman's decision making may well include relational concerns.39 7
For example, Dworkin interprets the Supreme Court's privacy jurisprudence in terms of moral responsibility and connection, as well as
moral independence:
The Court's previous privacy decisions can be justified only on the
assumption that decisions affecting marriage and childbirth are so
important, so intimate and personal, so crucial to the development of
personality and sense of moral responsibility, and so closely tied to
religious and ethical convictions protected by the First Amendment,
that people must be allowed to make these decisions for themselves,
consulting their own conscience, rather than allowing society to thrust
its collective decision on them.
And, with respect to abortion, Dworkin concludes:
The abortion decision is at least as much a private decision in that
sense as any other the Court has protected. In many ways it is more
private, because the decision involves a woman's control not just of her
reproductive destiny-is in turn a question of power, pure and simple. Roe v. Wade was

less a judgment about the relative importance of maternal liberty and fetal life, than it was
a decision about who should make judgments of that sort.
Id. (emphasis in original).
395. As the Court stated in Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 772:
Our cases long have recognized that the Constitution embodies a promise that a certain
private sphere of individual liberty will be kept largely beyond the reach of government....
That promise extends to women as well as to men. Few decisions are more personal and
intimate, more properly private, or more basic to individual dignity and autonomy than a
woman's decision... whether to end her pregnancy. A woman's right to make that choice
freely is fundamental.
(citations omitted).
396. See supra note 394; see also Laurence H. Tribe, Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the
Due Process ofLife and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 10, 32 (1973) (justifying Roe on the basis of a
"role allocation" model or "personal question doctrine"). But see TRIBE, supra note 374, § 15-10, at
1350 (partial retraction).
397. In Roe v. Wade, the Court spoke of familial concerns: "There is also the distress for all
concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing into a family
already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it." 410 U.S. at 153. See TRIBE, supra
note 374, § 15-10, at 1353 (stating that "[t]he Court's apparent intuition that abortion rights are
somehow grounded in relationalconcerns is ... correct").
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connections to others, but of the use of her own body, and the Constitution recognizes in a variety of ways the special
intimacy of a person's
398
connection to her own physical integrity.

Furthermore, as we have seen, under Dworkin's challenge model of ethics, ethical liberalism would reject coercing a woman's moral decision

about abortion or punishing her for it, even if the majority supports such
control, because it would reject the view that her life could be improved
by forcing on her decisions and acts contrary to her convictions.3 99
This theme of moral independence and toleration is also sounded by

David Richards in his Rawlsian interpretation of the Constitution and

justification of abortion. Richards interprets privacy in terms of autonomy, or liberty of conscience and freedom of intimate association in pursuing a conception of the good. 4 ' In justifying women's right to decide

to have an abortion as an exercise of liberty of conscience and moral
independence, Richards cites Gilligan "[o]n the moral conscientiousness

of an abortion decision for women."''
autonomy to responsibility.

1

Thus, again, we are brought from

Similarly, equality-based defenses of abortion have spoken of the

responsibility of self-determination as a component of equal citizenship
and how restricting abortion "denies women the capacity of responsible
citizenship."'"' 2 The responsibility of self-determination, as part of the
398. Dworkin, The Great Abortion Case, supra note 281, at 51; see also Ronald Dworkin,
Unenumerated Rights The Case of Abortion, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. (forthcoming 1992) (linking the
principle of autonomy over essentially religious matters not only to the Constitution as a whole but
to political culture and to a democratic belief in individual human dignity: "that people have the
moral right-and the moral responsibility-to confront for themselves, answering to their own conscience and conviction" fundamental questions defining the conditions of value, self-respect, and a
decent, honorable life).
399. See supra text accompanying notes 266-69; cf. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 332, 354
(1980) (Brennan, J., and Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the Hyde Amendment foists the
"majoritarian viewpoint" on "that segment of our society ... least able to defend its privacy rights
from encroachments of state mandated morality"; denial of benefits for medically necessary abortions "is tantamount to severe punishment").
400. RICHARDS, supra note 217, at 267-70.
401. Id. at 268. Richards's analysis is cited in the Amicus Brief of NOW Legal Defense and
Education Fund and NARAL, at 6 n.4, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490
(1989).
402. Law, supra note 374, at 1017. As Law further states:
The right to equal citizenship encompasses the right "to take responsibility for choosing
one's own future....
[11o be a person is to respect one's ability to make responsible
choices in controlling one's own destiny, to be an active participant in society rather than
an object." Denying abortion denies women the capacity of responsible citizenship.
Id. (quoting Kenneth L. Karst, Foreword:Equal Citizenship Under the FourteenthAmendment, 91
HARV. L. REV. 1, 58 (1977)).
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responsibility of citizenship, encompasses what West calls "reproductive
responsibility."
Pro-choice argument has similarly focused on moral independence

and its relationship to personhood and full participation in society. Contrary to West's charge, pro-choice litigants and amici have attempted
publicly to explain the importance of reproductive freedom to the quality

of women's lives-in fact, the circumstances of such women's lives are
reflected in the language about "distress" used in Roe v. Wade itself. °3
Indeed, the "voices of women" briefs filed in abortion litigation defend
abortion in terms of constitutional rights and show how such protection

of women's freedom enables women to live lives that they can experience
as personally and socially meaningful-lives that include responsibilities
and relationships.'
Similarly, pro-choice litigants have painstakingly
attempted to engage in such public education, presenting evidence of the

disruptive effect of abortion restrictions on family relationships as well as
on the lives of women, particularly young women and poor women, and
women in troubled marriages." Thus, rights talk about abortion can
403. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. For this observation, I am indebted to Nancy Stearns, who was
counsel of record on the amicus brief in Roe on behalf of New Women Lawyers, Women's Health
and Abortion Project, Inc., National Abortion Action Coalition. See Brief for Appellants, Motion
and Brief of New Women Lawyers, Women's Health and Abortion Project, and National Abortion
Action Coalition as Amici Curiae, and Motion and Brief of Planned Parenthood Federation of
America and American Association of Planned Parenthood Physicians, reproduced in PHILIP B.
KURLAND & GERHARD CASPER, LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (ROE V. WADE (1973)) (1990).
404. See, eg., Amicus Brief of NARAL, Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, 474 U.S. 809 (1986), reprintedin 9 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REp. 3 (1986); Amicus Brief of
NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund and NARAL, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,
492 U.S. 490 (1989)). West, in fact, cites these briefs as the "notable exception to the general tendency of prochoice advocates to adopt the liberal legalist logic of insular rights." West, supra note
14, at 82 n.174. Yet the quality of life spoken of in the briefs encompasses more than is described in
West's model of the web of responsibilities. Further, West inaccurately characterizes the NARAL
briefs as an exception. See infra note 405 and accompanying text.
405. See, e-g., Law, supra note 374, at 972-73 (describing educational efforts in constitutional
litigation instituted even prior to Roe). Such an educational c~mpaign was undertaken in the very
reproductive freedom case that West discusses. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756, 763-70
(D. Minn. 1986), rei'd, 853 F.2d 1452 (8th Cir. 1988), aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990). In Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 60 U.S.L.W. 3498 (U.S. Jan. 21,
1992) (No. 91-744, 91-902), while the Third Circuit otherwise upheld Pennsylvania's restrictive
abortion law, it did not uphold the requirement that women notify their husbands before having an
abortion. Id. at 710-15. The Court of Appeals stated that, in Hodgson, the Supreme Court "has thus
been attuned to the real world consequences of forced notification in the context of minor child/
parent relationships," id. at 711, and referred repeatedly to the extensive record before it concerning
domestic violence, sexual assault, and other coercive conduct that women face and experience in
marriage, id. at 712-14, leading it to conclude that "the real-world consequences of forced notification in the context of wife/husband relationships impose similar kinds of undue burdens on a
woman's right to an abortion." Id. at 711. In Casey, in addition to evidence introduced by those
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have a public education function while protecting the freedom of the
rights holder to make the abortion decision.
In sum, the rights/responsibility dichotomy that West posits as
caused by liberal legalism's emphasis upon moral insulation is overstated.
Furthermore, it is not clear that West's responsibility-based analysis is
doing anything different from what can be done or already has been done
through notions of rights, autonomy, and privacy.
3. The Locus of Responsibility
Even assuming that a more explicit focus on responsibility in talk
about rights might be prudent for strategic purposes, West's analysis
raises several troubling questions as to the locus of responsibility. West
argues that if liberals would focus "on the moral quality of reproductive
decisions rather than insulating them from understanding," they could
"redirect societal attention toward this web of shared responsibilities and
societal failures." 6 She suggests that we should recognize a "collective
responsibility" to address the "causes and effects of unwanted pregnancy,
childbirth and motherhood." 7 West urges us to recognize that abortion
at times is a result of societal failure, that is, "the harsh reality of a financially irresponsible partner, a society indifferent to the care of children,
and a workplace incapable of accommodating or supporting the needs of
working parents."'"' 8
West rightly draws attention to the socioeconomic circumstances in
which some women become pregnant and the impact of those circumstances upon some women's decisions, at times rendering the abortion
challenging the Pennsylvania regulations, the reported opinion indicates that a number of amici
curiae briefs were filed on behalf of groups representing or engaged in advocacy for battered women
and victims of domestic violence. Id. at 686-87. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Casey.
See also McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630, 668-90 (E.D.N.Y.) (upholding challenge to Hyde
Amendment restrictions on Medicaid payment for medically necessary abortions and referring in
judicial findings to evidence presented at a lengthy trial as to grievous physical harm likely to be

suffered by women suffering from various health problems who are denied abortions for medical
reasons), rev'd sub nor. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). Dissenting, Justice Stevens referred
to the extensive examples of serious physical harm in the record in stating that "it cannot be denied
that the harm inflicted upon women in the excluded class is grievous." 488 U.S. at 353 & n.5
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
406. West, supra note 14, at 85.

407. Id.
408. Id.
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right illusory. 9 A societal ethic of care, as West describes it, could go
far in removing many women from the bind of having children they do
not want to have and not being able to have the children they do want to
have. a10 But the decision whether and when to become a parent also
involves subjective factors not simply linked to societal failure.4 11 Perhaps because a "maternalist" basis is central to West's moral and legal

theory,4" 2 her description may imply that all women would be mothers,
but for society's failures.

If society is to focus on the moral quality of the reproductive decisions, may it attempt to ensure that such decisions are moral? If protection of reproductive freedom rests on the "demonstrated capacity" for

responsible decision making, is that demonstration assumed to have been
made for all women by recourse to empirical or moral literature (say,

reading Gilligan's work into the legislative record), so that all women are
entitled to a presumption that they engage in responsible decision making? Or do individual women have to demonstrate such capacity? Do
only women who apply the appropriate responsibility analysis satisfy the

test for the moral quality of the act that keeps abortion from being murder?4 13 Does West's argument open the door to asserting a state interest
in evaluating each individual woman's decision in order to ensure that
she truly faces "interlocking, competing, and often irreconcilable responsibilities and commitments"-and what about a state interest in ensuring

409. See also PETCHESKY, supra note 391 (recognizing that young women of poor, working
class backgrounds are more likely to carry their pregnancies to term because they have limited socioeconomic options and come from cultures that are more likely to view childbearing as a mark of
achievement).
410. See MacKinnon, Reflections, supra note 66, at 1313; see also Roberts, supra note 70, at
1460-61 (arguing that emphasis on abortion as the central component of reproductive freedom fails
to incorporate the needs of poor women of color, whose main concerns are the material conditions of
poverty and oppression that restrict their reproductive choices). Byllye Avery, a health care activist,
and Founding President of the National Black Women's Health Project, has stated that abortion is
not experienced as a right for many poor women of color and stresses the need to focus on the
broader issue of reproductive health. Byllye Avery, Empowerment Through Wellness, 4 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 146, 151-52 (1991).
411. A wide range of such factors is discussed in the "voices of women" amicus briefs, supra
note 404 and accompanying text.
412. West, supra note 34, at 80.
413. West acknowledges that "explicitly basing reproductive freedom on the responsibility as
well as the rights of women seems to invite a world in which each woman's decision to terminate her
pregnancy would be monitored for compliance with some sort of responsibility-based moral code."
West, supra note 14, at 83. She also acknowledges that such monitoring might be "badly tainted by
... misogynist and racist perceptions of women." Id. Nonetheless, she argues that "[a] failure to
rest reproductive freedom on a theory of responsibilities may ensure the complete erosion of the
right." Id. at 84.
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only responsible decisions to continue a pregnancy?4 14 Women's experience before medical review boards, prior to Roe, and the experience of
female teenagers with judicial bypass procedure has amply revealed the
humiliation, embarrassment, and sense of loss of self-control over one's

life bound up with having to explain the circumstances of one's life and
to justify one's decision making to strangers.4 15 And would the very
enormity of the problems that some women face-such as lack of choice,
power, or even responsibility as to the basic features of their reproductive
lives-render women's circumstances not believable, so that they would

encounter a lack of empathy or understanding on the part of the audi416

If
ence to whom their public-regarding arguments would be directed?
a pregnant woman's genetic or associative partner, part of her web of
relationships, is financially responsible and eager to provide a home in
which "a new life will be nurtured and loved," should he or she have a
legally protected stake in the woman's decision making, and may he or
she challenge the pregnant woman's assessment of whether her responsi41
bilities are "irreconcilable"?

7

414. Id. at 85. On the role of the rhetoric of responsibility in public welfare policy designed to
deter certain women on public assistance from having additional children, see supra note 153. Some
have begun to note the ideological tension between a conservative stance opposing abortion and
supporting such deterrence. See Sam Roberts, Anger, Assumptions and the Rush to Limit Welfare,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1992, at B3.
415. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 134-35 (1989); see also
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926, 2940 (1990) (reporting that the judicial bypass procedure
produced "fear, tension, anxiety and shame among minors").
416. This becomes more likely if one combines West's description of women's lives with that of
MacKinnon, in which women's powerlessness and lack of control over whether to have sex or to use
contraceptive measures make the applicability of the concept of responsibility to such women questionable. MacKinnon, Reflections, supra note 66, at 1316-18.
As to a lack of empathy in the face of such a picture, arguably, an analogous occurrence
unfolded in the recent Senate Judiciary Committee hearings over Professor Anita Hill's allegations
of sexual harassment by now-Justice Clarence Thomas. The successful strategy of Thomas's key
backers on the Committee was to paint the alleged conduct by then-Chairman Thomas as so sickening, outrageous, disgusting, and the like that, had it actually occurred, no reasonable woman would
have endured it without filing a complaint, quitting her job, and severing all professional and personal ties with him. Thus, Thomas's backers transformed what many commentators felt was typical
sexually harassing behavior into a most unusual occurrence that rendered Professor Hill's allegations
not credible. One can imagine similar scenarios as women attempt to explain the incidence of battering in relationships or experiences of passivity as to contraceptive decisions in sexual relationships. Yet some of these attempts have been successful, at least in convincing courts to protect
women's decisional privacy about abortion. See supra note 385.
417. Cf. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 94 (1976) (White, J., dissenting) (stating
that the law requiring a husband's consent to abortion "represents a judgment by the State that the
mother's interest in avoiding the burdens of child rearing do not outweigh or snuff out the father's
interest in participating in bringing up his own child"). A relational feminist analysis that urges an
interconnected view of the pregnant woman would seem more likely than a rights-based analysis to
acknowledge a permissible role for the biological father, provided he evinced care and responsibility.
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Nor does West's sole focus on "irreconcilable responsibilities" seem
to capture a woman's positive valuation of her own well-being, independent of her relationship to other persons. As West has acknowledged, the
"unofficial message" of the connection thesis is that women long for separation and individuation, but that certain "connecting" experiences,
including pregnancies, threaten this development of the self.418 Feminists should continue to place a strong value on women's self-determination and their well-being. They also should never forget the role that
gaining control of reproduction has played in women's steps toward
achieving equality and full participation in society.419
4.

Taking Rights and ResponsibilitiesSeriously

The questions raised above suggest that focusing solely on the moral
quality of reproductive decisions would not better secure reproductive
freedom than does focusing on the importance of self-determination.
Although West urges that we take responsibilities seriously, taking rights
seriously may require insulation if the rights are to survive. For attempting to engage in public justification, as Dworkin has recognized, does not
guarantee success and thus recognition or protection of rights deemed
fundamental.
On the highly controversial issue of abortion, resting reproductive
freedom upon convincing others that it is responsibly exercised seems
especially dangerous: It overlooks the highly controversial nature of the
abortion issue and ignores the role of people's convictions about family,
religion, and the proper role of women in opposition to abortion.420
First, West's suggestion that what distinguishes abortion from murder is
not the fetus/baby distinction, but the moral quality of the act, underestimates the role of a belief in "fetal personhood" in much opposition to
abortion.42 In the face of such belief, it seems doubtful that arguments
about women's irreconcilable responsibilities will persuade those who,
for reasons often deeply rooted in religious faith, believe that abortion is
418. West, supra note 2, at 37-38. West cites the work of Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea
Dworkin as illustrative of this message of radical feminism. See, e.g., id. at 32-36, 48-49.
419. See, eg., LINDA GORDON, WOMAN'S BODY, WOMAN'S RIGHT (2d ed. 1990). Sylvia Law
suggests that "[n]othing the Supreme Court has ever done has been more concretely important for
women" than the Court's holding in Roe. Law, supra note 374, at 981; see also Karst, supra note
402, at 58 (recognizing that the issue underlying a woman's right to control her body is the right to
control her future).
420. These criticisms are elaborated in McClain, supra note 374.
421. See, eg., PETCHESKY, supra note 391, at 241-85, 335-45.
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murder and that a pregnant woman who has an abortion is a "mother"
2
killing her "baby.

42

Second, granting that any attempt to use or interpret public opinion
polls is fraught with peril, it seems doubtful that West's analysis of what
makes particular decisions to have abortions "responsible" would map
actual public opinion with any degree of fit.4 2 Although it seems that a
consistent majority of Americans supports making abortion legal, and
leaving the choice with women, it is questionable whether similar support
could be garnered concerning whether women were behaving responsibly
in making particular decisions, either to terminate or to continue preg-

nancy.424 When weighed against the supposed value of potential life, or

of "fetal personhood," women's reasons are too easily dismissed-by the
public, by judges, and by legislatures-as reasons, not of "responsibility,"
but of "convenience." 4 2 5 Those attitudes themselves are often imbued
with notions of a proper degree of maternal self-sacrifice and a hostility

to goals of women's equality.426
West's claim that under liberal legalism, the moral worth of the act
protected by rights does not matter, fails to distinguish the perspective
from which moral worth is assessed. As Dworkin indicates, "people

must be allowed to make these decisions for themselves, consulting their
own conscience, rather than allowing society to thrust its collective decision on them."42 7 West interprets moral insulation as mere license to

irresponsibility and ignores why such decisions are removed from collective determination. Removing such rights from the political agenda and

the "vicissitudes" of changing political majorities428 helps to ensure
autonomy in the sense of self-determination. And even if women must
422. See McClain, supra note 374 (describing language used by anti-abortion protestors engaging in demonstrations and other tactics in front of abortion clinics in Wichita and elsewhere during
the demonstrations and disruptive tactics used in August 1991 activities).
423. Id. (comparing public opinion polls with West's treatment of responsibility and studies of
women's abortion decisions).
424. Id.; see supra notes 153 & 414 and accompanying text.
425. Id. In his dissents in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 221 (1973), Justice
White characterized the Court's ruling as providing that, prior to viability, "the Constitution of the
United States values the convenience, whim, or caprice of the putative mother more than the life or
potential life of the fetus."
426. See generally KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 192-215
(1984); McClain,supra note 374 (discussing other sources).
427. Dworkin, The Great Abortion Case, supra note 281, at 60; see supra text accompanying
notes 398-99.
428. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943); DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 9. Of course, Roe acknowledged some realm of permissible
state regulation. 410 U.S. at 163-65. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989),
stressed drawing the line between what about abortion was properly removed from public debate and
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increasingly turn to legislatures to preserve reproductive freedom (as
they have done subsequent to Webster), arguments based on self-determination and on women as the proper locus of decision making are more
likely to preserve the reproductive freedom for women that West wishes
to defend, that is, "freedom to pursue their authentically chosen and
desired life goals." 4'29
C. RECONCILIATION OF ABORTION AND A DUTY TO AID
In Bender's proposed reform of the no duty to rescue rule in tort
law, an ethic of care analysis leads to the rejection of a balancing of
autonomy against peril and a focus on the connection of the stranger to
others. In West's responsibility-based justification of abortion, a rightsbased insulation of the abortion decision gives way to a focus on the web
of responsibilities in which the pregnant woman stands in order to recognize the moral quality of her decision. How would an ethic of care that
entails a duty to aid assess the web of connections when the stranger in
peril is the fetus and the potential rescuer is the pregnant woman? How
would it assess the pregnant woman's responsibilities, if any, to the fetus?
Can an ethic-of-care-based proposal for a duty to aid coexist with an
ethic-of-care-based defense of abortion (or even a rights-based defense)?
Below I suggest that they can coexist only through recognizing the special type of connection and dependency found in pregnancy and by placing a strong value on a woman's autonomy or self-determination.
1. Pregnancy and Connection
Admittedly, Bender does not address the relationship between an
ethic-of-care-based duty to aid and abortion. But her language about the
human experience of connection may unwittingly describe (for some) the
what was not, id. at 520-21, in an opinion read by many as opening the door to increased state
regulation. See id. at 537-38 (Blackmun, J.,dissenting); TRIBE, supra note 415, at 24-25.
Not all liberals agree that abortion should be removed from the political arena as a constitutional right. Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson have recently argued that abortion cannot be
removed from the political process precisely because of the moral nature of the debate, but instead
must be the subject of democratic deliberation based on mutual respect for both the "pro-life" and
"pro-choice" positions. See Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 180. They claim that both sides can
agree on the two "general (incompletely specified) moral principles that innocent people have a right
to live and that women have freedom of choice with regard to their own bodies" but they disagree on
their application in the abortion context.
429. West, supra note 14, at 83; see TRIBE, supra note 415, at 172-91 (describing NARAL's
public education campaign in anticipation of Webster, organized around the effective message, "Who
decides?," and the galvanizing impact of the Webster decision on the pro-choice movement's efforts
in the political arena, organized around the successful theme that a vote for any abortion restriction
threatened women's right to choose whether to terminate a pregnancy).
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pregnant woman-fetus relationship: "In defining duty, what matters is
that someone, a human being, a partof us, is drowning and will die without some affirmative action.""4 3 Could a caring woman ignore the interest of the fetus, a potential human being, in a sense a part of her, in
becoming a person? Given Bender's proposed tort standard, premised
upon increasing the duty based on the closeness of the relationship, the
pregnant woman-fetus relationship presumably would be at the highest
level of duty, because of the high degree of "intersubjectivity" and "connection." Women reportedly view the pregnancy experience as a dramatic situation of interdependency and interconnectedness. 3 1
"Interdependency" is a highly problematic description since the pregnant woman is not dependent on the fetus, while the fetus is uniquely and
totally dependent on the pregnant woman who carries it.432 Indeed, at
least prior to viability, only the pregnant woman can meet the needs of
the fetus, while presumably any bystander could come to the rescue of a
stranger in need. Yet that has not stopped anti-abortion activists
charged with trespassing for their attempts to block access to abortion
clinics from asserting a defense of the need to rescue human lives, either
under the legal doctrine
of necessity, or under the "higher," divine law to
"rescue the innocent., 4 33
Of course, one might distinguish abortion from a duty to aid on the
ground that a fetus is not a person to whom such a duty is owed. But
would reliance on such a distinction be consistent with a feminist vision
of intersubjectivity, interdependency, connection, and responsibility that
Bender embraces, or, for example, with West's grounding of woman's
connectedness in the experience of pregnancy? Indeed, Colker has suggested that a woman's "interconnected responsibilities" include a responsibility to a fetus.43 4 And, while constitutional protection of abortion has
430. Bender, Primer,supra note 294, at 34 (emphasis added); see supra text accompanying note
310.
431. See, e.g., GILLIGAN, supranote 5, at 76, 108 (reporting this experience of interdependency
and connection in the pregnant women who were the subjects of her abortion study); see also Conversation, supra note 66, at 38-39 (Gilligan conversing about the same experience).
432. See Law, supra note 374, at 1023-24.
433. On the assertion of the legal defense of necessity, see Joseph F. Sullivan, A Judge Likens
Legal Abortion to Executions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1991, at B2; Joseph F. Sullivan, Judge Would
ConsiderLife at Conception, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1991, at 26. On the divine mandate, Operation
Rescue leader Terry Randall has reportedly defended the protests as efforts to follow divine command to "rescue the innocent": "God's law is always higher than man's law, especially when human
life is at stake." See Don Terry, Face of Protests in Wichita is Religious and Undoubting, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 12, 1991, at Al.
434. Colker, supra note 376, at 180-82. But see Sarah E. Bums, Notes From the Field: A Reply
to Professor Colker, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 189 (1990) (arguing that women should accept the
view that they should be relationally oriented only if it can be done in a manner that does not
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derived in part from the Supreme Court's conclusion that a fetus is not a
constitutional person, West claims that the difference between a "fetus"
and a "baby" is "nominal and question-begging. '
Alternatively, feminist advocates of an ethic of care and responsibility could assert that no duty to aid exists where a significant burden
results, such as the burden imposed upon a potential rescuer-pregnant

woman in sustaining the life of a stranger-fetus. By focusing on the
woman's responsibilities and connections, Bender's standard could leave
the abortion right unaffected if the duty to aid were limited to that of
"easy" rescue, to use Weinrib's term. On Bender's analysis, though, such
a focus becomes circular, because if the fetus is the stranger in peril, we

must include the fetus's life-sustaining connection to the pregnant
woman in the woman's web of relationships. At the same time, if we
examine the fetus's web of relationships, that web consists of the same
life-sustaining connection, its genetic connection to the potential father,
and potentially the broader web of relationships of each party. In a
sense, including the woman's perspective replicates the ethic of care analysis of abortion whereby a woman might conclude that she faces irreconcilable responsibilities.
2. Abortion and Good Samaritanism
It has been suggested that the most powerful argument against laws
prohibiting abortion, even if the previable fetus is viewed as a full person,
stems from the fact that our law does not require people in general to be
Good Samaritans. Yet, by requiring a woman to carry a fetus to term

against her wishes, we force her to be a Good Samaritan.436 In her essay,
compromise women's rights). Raised in the Colker-Burns debate is whether feminist argument
about abortion must acknowledge the value of potential life and of a pregnant woman's possible
responsibility to that life. Colker argues that a good-faith feminist argument must include recognition of(l) the value of the well-being of women and (2) the value of prenatal life. Colker, supranote
376, at 161. Using this two-prong analysis to assess feminist amicus briefs filed in the Webster
litigation, Colker finds that those briefs largely failed both prongs. Id. at 168-83. Colker expresses
the latter prong as "letting the fetus in" to the abortion dialogue and suggests that women may have
responsibilities and obligations to the fetus. Id. at 180-82. In reply, applying a rights and autonomy
analysis, Burns argues that to divert focus from the woman to the fetus is to "forfeit our rights. The
potential life is part of the woman, not she of it." Burns, supra at 203.
435. West, supra note 14, at 83.
436. Donald H. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1569, 1576 (1979) (acknowledging his debt to Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, I PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47 (1971)).
Some have questioned the wisdom of relying on such an argument because linking the right to
abortion to the absence of a legal duty to rescue, notwithstanding a widespread sentiment about a
moral duty, may suggest that abortion is immoral but lawful. See, eg., Law, supra note 374, at 1022.
Others have questioned the appropriateness of the analogy because of the unique nature of the relationship between the pregnant woman and the fetus. See, e.g., TRIBE,supra note 374, § 15-10, at
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A Defense of Abortion, written before Roe, Judith Jarvis Thomson argued

that "no person is morally required to make large sacrifices to sustain the
life of another who has no right to demand them, and this even where the
sacrifices do not include life itself; we are not morally required to be
Good Samaritans or anyway Very Good Samaritans to one another."4 37
Thomson demonstrated that the physical burdens of pregnancy require
precisely such sacrifices of women and that in prohibiting women from
obtaining abortions, women are being held to a higher moral standard

than others. Thomson's argument does not contradict recognition of
either a natural or legal duty of mutual aid. She associates abortion with
a degree of burden that would entail large self-sacrifice. She distinguishes Minimally Decent Samaritanism, where one may aid at little or
no cost to oneself, as in Weinrib's proposal of "easy" rescue, from Good
438
Samaritanism.
Writing after Roe, and arguing that the most promising defense of
the controversial right in Roe had not yet been made, Donald Regan

follows Thomson in casting the abortion issue in the context of "the law
of samaritanism.

'4 39

Basing his argument on equal protection, Regan

argues that laws forbidding abortion treat women in a manner at "odds
with the general tenor of Samaritan law" and also impair constitutionally
1354-57 (citing Law, supra note 374, at 1023). Jeanne L. Schroeder also has recently noted the
tension between Bender's proposal for imposing a duty to rescue and reliance by pro-choice advocates upon Thomson's defense of the right to abortion. Jeanne L. Schroeder, Abduction from the
Seraglio: FeministMethodologiesand the Logic ofImagination,70 TEx. L. REv. 109, 138-40 (1991).
437. Thomson, supra note 436, at 64. Thomson uses a now-famous analogy of a person being
kidnapped and waking up connected to a famous violinist who needs such connection for nine
months in order to live. Id. at 48-52. She also argues that "the right to life consists not in the right
not to be killed, but rather in the right not to be killed unjustly." Id. at 57; see also FRANCES
MYRNA KAMM, CREATION AND ABORTION (forthcoming 1992) (elaborating upon Thomson's arguments). Contrast West's distinction of abortion and murder, supra text accompanying note 391.
438. While Thomson suggests that laws compelling people to be Minimally Decent Samaritans
might not be a bad thing, and that a pregnant woman in certain circumstances might even have a
moral obligation to be a Minimally Decent Samaritan, she points out that our laws do not yet require
people to meet this minimal standard. Id. at 63-66. Thomson gives as an example a woman who,
late in her pregnancy, seeks an abortion in order to go on vacation. Id. at 65-66. She notes the Kitty
Genovese incident and observes that:
inhere is no law under which charges could be brought against the thirty-eight who stood
by while Kitty Genovese died. By contrast, in most states in this country women are
compelled by law to be not merely Minimally Decent Samaritans, but Good Samaritans to
unborn persons inside them.
Id. at 63. But see supra note 309 (Vermont criminal statute).
439. Regan, supranote 436, at 1569. Regan argues that the types of burdens imposed by pregnancy and childbirth are those of "a sort disfavored by our tradition" and are far greater than those
imposed under exceptions to what he calls the "bad samaritan principle" under which one does not
have a duty to aid another. Id. at 1572.
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protected interests in nonsubordination and freedom from physical
invasion.'
Applying Regan's analysis in a sex-equality defense of abortion,
Tribe suggests that outlawing abortion or restricting funding to
encourage childbirth results in the conscription of women and that
women are "uniquely vulnerable to imposition of this burden ...because
women must call on others for assistance if they would choose not to
make such a sacrifice."" 1 Since society's willingness to impose on
women alone such sacrifice may reflect a "deeply held traditional view of
the differences in character between the sexes," Tribe argues that there
should be no "woman's exception" to individualism and autonomy." 2
The continuing viability of the Good Samaritan argument in support of legal protection of abortion is the subject of some debate." 3 Both
Thomson and Regan invoke liberal principles of autonomy and liberty
from invasion of bodily integrity that some feminists have criticized.
Colker criticizes a similar argument made in an amicus brief in Webster
that "[c]onstitutional concerns of privacy protect bodily integrity of persons and do not require exceptional samaritanism.... There is no question that the individual's rights of privacy and physical integrity would
prevail over.., the fetus' claim for assistance." 4 " She faults that argument for "refus[ing] to acknowledge that we may want to live in a world
in which we have interconnected responsibilities to each other" and for
"fail[ing] adequately to address the possibility that a woman might have
a responsibility to her fetus.""
However, not every feminist critic of atomism proposes using law to
encourage aspirational views of responsibility in the context of abortion.
For instance, Sherry invokes Thomson's argument as the best argument
"that elective abortion may be justified even if the fetus is a human life
(or of more than 'trivial importance')."" 6 Sherry does not criticize the
"widely shared moral consensus [in our society] that while providing aid
440. Id. at 1570-71. Regan also demonstrates that the preservation of life is not the highest
value in our legal system, since in other cases involving potential samaritans, "our legal system
prefers values such as non-subordination and physical integrity." Id. at 1635-36.
441. TRIBE, supra note 374, § 15-10, at 1354-55; see also TRIBE, supra note 415, at 130-35.
442. TRIBE, supra note 415, at 135; see infra text accompanying notes 446-49.
443. See supra note 436 and infra text accompanying notes 444-49.
444. Colker, supra note 376, at 180 (quoting an amicus brief filed by Catholics for a Free

Choice).
445. Id. See also Colker, supra note 296.
446. Suzanna Sherry, Women's Virtue, 63 TUL. L. REv. 1591, 1593 (1989) (using Thomson's
violinist analogy); see supra note 30 and text accompanying notes 22-23 (Sherry's contrast between
the liberal and feminine paradigms).
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to others may be morally commendable, it is neither morally nor legally
required."' She rejects an argument that a morality of aspirations
(which Michael Perry claims is generally shared in society) suggests that,
instead of decriminalizing abortion, we should have a more generalized
Good Samaritan principle and extend the principle of requiring aid to
others."' Like Tribe, Sherry argues that such an argument is suspect
because, "[g]iven the pervasive sexism of our society, it is questionable to
begin creating a generalized Good Samaritan principle by imposing a
substantial duty only on women"-a duty more substantial than "one we
would even contemplate demanding of other proposed Good Samaritans."" 9 She reserves to women the responsibility for their moral decisions and the autonomy prerequisite to such decision making. Sherry's
notion of responsibility, like West's, comes to something very like autonomy as self-determination.
3. Rescue and Relationship
The best argument that imposing a legal duty of easy rescue should
not lead to a prohibition of abortion may be drawn from the unique
nature of the relationship between the pregnant woman and the fetus.
While the state may indeed have an interest in "saving the fetus," 45 until
after viability the state through its agents simply cannot "save" the fetus,
'
because "the sustenance the fetus needs is not society's to give. 451
Rather, as Sylvia Law has observed, only a particular pregnant woman,
452
upon whom a fetus is entirely dependent, can sustain that fetus's life.
Thus, Tribe argues that legal protection of abortion is best justified on
the basis of the special position of, and the potential burden placed upon,
the pregnant woman.4 53 The Supreme Court adopted viability as a principled point before which abortion cannot be prohibited precisely
because prior to that time, only the pregnant woman can sustain the
fetus.4 54 The particular pregnant woman's sustaining of the fetus
involves not merely one brief temporal supererogatory act on behalf of a
stranger to whom she will have no further obligation or relationship, but
447.
448.

Id.
Id. at 1594 (addressing the discussion of abortion in MICHAEL PERRY, MORALITY, POLI-

TICS, AND LAW (1988)).

449.
450.
451.
452.
453.
454.

Id. at 1595.
TRIBE, supra note 374, § 15-10, at 1357 (citing Law, supra note 374, at 1023).
Law, supra note 374, at 1027.
Id.
TRIBE, supra note 374, § 15-10, at 1353-58.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
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the continuation of a life completely bound up with her own. 4 5 As Law
puts it:
Forcing her to support the dependent fetus denies her capacity to
decide whether that is a relationship that she can sustain and imposes
enormous costs on her life, health, and autonomy. Respect 45for
the
6
fetus is purchased at the cost of denying the value of women.
The message of a responsibility analysis of pregnancy and the abortion decision is ultimately not dissimilar from that of an autonomy analysis. The pregnant woman decides whether there is a relationship she can
and will sustain, or "that a new life will be borne only if it will be nurtured and loved. ' 4 7 Both approaches leave that decision with the
woman.

4 58

455. Noddings distinguishes caring for an intimate from caring for a stranger in commenting
upon the temporal aspect of care: "When we care for a stranger in immediate need, we care for the
interval of need and, afterward, forget." NODDINGS, supra note 74, at 39-40; see KAMm, supra note
437 (distinguishing Thomson's violinist case from that of pregnant women because of "post-natal
burdens," including, for example, that "[flor some people the existence of their biological offspring,
even when they are raised by others, creates a new inescapable orientation, from independence to
relatedness to another person").
456. Law, supra note 374, at 1027; see also TRIE, supranote 374, § 15-10, at 1358 (citing Law).
Ruddick stresses that motherhood entails acceptance of responsibility for a particular child. See
RUDDICK, supra note 51, at 17. Elsewhere, I explore the relationship between protecting potential
life and devaluing women's lives and liberty. See McClain, supra note 374.
457. West, supranote 14, at 83; see also GILLIGAN, supra note 5, at 64-105. In focusing on the
pregnant woman-fetus connection, Law states that she does not base her defense of abortion on the
social reality that women care for children, since such social arrangements could be altered. Law,
supra note 374, at 1027 n.252.
458. Another potential danger of using the coercive power of the law to promote an ethic of care
is in its application to regulation of maternal conduct during pregnancy to protect the fetus. Some
outside the circles of feminist jurisprudence have already advocated imposing a "duty of care" on
pregnant women toward their fetuses if they decide not to abort. See, e.g., Alan Dershowitz, Drawing the Line on PrenatalRights, L.A. TIMES, May 14, 1989, reprinted in 135 CONG. REC. S9322
(daily ed. Aug. 2, 1989) (statement of Sen. Wilson); John A. Robertson, ProcreativeLiberty and the
Controlof Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REv. 405 (1983); see also Dawn M.
Johnsen, Note, The CreationofFetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's ConstitutionalRights to Liberty,
Privacy, and EqualProtection, 95 YALE L.J. 599 (1986) (criticizing proposals covering a wide range
of conduct). Feminist opposition to such proposals has stemmed from traditional autonomy and
privacy arguments as well as from relational feminist responsibility arguments. Compare Johnsen,
supra, with Note, supra note 382 (arguing in favor of "empowering" women with respect to decisions
about their conduct during pregnancy precisely because the mother will be responsible and is the
best judge of the best interests of the fetus).
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MOTHERING VERSUS CONTRACT: A CALL FOR
RICHER AND MORE VARIED MODELS OF
459
CONNECTION

I have argued that the feminist critique of liberal political philosophy and jurisprudence as atomistic is not apt insofar as it describes liberalism's view of the person as being one of self-interested, presocial,
unconnected individuals. I have sought to demonstrate that although the
conceptual models of feminism and liberalism may be different, kindred
concerns are present and that the simple dichotomies drawn to date have
obscured such kinship.
Feminist theory has rightly focused upon relationships, care, and
interdependency and has made more explicit and visible the life-sustaining and nurturing activity essential to the preservation of persons and
of society that is seemingly absent from liberalism. Feminists correctly
remind us that persons do not spring forth from the earth full grown like
mushrooms, without attachments, as Hobbes hypothesized,' 6 or like
Athena, from the head of Zeus, without mothers. Hence, a feminist
focus on mothering and interdependency is useful because it makes more
visible the caretaking activity necessary for the preservation of human
life.
Yet the choice need not be a stark pick between mothering and contract, or care and justice, or connection and separation. Liberalism, as
envisioned by both Rawls and Dworkin, recognizes interdependency,
connection, and responsibility in many ways, including duties arising
from personhood, citizenship, and fraternity or sorority. And the family
has served as a model in deriving associative political obligations, as in
Dworkin's account of political legitimacy, or in a social commitment to
sharing talents, as in Rawls's notion of the difference principle. Such
usage remains unsatisfactory without a full focus on gender and justice,
but nonetheless indicates a role for notions of care, responsibility, and
interdependency derived from notions of family. Feminists, too, have
proposed models beyond that of mothering, looking at friendship or sisterhood or other relationships of mutuality. In such models, principles
of justice, equality, and autonomy can coexist with and inform care and
responsibility, just as care and connection, for both liberals and feminists,
aid in the pursuit of justice. Dialogue between feminists and liberals can
459.

For the title of this concluding section (though not the ideas), I am indebted to Held, supra

note 20.
460.

nature).

Benhabib, supra note 94, at 84 (quoting Hobbes in discussing the metaphor of the state of
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enrich such models used by both to describe political and legal
relationships.
In exploring how to translate feminist claims about interdependency
to the legal realm, I have tried to illustrate the potential dangers of legal
reform based on an ethic of care and responsibility that does not place a
strong value on self-determination and rights. Here, too, dialogue
between liberals and feminists could enrich such efforts. Just as liberal
concepts such as autonomy and equality need not conjure up the atomistic man, so too must relational feminist thought struggle against collapsing into a distortion of itself, whereby the self is sacrificed and one's only
responsibility is to others. When the coercive power of the state is
brought to bear on certain aspirational notions about what women's
moral experience is (or should be) or how people feel (or should feel)
about each other, there may be a social cost not yet recognized in the
rhetoric of connection. Liberal conceptions of autonomy and personhood should remain a vital component in attempts to realize a vision
of interdependency and care.

